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Abstract
How did a country birthed in individual liberty and voluntary associations create just the
opposite in its inflexible, layered, government-controlled public education system? Here, using
public choice theory, I explain how near-sighted and unrelated reforms, often based in private
motives, gave us what I call the public education centropoly – a hybrid government organization
consisting of a set of monopolies layered beneath two additional government levels that
especially fails disadvantaged students.
After defending the use of public choice theory (Chapter 1) and summarizing the U.S.
public education system formation (Chapter 2), in Chapter 3 I examine the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and subsequent reauthorizations, showing how
external reforms intended to correct the system’s educational failure of its disadvantaged
students did little more than to expand and cement the centropoly. Chapter 3 contains a panel
data, fixed effects empirical analysis of the associations between ESEA (and its various
amendments) and staffing increases at the state and local (school district) levels between 1965
and 2004. I find that, of 13 amendment sets analyzed, 8 are associated with large and highly
statistically significant staffing increases relative to staffing levels in 1965 when ESEA was
originally adopted. I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of ESEA Title I effectiveness
literature and analysis, illustrating that any improvements gained might be outweighed by the
problems the ESEA reforms generated – including the staffing increases, which have helped to
increase the educational bureaucracy.
Although previous research examines reasons why charter school presence differs across
states, very little research analyzes the relationship of this difference to the power of the
traditional public schools (TPSs) directly rather than indirectly as through union or partisan

strength. In Chapter 5, I hypothesize that the American TPS system itself is a predictor of
opposition to charter schools. Relying largely on public choice theory, I first explain the
incentives, power, and rigidity behind the TPS institutional network. I then apply this
explanation to my hypothesis by employing a TPS power proxy –TPS staff size relative to adult
(voting) population – as my variable of interest. Upon this foundation, I control for most
characteristics shown in prior research to be associated with proportional charter school
enrollment thereby deepening the understanding of how the TPS system works to prevent
alternative learning opportunities for students who cannot afford to leave the TPS system. While
noting certain caveats, I find a strong inverse association, providing evidence that the TPS
institutional network defends itself against competition in Right-to-Work states.
In some states, charters must meet inflexible, standardized performance standards to
survive. Again through the lens of public choice theory, in Chapter 6 we hypothesize that
charters that were established by African Americans and those which serve more African
American students are more likely to close, and that state-imposed standardized closure rules
exacerbate these inequities. Analysis confirms our hypotheses: The percentage of African
American students and having an African American founder were associated with charter school
closure. Moreover, automatic standardized closure criteria disparately amplifies the effects.
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Introduction
America’s pragmatically idealistic inception contrasts sharply with the formation of the
U.S. public school system. While the two began in tandem, public education deviated and
devolved into a set of monopolies, centralized first by states and later by the federal government
into a massive bureaucratic structure which reflects progressive ideology of how government and
the private sector should work. I call this monopolistic, layered bureaucratic creation the
educational centropoly. The American public school system is frequently referred to as the
traditional public school (or TPS) system, but I coined the term centropoly because it more aptly
represents the entirely new government type that has combined three governmental levels,
including monopolies, into one multi-level structure.1 The base of the educational centropoly is a
set of government monopolies, which hold captive their constituents by virtue of where they live,
affecting especially those who have no means to change residences. Though not the sole
transgressor, this foundation becomes important to my thesis, in which I focus on disadvantaged
students. The next two levels of the centropoly are, in order of their addition to the multi-layered
structure, the state and the federal government; both levels caused a greater degree of
bureaucratization as well as resulting in a centralized structure. Importantly, parts of the
centropoly then leverage all or part of the new structure to defend against any encroachment into
the system. Each of these government levels relies on the others as needed to maintain its power.
Here I argue that, once created, the educational centropoly has been simultaneously a growing

1

Arguably, America’s health care system involves another multi-layer government structure that has resulted in
bureaucracy and centralization as well as the ability of one layer to defend itself with the help of the others.
However, users are not limited to use of specific facilities based on their residence (other than statewide), as is true
in the public education system. See, e.g., a description of within-state limitation of Medicaid use at
https://www.healthinsurance.org/faqs/can-i-use-my-medicaid-coverage-in-any-state/ .
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government establishment, a stagnant education provider, and a stalwart defender of turf. I
provide evidence for all three arguments.
The following illustration represents the structure of my dissertation. In Chapter 1, I
discuss the theory behind public organizations as reflected in the public school system. Here I
present public choice theory as the foundation of my dissertation. I then juxtapose that theory
against views of other thought leaders on bureaucracy, providing evidence that public choice
theory appears to be not only correct, but also the most complete conceptualization of the
American public education system.
I divide the remainder of the dissertation into two parts and five chapters, three of which
are empirical in content. I examine aspects of the centropoly in Part One and of charter schools,
and their relationships to the centropoly, in Part Two.
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Chapter 1
Theoretical Framework

Part Two:
Charter Schools in the
Shadow of the Centropoly

Part One:
The Educational Centropoly

Chapter 4
Charter History – How Charters
Grew from both the Centropoly and
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Disadvantaged Student

Conclusion:
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Cage?

Figure 1. Structure of Bradley-Dorsey Dissertation

I present a two-part examination of the educational centropoly in Part One (Chapters 2
and 3). In Chapter 2, I add to the literature by tracing, in a single document, the larger early
education reform movements that shifted American public schooling from its individual
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community beginnings to the layered structure it has become. In Chapter 3, I specifically
examine twentieth-century reforms adopted under the most significant federal education act, the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), which was intended to correct one of
the system’s most significant shortcomings by improving the educational outcomes of students
disadvantaged due to low income. I provide evidence that these attempts to improve the
education of low-income students have failed largely because of two phenomena: first, the
system itself resists reform; and second, the ESEA reforms themselves have advanced and
strengthened the public educational centropoly making it even better able to resist reforms. Here
I empirically test the association between ESEA and its several amendments, including the seven
reauthorizations, and the centropoly’s power as evidenced in the relative state- and local-level
staff counts. I use a panel data, fixed effects longitudinal regression model to test my hypothesis
that ESEA and its amendments are associated with a sustained growth in relative state and local
full time-equivalent (FTE) public school staff. I find that there are positive, statistically
significant associations between FTE increases and eight of thirteen ESEA law changes, relative
to the original (1965) Act. None of the five remaining law changes analyzed was associated with
a statistically significant FTE change, and only two of those five (nonsignificant) associations
were negative. I also find a negative, statistically significant association between poverty and
FTE in the first analysis even given my independent variables of interest: ESEA amendment sets,
the majority of the funding of which was based upon census counts of children in poverty. This
finding needs further examination, as it might be concerning.
In Part Two I turn to charter schools, one significant attempt to exit the educational
centropoly. Chapter 4 provides a brief but comprehensive overview of charter school history,
showing that their inception is rooted in both the traditional public school system and the school
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choice movement. Here I also provide limited discussion of several theories of legislative
decision-making. Chapter 5 addresses a direct, inverse relationship between the strength of the
centropoly and strength of the charter school movement in states – providing additional, but
differently focused, evidence of the traditional public school system’s power to resist reform. I
again use a panel data, fixed effects longitudinal regression model to test my hypothesis that a
state’s charter school enrollment is inversely associated with the state’s relative public school
staff count. I find that this association is strong and statistically significant in states with Right to
Work laws, where the states (not the unions) control whether an employee must be a union
member to get or keep a job. The implication of this finding is that, in states without a strong
formal union influence, the centropoly protects itself from reform involving students’ exit to
charter schools.
At this juncture it is important to discuss the concept of reform as it intersects with
American public education. One must consider not only the focus, but also the source of any
reform effort. This consideration intersects with public choice theory, which describes how, as
government bureaucracies grow, policymakers respond by imposing reforms. Faced with these
externally-sourced reforms the bureaucracy defends itself by “circling the wagons” – i.e.,
creating and using defensive measures to protect their organization, which frequently also result
in greater bureaucratic strength and inflexibility (Downs, 1967).
Both Chapters 3 and 5 address externally-sourced reforms. A higher government level
conceived of and imposed ESEA onto a school system heretofore almost completely consisting
of only the state and school districts. ESEA’s focus was to improve education for one student
group in the extant district school system: students disadvantaged by poverty. The charter
schools reform effort was simultaneously a national and state-level movement consisting of
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reformers desiring to reset public education in the form of independent schools devoid of the
centropoly’s monopolistic and bureaucratic pitfalls; its focus, then, was to create a new type of
public school outside the centropoly. As I detail in Chapters 3 and 5, the centropoly has resisted
both of these externally-sourced efforts regardless of their focus.
In Chapter 6, I consider a more direct intersection of the centropoly’s political influence
on charter schools. Charter schools presented an opportunity for internally-sourced reforms, in
that charter schools are created to be independent and therefore more accountable for their own
success or failure. However, as shown in this chapter, externally-sourced reform measures
frequently make their way into charter school laws; as such, they represent a reform the primary
purpose of which is to protect the centropoly instead of improving the independent charter
school. This, too, reflects public choice theory: the centropoly circles its wagons – this time
widely, to prevent an external interloper’s success. Here I argue that charter school
accountability has been adulterated by the same turf-protective politics that have weakened many
states’ charter school laws, as I explain in Chapter 5. I argue further that these politics also have
succeeded in restricting charter schools in ways that have, once again, negatively affected
disadvantaged students, this time by virtue of race.
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PART ONE:The Educational Centropoly
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Examination: The Irony and Power of the Centropoly
Introduction
Examining theory behind the centropoly’s behavior involves looking at political,
economic, sociological, and psychological factors, all as they play out in bureaucracies. Under
mainline economics theory,2 the first three of these – politics, economics, and sociology – would
fall under the category of political economy. I base my analysis in public choice theory, which
operates within the overarching mainline economics theory and therefore is part of the realm of a
particular branch of political economy. Public choice theory contemplates choices inside formal
(e.g., public) institutions. The theory can be explained using three relatively simple concepts:
individual incentives are similar inside and outside institutions, knowledge decreases as
organizations grow, and organizational individuals seek increased resources as the natural
outcome (Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, & Storr, 2016; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962, 1999; Tullock,
1965, 2005; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971, 2007). Mises (1949, 1998, 13) aptly summarized the
force that underscores all economic theory, including public choice, when he wrote, “Action is a

2

Mainline economics theory distinguishes itself from mainstream economics, the latter of which changes over time
and frequently has emphasized the role of government over the marketplace. As Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr
(2016, 4) state, mainline economics is based upon several positive premises about social order. These propositions
include three on “the nature of human action and the role of institutions….” First, human benevolence has its limits,
in part resulting in knowledge limits in navigating the social world. In other words, “human beings can be
imperfectly benevolent…. [and we] are more likely to succeed … by relying on their self-love than by relying on
their kindness” (Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr, 2016, 5). Second, because of these limits, both formal and
informal institutions influence activity. Third, and key to mainline economics, “social cooperation is possible
without central direction.” The editors conclude, “Stated another way, by relying on the emergent and humandevised rules of conduct, agents possessing both the capacities and the failings of the typical human being can
nonetheless work together to achieve their individual and collective goals (Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr, 2016,
4) (Emphasis added).”
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real thing. What counts is a man’s total behavior, and not his talk about planned but not realized
acts.”
Public choice theory is based upon the concept of rational self-interest. I begin my
theoretical analysis by discussing several views of the concept of rationality.
As the educational centropoly necessarily involves bureaucracy, I must examine it in the
context of bureaucratic theory. It is intimidating to embark upon bureaucratic theory in any
research work, as volumes have been written on the subject. Indeed, summarizing even one of
bureaucracy’s primary scholars is a daunting task. Here I do not pretend to provide an extensive
theoretical analysis of bureaucracy. I intend instead to provide theoretical evidence to support my
theory of choice, public choice theory (no redundancy intended), and contrast it briefly against
the work of two scholars whose views appear to differ.
In summarizing and discussing public choice theory as it relates to bureaucracy, I cite the
works of several authors including those I have discussed previously. Here I explain the primary
concepts of public choice – regarding knowledge, public versus private intentions, and the
behavior of bureaucrats in the final analysis: budget and power maximization. Later, in Chapters
2 and 4, I show how public choice fits theoretically – first with the concept and behavior of the
centropoly and then as an external force against charter schools.
I contrast public choice theory against works of Max Weber and James Q. Wilson. Again,
my analysis will not delve deeply into either scholar’s work, nor will it carefully dissect all
relevant features of their scholarly works on the subject. Here I examine pertinent aspects of each
scholar’s works, including secondary analyses of their works, to compare selected aspects with
public choice theory.
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Prelude: On Being Rational
People who argue that men are not rational are, in a sense, contradicting
themselves. If men are not rational, there is no point, or possibility, of argument
or discussion (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 30)
Thus begins public choice theorist Gordon Tullock’s discussion of humans’ rational
behavior in bureaucracies. Tullock proceeds with detail regarding how human rationality
manifests itself, ultimately concluding that those who work in bureaucracies are “among the
most rational of men” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 30). Even if humans are not consistently rational –
i.e., if some humans are and some are not, or if some humans are more rational than others – then
“[t]he people who rise in any merit-type hierarchy will be, at least, among the most rational of
men” (Tullock, 1965, 1992). However, Tullock argues that people regardless of their culture are
rational because “they aim at different objectives and base their operations on different
‘information’ about the real world” (Tullock, 1965, 1992).
Tullock asserts that many conclude humans are basically irrational in their behavior
because they “[use] the term [i.e., rationality] in a wider sense than … intended here” (Tullock,
1965, 1992). Tullock divides the motives behind all human actions into “two categories:
instrumental and ultimate” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 30-31). Eating a particular food because one
likes the taste is based on an ultimate focus, while a person who does a particular job does so, at
least in part, for the instrumental, or ulterior, motive of earning money. He then concludes,
“Actions motivated by instrumental considerations are, almost by definition, rational” (Tullock,
1965, 1992, 31).
Frequently, Tullock argues, human motivations are complicated because “[a]lmost all
human beings have extremely complex aspirations, and any action is thought of as a method of
reaching numerous ultimate ends” (Tullock, 1965, 1992). Attempts to explain such behavior are
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often oversimplified, and this oversimplification leads to the conclusion that a person’s actions
“may seem inappropriate to his stated ends” (Tullock, 1965, 1992).
Tullock then addresses the concept of human error as it relates to rationality. Human
error is ubiquitous, so a bureaucracy’s merit system generally will “select for intelligence” by
allowing those who make the fewest mistakes to rise in the organizational structure. However,
error still occurs, and public choice theory takes this into account. While, generally, economists
have ignored error because in economic situations, errors cancel each other out, Tullock
maintains that “in the typical organizational hierarchy, errors tend to compound each other”
(Tullock, 1965, 1992, 32).
In summary, Tullock views rationality as (1) a ubiquitous human characteristic, which is
based on (2) actions divided into two categories of choices – ultimate (based on subjective
assessment) and instrumental (based on means-end assessment); and is (3) subjected to a
compounding of error in hierarchical organizations. Combined with the attribute self-interest,
this combined characteristic – rational self-interest – is the basis on which public choice theory is
founded.
But theorists from different fields of study define rationality in different ways. Agreeing
upon a definition is essential to understanding any theory behind actions in a bureaucracy,
certainly including public choice theory. Here I examine meanings of rationality as used in
economics, sociology and politics, and psychology. I then attempt to show that rationality as
applied in public choice theory does not conflict with definitions from other fields of study – if
certain ground rules are accepted.
In all cases here, I ultimately compare among theories based on reasons for individuals’
actions, not their thinking. This is the primary assumption which, I argue, separates agreement
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from disagreement between these theorists’ definitions of rationality. Second, I focus on
individuals’ actions within public organizations such as the public school system. I point out
theoretical arguments that are not focused specifically within public organizations.
Economics
Since economics is a social science, it concerns itself with how individuals organize to
meet needs and further enhance their existence (Goodwin, et al., 2019, 145). The classical
economic view of rationality dates at least to Adam Smith’s conception of the invisible hand,
which he explained in his famous book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, first published in 1776. In Smith’s conception, individuals would act self-interestedly
through markets, and their self-interested actions would promote the welfare of the group.
Importantly, as detailed in Goodwin et al. (2019, 145), many have ignored Smith’s prior book,
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (first published 1759), in which he made it clear that selfinterest is not the only human inclination influencing both individual actions and the general
welfare. Rather, he explains, actions are motivated by “moral sentiments”, or the “universal
desire” for self- and other-respect, in addition to “the fortunate accident by which … selfish acts
can [often, though not always] ‘promote the public interest’” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 145). This
addition to Smith’s theory – and conversely, its oversight by others – becomes important later in
my analysis.
The neoclassical view of economics, which appeared in the twentieth century, simplified
the classical by limiting the number of economic actors to two – the firm and the household –
and further assuming that each of these actors maximizes utility in the form of profits (for firms)
or satisfaction (for households). Economists espousing this model claimed that all in economic
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theory could be deduced from this assumption, termed the rationality axiom (Goodwin et al.,
2019, 146).
In recent decades behavioral economists have challenged the neoclassical view by
rejecting behavior-related assumptions in favor of actually testing behavior. Two important
findings have resulted from behavioral economics; ironically, psychologist Daniel Kahneman
discovered both. Kahneman uncovered a phenomenon he termed the “availability heuristic”, i.e.,
that individuals generally give more weight than is deserved to information that is “easily
available or vivid” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 148). Kahneman also showed the effect “framing” has
on individuals’ decisions, i.e., “the way a decision is presented to people can significantly
influence their choices” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 148).
Economists have also analyzed time’s role in individuals’ decision-making: individuals
place different weights on gains amassed immediately versus costs amassed later for given
decisions. Behavioral economists have changed the view of emotions’ role in decision-making.
Instead of emotions having a straightforward and negative influence on decision-making in all
cases, “studies suggest that reasoning is most effective when used for making relatively simple
economic decisions, but for more complex decisions we can become overwhelmed by too much
information” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 150).
To summarize economics’ various general contributions to the definition of rationality,
one might conclude it is not as simple as many others have opined. Even as far back as Smith
(1759, 1776), economists have acknowledged behavioral nuances. This background combines
with Tullock’s specificity regarding rationality in organizations to form a more detailed theory
on which to base public choice than many acknowledge. Turning now to sociology and political
science, I show that, where the theories differ from that underpinning public choice, at least one
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of two processes is at work: either the theory is based primarily on human thought as opposed to
action, or the theory assumes a literal translation of public choice arguments as with those who
addressed only one aspect of Adam Smith’s nuanced theory regarding human action.
Sociology and Politics
Max Weber is likely the most well-known sociologist historically, although he also
analyzed human thought and behavior based on politics. According to Kalberg (1980), Weber’s
primary contribution was his development of rationality theory. Indeed, Kalberg (1980) analyzes
Weber’s “major comparative-historical-sociological works….” (published after 1904) consisting,
in part, of his analyses of the religions of China and India as well as ancient Judaism, and
Weber’s well-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Kalberg, 1980, 1147).
As Kalberg (1980, 1148) notes, Weber developed a typology of social action consisting of four
action types – “affectual, traditional, value-rational, and means-end rational” which, Weber
claimed, applied to all humans. Among these, Weber argued that “even everyday actions of
‘primitive’ man could be subjectively means-end rational” because they constituted “pure
exchange” relationships. Weber moved beyond analysis of human action when he developed
four different types of rationality, as Kalberg illustrates in Table 1 (from Kalberg, 1980, 1161;
adapted with permission).
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Table 1
Weber’s “Conscious Mastery of Fragmented Realities through Regularities of Action” as
Explained and Defined in Kalberg (1980)
Type of
Rationality

Definition

Mental
Processes

Relation
to Action

Theoretical

“…[A] conscious mastery of
reality through the
construction of increasingly
precise abstract concepts
rather than through action”
(Id., 1152)
“…[E]very way of life that
views and judges worldly
activity in relation to the
individual’s purely pragmatic
and egoistic interests….” (Id.,
1151)
“… [R]elates to spheres of life
and a structure of domination
that acquired specific and
delineated boundaries only
with industrialization; most
significantly, the economic,
legal, and scientific spheres,
and the bureaucratic form of
domination (Id., 1158)
(Emphasis added)
“[D]irectly orders action into
patterns…. in relation to a
past, present, or potential
‘value postulate’ (Id., 1155)

Various
abstract
processes

Indirect

Means-end
calculation

Direct

Interests

Means-end
calculation

Direct

Rules, laws,
regulations

Practical

Formal

Substantive

Subordination Direct
of realities to
values

Reference for
Mental
Processes
Values or purely
theoretical
problems

Values

As shown in the above table, Weber conceived of rationality in multiple ways, but he
conceived of bureaucracies as belonging in a single (the formal) rationality type. Weber
theorized that formal rationality maintains a direct relationship to action and involves means-end
calculations. Hence, it appears, Weber theorized that rational action differs based on who is
doing the acting – and bureaucrats, it seems, act based on a definition of rationality that is like
that maintained by public choice theory since it is a means-end calculation.
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Zafirovski (2005) similarly concludes that, as classical sociological theory “clearly
differentiates between economic and non-economic forms of rationality…., [the distinction is
related to] Weber’s differentiation between instrumental rationality … and value rationality…
[which in turn] corresponds to Weber’s alternative typology of rationality into formal and
substantive” (Zafirovski, 2005, 105). Importantly, the author then concludes that, in classical
sociological theory, “phenomena ‘treated as constants in economic analysis are very often
compatible with significant structural variations-from a sociological point of view’ [Weber,
1968, 341]” (Zafirovski, 2005, 106) (Emphasis added).
Simon (1995, 48) plainly disagrees with public choice theory. He notes,
The economist’s definition of rationality … imposes a crushing weight of
knowledge acquisition, computation, and global consistency on the decisionmaker at the same time that it allows him or her nearly complete freedom in the
selection of the goals of action. The former property of the theory might appear to
provide it with strong predictive power: given the actor’s goals as defined by a
utility function, and the (known) alternative actions, and the known (at least up to
a probability distribution) connections between action and utility, only one action,
in general, can be rational. The actor’s freedom to define the utility function
destroys almost all of the predictive power so arduously obtained, because what
action is rational will depend critically on what goals are assumed to have utility,
and this is not specified by the theory. (Simon, 1995, 48-9)
Is it possible that Simon (1995) assumes a literal translation of public choice theoretical
explanations of action? I argue that Simon (1995) derives his conclusions from a high-level (i.e.,
non-detailed) vantage point. As such, it appears Simon ignores, first, the various contributions of
economic theory in general (such as behavioral heuristics) and, second, the nuances
contemplated in public choice theory (Tullock, 1965, 1992) regarding, e.g., the distinctions
between the two action categories. As with the often-ignored first book by Adam Smith (1759),
many who criticize public choice theory assume too little nuance and too much rigidity. I turn to
the field of psychology for potential answers to this question since psychology provides
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additional valuable explanation of rational human behavior by examining the details surrounding
it.
Psychology
As Sunstein (2020) and Clore (2011) summarize, the field of psychology has contributed
in multiple ways to studies on rationality. Sunstein (2020) summarizes the contributions of much
of behavioral science as “departures from standard accounts of rationality” (Sunstein, 2020, 38).
Both Sunstein (2020) and Clore (2011) amplify this characterization through the use of research
examples. For example, an individual differences study by Block & Funder (1986) found that
judgment heuristics allow people to fare better in everyday life. “Engaging in heuristic thinking,
although it occasionally leads to error, tends to be adaptive, rather than undesirable…. Indeed, if
we routinely thought in a systematic, conscious, controlled fashion, humans would never have
survived as long as we have. Thinking and acting appear to be guided, much more than is
generally realized, by the requirements of resource management [Proffitt, 2006]” (Clore, 2011,
3). In other words, individuals who do not take the time to consider every choice in detail are
generally more successful in terms of life satisfaction. While this is not intended to be considered
normatively, the research indicates that many employ heuristics in their decision-making
processes, thereby “getting on with life,” and herein might lie the connection to public choice.
Psychological studies also have found that emotion sometimes precedes, and sometimes
follows, behavior. Clore (2011) details anticipation of various emotional states and the effect of
this anticipation on action. Anticipation of negative emotion frequently leads one to modify
one’s behavior. Most individuals would anticipate negative emotion in the cases of supervisors
reprimanding, isolating, or otherwise casting them aside; many of these employees would
anticipate supervisory rejection if the employee disagreed with their supervisor. Accordingly, an
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individual in an organization could make the expedient decision to avoid unpleasantness by
making choices to further his/her own advancement. “Good decision-makers are people who are
both emotionally and intellectually intelligent in that they are attuned to the affective reactions
that foreshadow productive and unproductive lines of thought and action” (Clore, 2011, 5).
Psychological research also produced the finding that, while cognition regulates emotion,
emotion also regulates cognition. In a study of how emotions are related to cognition at a global
versus a detailed level, Gasper & Clore (2002) conclude that “… feelings in any given moment
direct our mental processes, so that in happy states, people more readily adopt a global focus,
whereas in negative states (e.g., sadness) they more readily focus on details….” (Clore, 2011, 8).
For example, while management quality is not the subject of this paper, it is highly possible that
management (leadership) in bureaucracies suffers in quality. Relatedly, Worthy (1950, 173)
studies employee morale in organizations of various structures and finds:
… [T]he smaller the unit the higher the morale, and vice versa. It is clear that the
closer contact between executives and rank and file prevailing in smaller
organizations tends to result in friendlier, easier relationships….
In broader terms, the smaller organization represents a simpler social system than
does the larger unit. There are fewer people, fewer levels in the organizational
hierarchy, and a less minute division of labor….
Therefore, since “emotion often motivates thought….” (Clore, 2011, 8), and thought frequently
leads to action, responses based on emotion can also be seen as a basis for rational action.
In summary, I question whether there might be more similarities than differences
between the various theories of rationality. Whereas some view economic theory as truncating
thought processes leading to actions, a more detailed examination shows such is not necessarily,
or at least not always, the case. On the other hand, other social sciences generally delve more
deeply into the thought processes that precede actions – heuristics represent a prime example –
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yet actions still result and likely are not so different from what public choice theorists describe in
the public organizational setting.
Public Choice: Identical Motivations Leading to Collation of Individual Preferences
In contrast with the presumption that people participating in the political arena
benevolently “rise above their own parochial concerns” to “promote the common good”, the
public choice model “simply transfers the rational actor model of economic theory to … politics”
(Shughart, n.d.). Public choice differs from most analyses of bureaucracies in two important
ways. First, in public choice theory the individual, and not a group (such as the office or
institution) is the analytical focus. Says Shughart, “Groups do not make choices; only individuals
do. The problem then becomes how to model the ways in which the diverse and often conflicting
preferences of self-interested individuals get expressed and collated when decisions are made
collectively” (Shughart, n.d.) (Emphasis added). Second, differences between individuals and
organizations occur, not because of motivational differences, “but because of stark differences in
the incentives and constraints that channel the pursuit of self-interest in the two settings”
(Shughart, n.d.) (Emphasis added).
In other words, individuals enter the organizational “black box, and what emerges is the
combined and perhaps layered effect of individual decisions which have been subjected to
organizationally-created or -modified incentives and constraints. At each individual decisionpoint step along the process in the institutional black box, the individual weighs his/her
preferences considering what (s)he observes to be the preferences and limitations of the
organization’s other participants, presumably considered in hierarchical order. While some
individuals choose consciously to obey, and while some are doubtless more adept at navigating
this organizational process, even those who choose benignly to defer to other individuals’
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influences are doing so based upon a private calculation that deferring is their best option in the
circumstances.3
In summary, actors inside organizations have the same human motivations as any
individual acting outside an organization. However, as an organization grows, any organizational
individual becomes further insulated (removed) from the knowledge needed to accomplish the
goal(s) sought. This and interactive issues, stemming from incentives operating inside the
organization and often relating to power within the organization, result in actions directed toward
benefitting organizational insiders and not the organizations’ constituents.
Lavoie (1985) describes the “knowledge problem” by making the distinction between
gathering data and gathering knowledge in the setting of a planning bureau.
While a planning bureau can gather data, it cannot gather the knowledge
needed for rational planning. Such knowledge is dispersed among market
participants. It is embedded in their various skills and specialties, and it is
generated by their competitive contention with one another. Yet without such
knowledge the planning bureau would be unable to justify intervening in
ignorance into the workings of the market process (Lavoie, 1985, 6).
Importantly, then, data points are a poor substitute for the knowledge “on the ground” –
i.e., all the various considerations that market participants know, learn, and convey in the market
itself. Lavoie’s (1985) focus on economic planning could instead address any public
organization, including the educational centropoly. In the briefest of statements, Lavoie (1985, 3)
provides the key to understanding what I argue could be termed desire based on ignorance of
those espousing planning as central to control of an economy or any part of it, including its
educational component. The author comments, “All advocates of planning [as opposed to
advocating reliance on the market economy] seem desperately to want comprehensiveness and

3

Neal Peart, lyricist and percussionist of the Canadian progressive rock group Rush, in his Ayn Rand scholarly
phase penned this concept in “Freewill”: “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”
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rely profoundly upon its rhetorical appeal.” The problem, he states, relies in the assumption
behind the superiority of planning: “The critique of the market economy upon which planners
base their argument presupposes that it is actually possible to scientifically control the causal
development of a modern … economy” (Emphasis added). Public choice fits here by showing
why such “science” cannot be actualized. Science relies on knowledge and knowledge is absent,
to a large extent, from the very group espousing its employment. Additionally, the limited
knowledge an organization possesses is manipulated, even if inadvertently, due to the playout
(collation) of incentives functioning inside the organization.
Public Choice and Bureaucracy
Public choice theorist Anthony Downs (1967) identifies bureaus as a subset of
organizations, which must exhibit all of four characteristics: (1) they are large – a term that
could expand, at least in relation to the public school system, to include the effect of layering
government levels;4 (2) most of a bureau’s members are full-time employees who depend on
their employment in the organization for most of their income; (3) hiring, promotion and
retention are at least partly based on achievement-related characteristics that can be judged by
performance assessment, as opposed to ascribed characteristics (religion, race, class,
connections) or election to office; and (4) their output is not subject to external market
evaluation (Downs, 1967, 25) (Emphasis added). Downs (1967, 144-166) then describes how
increasing bureaucracy defends and expands itself, and then rigidifies.

4

Of course, not all U.S. school districts are large; indeed, many are small organizations. However, as will be
explained later, the layered bureaucracy resulting from state and federal involvement changes the structure to some
extent, effectively making even small districts operate as larger entities. State and federal involvement result in
decreased information flow and flexibility of even the small districts.
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A central tenet of public choice theory is that knowledge suffers as distance increases
between decision-makers and those who provide input. Tullock (1965, 1992, 148-152) describes
this phenomenon in bureaucracies by employing an analogy to an American army experiment
used as a teaching device, wherein trainees stood in a large circle outside hearing distance of
each other. An officer would pass a message orally to one soldier, who then ran to the next
soldier in the circle to deliver the same message orally, and so on until all soldiers had received
the message. When the last soldier repeated the message, normally it no longer resembled the
original. Tullock (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 148) ascribed this not to a defect inherent in using oral
over written transmission, but instead to distortions arising “in the brains of each man”. He then
elaborates regarding bureaucracies, explaining bureaucrats are not “mere postmen” but are
interpreters as well (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 150). As bureaucracies have multiple hierarchical
levels, so the possibility of multiple (mis)interpretations increases.
William Niskanen (1971) furthered public choice theory by explaining that public
bureaucracy employees maximize utility through rational decisions regarding survival and
personal growth. Alternatively stated, officials, acting rationally, seek strategies to maximize
their budgets. Regarding incentives, Downs (1967, 82) states, “Utility maximization … means
the rational pursuit of one’s goals…. In order to predict what officials will do, we must know
their goals.” Downs (1967, 82) juxtaposes social functions – the overt, publicly stated goals of an
organization – against individual officials’ private motives. Private motives include increased
power among organizational leaders, job retention and pay increases for employees, and others.
Here we come full circle to the first concept, that of humans operating with the same motives
inside and outside institutions.
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According to Blais & Dion (1990, 657), “The Niskanen model predicts that the
bureaucrat’s personal utility is a function of the budget and that bureaucrats attempt to maximize
their budgets.” Specific considerations include salary, benefits and other perquisites, power and
reputation, all which Niskanen theorizes constitute “a positive monotonic function of the total
budget” (Blais & Dion, 1990, 656). Public bureaucracy officials, according to Niskanen, also
maximize their budgets for survival purposes (Blais & Dion, 1990).
Because humans populate institutions, organizational behavior is fundamentally human
behavior. However, the layering of institutional control over humans produces layered responses
with the deepest layers – and their motives – cloaked to some extent. Assuming, as with the
public choice model, that “every official acts at least partly in his own self-interest” (Downs,
1967, 83), one must take private motives into account when examining the actions of a bureau,
and particularly a layered one. Downs (1967, 83) cites Calhoun (1953, 5): “‘Each [individual]…
has greater regard for his own safety or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others, and,
where these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own.’”
Hearkening again to the words of Mises (1949, 1998, 13), it is a person’s actions that ultimately
count.
How does public choice theory compare with the scholarly works of Max Weber and
James Q. Wilson? Here, I use secondary sources to analyze Weber’s sociological and political
works, and James Q. Wilson’s assessment of bureaucracy and related theory.
Max Weber: Different Interpretations Leading to Confusion, and Perhaps Conclusion
Max Weber proposes the concept of Bureaucracy in a context in which he
considers the rationalization of society as inevitable …, causing a growing
impersonality in the social relationship…. Rationalisation boosted the project of
modernity by enabling the application of the general principles of reason to the
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conduct of human problems, fostering the ability to respond to unstable
environments and to manage the inherent complexity….
(Serpa & Ferreira, 2019, 12) (Internal references omitted)
In the above statement, Serpa & Ferreira (2019) summarize several scholars’ analyses of
the Weberian sociology of bureaucracies. Rowley, in his 2005 introduction to the work of
Tullock (1965, 1992) regarding bureaucracies, agrees generally with this assessment. Public
choice theory exists in sharp contrast, he says, to interpretations of Weber’s assessment that
bureaucracies had become dominant because of their “efficiency in performing complex
organizational tasks” and because a new middle class had emerged whose position depended on
“... its possession of technical and organizational skills and … its authority position within the
bureaucratic hierarchy” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xi). Further, according to Rowley, Weber
characterized members of a bureaucracy as “selflessly [serving] the goals of their superiors,”
even in the public sector (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xi.).
However, this interpretation does not consider the distinction between Weber’s
sociological work and his political writings. Whereas his sociological analyses focus on the
structure of bureaucratic organizations and of the intended purpose(s) of bureaucracies, Weber’s
political analyses ponder the political context and, hence, unintended consequences of the
bureaucratic structure.
Automatons vs. Autonomy
Serpa and Ferreira (2019, 14) draw on several scholarly works to interpret Weber’s
analysis of bureaucracies as consisting of “disinterested” individuals consenting to organizational
objectives by agreeing, via employment, to be a cog in the bureaucratic wheel.
For Weber, impersonality and formality, ensured by bureaucratic rationalisation,
guarantee that organisational objectives are not confused with personal
motivations or other interests (Godoi et al., 2017). Impersonality and formality
allow dealing with situations and not exactly with people, treating all in the same
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formal way (Cruz, 1995). Furthermore, it would increase predictability in the
functioning of any organisation (Ferreira, 2004; Filleau & Marques-Ripoull,
2002) (Emphasis added).
In other words, according to several analyses Weber points to the need for “rational action” to
control uncertainty. Under this perspective Weber then characterizes individual bureaucrats as
automaton-like beings disinterested to the point they would work in unquestioning obedience to
this “rational” hierarchical authority, regardless of personal consequences.
Others disagree, however. Cuff (1978) compares Weber’s sociological and political
analyses of bureaucracy. Citing Beetham’s (1974) Max Weber and the Theory of Modern
Politics, Cuff distinguishes between “Beetham’s Weber” (Cuff, 1978, 241) and the “Weberian
model of bureaucratic administration” (Cuff, 1978, 240). Whereas, Cuff says, Weber’s
sociological writings delineate a leadership and staffing structure allowing for improved
efficiency in organizations, in his political writings he registers concern for the potential loss of
political control by elected leaders, which, he maintains, is the proper sphere for such control.
Says Cuff (1978, 241):
Weber’s purpose … was to emphasize not what bureaucracy could do, but what it
would not and should not do. As a political commentator Weber stressed the need
to subordinate bureaucracy to strong political control. Strong leadership was
required, he argued, to restrain the bureaucracy’s inexorable quest for
autonomous power and to reduce its collusion with powerful economic interests
(Emphasis added).
Reprise: Public Choice Response to Weber
To the extent Rowley (Tullock, 1965, 1992) refers to Weber’s sociological analyses, he
maintains that Tullock’s public choice analysis constitutes a “direct rational choice attack” on
Weber’s perspective (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xii). Rowley states that Tullock maintained a
different view of rational action, and that Tullock based his “attack” partly on the analysis that
resulted in Parkinson’s Law, i.e., “‘Work expands … to fill the time available for its
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completion’” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xii). In 1957, C. Northcote Parkinson challenged Weber’s
analysis by conducting two empirical studies – of the British Navy in 1914 and of the British
Colonial Office in 1954 – each of which found that staffs grew even as the need for them shrank
(Tullock, 1965, 1992, xii-xiii). Presumably, under the Weberian sociological interpretation, if
bureaucrats were so “selfless,” they would voluntarily exit their posts when no longer needed.
Yet, Parkinson found the opposite occurred in these two situations. I question, however, whether
this analysis includes only that covered in Weber’s sociological works. As noted previously by
Cuff (1978), Weber also recognized the dangers of bureaucracies, which he described as poweramassing behaviors and which therefore, if only in a general sense, comport with public choice
theory.
James Q. Wilson: Theory by Exception?
Wilson addressed bureaucracy more from a historical than a theoretical perspective. His
1975 essay titled “The Rise of the Bureaucratic State,” in which he summarizes the history of
U.S. government bureaucracy, provides context for the centropoly.5 Wilson (1975, 78) indicates
the War Department had 80 civilian employees in 1801, while the Treasury Department was the
only department to have substantial powers (e.g., collecting taxes, managing the public debt, and
running the national bank). During the entire 19th century and the early 20th century, “[t]he
number of administrative agencies and employees grew slowly but steadily … and then
increased explosively on the occasion of World War I, the Depression, and World War II”
(Wilson, 1975, 78).

5

Interestingly, the executive branch of American government became the future locus of most federal bureaucracy
when Vice President John Adams cast the tie-breaking vote to place federal executive department head removal in
the hands of the President. State government executive branch bureaucracies generally followed suit; however, not
all state public education bureaucracies extend from the executive branch. See, e.g., Kansas Constitution, Article 6,
which establishes an independent State Board of Education “which shall have general supervision of public
schools….” and which is answerable to neither the Governor nor the Legislature.
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Given this history several questions come to mind. First, did bureaucracy appear through
“explosive growth” only because of crises? Second, one might question whether an educational
bureaucracy was necessary, whether what constituted a crisis changed in scope, or whether
America simply grew accustomed to bigger governmental entities. Whichever way, perhaps it
was only a matter of time before the U.S. government created an education department.
Regarding U.S. bureaucracy Rozansky and Lerner (2012) note:
Wilson argues that those who believed in the infallibility of institutions
were almost entirely wrong and the public choice school was often right. But he is
also critical of what he sees as the movement’s methodological dogmatism, and
its resulting inability to account for the actual behavior of government agencies.
To describe what Rozanski and Lerner (2012) call “methodological dogmatism,” the
authors note that public choice theorists believe “that bureaucratic behavior is reducible to
simple games of incentive; that a bureaucracy will always have an incentive to increase its
funding, powers, and control; and that individual bureaucrats additionally are motivated by selfinterest, concerned chiefly with their careers, salary, and reputation.” To the contrary, the authors
say, Wilson instead argues bureaucracies are different based on their structure and leadership, as
opposed to their goals.
In Bureaucracy (Wilson, 1989), a book the author describes as “primarily descriptive”
(Wilson, 1989, 27), Wilson uses Carver High School in Atlanta, Georgia as an example of how
structure and leadership can dramatically change an organization. Wilson describes Carver
High’s status prior to Hogan’s appointment as principal in the terms used by Cooke (1985)
regarding all-black middle or junior high schools: “[A] disorderly all-black … school in which
the norm was to ‘leave the teachers alone and let the students fail’” (Referenced internally in
Wilson, 1989, 21). At Carver, change came in the person of Norris Hogans, who, among other
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things, operated in an “authoritative, even authoritarian style” and “stressed the importance of
education, especially vocational education (Wilson, 1989, 21).
The problem with assuming Wilson’s example somehow undermines public choice
theory is that it constitutes “theory by exception”. In other words, Wilson’s example of Carver
High’s Principal Hogan is one in which a leader with courageous convictions defied the
underlying system described by Cooke (1985) as arguably the exact result of the centropoly,
which I summarize in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. In these chapters I show that the system as
created instituted an “equal” (i.e., uniform) education in very unequal geopolitical circumstances,
hence leaving disadvantaged students in a system that could not work for them. The Carver
Highs of America might indeed change the circumstances for those students fortunate enough to
attend such schools under such courageous leadership. But what happens when that leader
leaves? Examples abound illustrating how the centropoly rushes to erase the reforms
implemented by such leaders.6
Albeit limited in scope and wanting in additional research, at this juncture I conclude that
my analysis of various other theories has not provided an alternative I would consider as superior
to public choice theory. Once one has considered actions (not thoughts or beliefs) and excluded
exceptions, it seems we return to the goals, knowledge, and budget bases of public organizations
to derive the underlying life forces of the centropoly’s strength.

6

See, e.g., Whitmire, 2011.
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Chapter 2 – The Centropoly Rises: Formation of the American Public School System7
Introduction
America’s pragmatically idealistic beginning contrasts sharply with the formation of the
U.S. public school system. While the two began in tandem, public education deviated and
devolved into a set of monopolies, centralized first by states and later by the federal government
into a massive bureaucratic structure. I call this monopolistic, layered bureaucratic creation the
centropoly.
The American founders provided fertile ground for Adam Smith’s invisible hand to
flourish through a constitution designed to limit government and allow individual liberty. The
founders’ design gave the free market – of both goods and ideas – an optimal setting. Alexis de
Tocqueville praised the resulting American civic society stating Americans maintained a correct
understanding of self-interest, which tempers individualism by recognizing the need for social
involvement via small, “free” organizations. Americans, he opined, operate under the assumption
that sacrificing oneself for one’s fellows is useful in maintaining one’s own interests through
maintenance of the government form. Herein, said Tocqueville, lies the nexus of individual
liberty and social responsibility (Tocqueville, 1840; 891, 920-923). While no human governance
system is perfect, Tocqueville concluded that the combination of the invisible-but efficient
informal information systems and the conscious development of communities populated by
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This chapter and Chapter 3 together, in large part, comprise the following forthcoming book chapter: BradleyDorsey, M. (Under Contract). “Rise of a Centropoly: Good Intentions, Distorted Incentives, and the Cloaked Costs
of Top-Down Reform in Public Education” (working title), in Candela, R.; Fike, R.; and Herzberg, R., Institutions
and Incentives in Public Policy: An Analytical Assessment of Non-Market Decision-Making (working title). Under
contract with Rowman & Littlefield International.
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responsibly acting individuals served both individuals and communities well in their quest for
betterment.8
Schooling in America began in precisely this way: a nonsystem consisting of individual,
community-organized schools. Historical twists, however, led public schooling to an alternate
universe. Instead of remaining community-based, public schooling evolved into the educational
centropoly – my term for the multi-level, monopolized, and centralized government bureaucracy
that controls American public schools. Extending from early reformers’ actions, this change
unfolded in pieces over time to eventually form the complex structure we have now. Through
external reforms that have attempted to “repair” schools, social policy interventions have caused
increasing centralization through larger and deeper formal institutions. This result has decreased
knowledge (a process explained by Tullock, 1965, 1992, 148; and Lavoie, 1985) and
strengthened bureaucratic inflexibility (Downs 1967, 144-166), and it has left numerous students
vastly underserved.
Importantly, neither bureaucratization, centralization, nor monopolization alone created
the U.S. public school system. The three combined to generate the layered and hyper-inflexible
centropoly we have today. Here I add to the historical literature by explaining the myriad
changes reformers wove together to unify what once represented diverse community interests,
monopolize schools that once operated independent of such protection, and centralize what was
once decentralized.

8

Indeed, later the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, regarding successful efforts by communities to overcome
community (“commons”) challenges absent centralized control, would reinforce Tocqueville’s impression. (See,
e.g., Cole & McGinnis (Eds.), 2015; Boettke, Lemke, & Palagashvili, 2015.). Although public education could have
benefitted from the Ostroms’ model, reformers took it in a different, and more centralized, direction.
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“Exigencies of an Earlier Era”: Formation of the U.S. School System and the Dawn of the
Centropoly
Considerable support exists for state educational oversight. Early philosophers such as
Plato and Locke defended education as fundamental to the well-being of a society. The issue in
the U.S., however, is not that American states took control of their schools, but rather, how they
did so. Importantly, American reforms led to centralized, bureaucratic, and monopolistic control.
Contrary to what public education has become, informal organizations drove early
American school efforts. Public schools began with both public and private roots as individual,
voluntary efforts in small communities before the nation’s establishment.9 In some areas private
schools were permitted to operate in community schoolhouses. In other areas, parents and others
volunteered to form and operate schools. Legislators permitted and funded still other schools via
a “rate bill”, for which only the users of the school would pay (Cubberley 1916, 4). In fact,
education in America did not begin as a system at all, let alone a centralized one. Cubberley
(1916, 3) notes that, since the U.S. Constitution does not mention “any form of education for the
people” nor was education mentioned during the debates of the Constitutional Convention,
“education became one of the many unmentioned powers ‘reserved to the States’” under the
Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
A country as large and diverse as America, however, is bound to be affected by many
forces. Among them for schools, concerns developed around diversity itself. Reformers uneasy
about the country’s growth and diversification in many aspects, including religion, culture and
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The nation’s response to the 2020 pandemic has included a return to small-group schooling (often referred to as
“pods”, micro-schools, or hybrid homeschooling). See, e.g., Watson (2020); Burke (2020; and Manning Kennedy &
Kerr 2020.
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race, industry, and population density, began to exert more control over the relatively
unconnected schools in individual communities.
These reforms were not carefully planned; instead, they occurred in piecemeal fashion
over time and through various social and cultural changes. As Hess (2010, 40) explains,
frequently defenders of the current public school system “impute … [a] high-mindedness to what
are in fact makeshift responses to the exigencies of an earlier era.” In this paper, I employ instead
a perspective of historical mindfulness to what these exigency-based reforms have actually
produced in the aggregate.
The Early Influences: Religions, Wars, and the Beginning of a Centralized Structure
Before the Revolutionary War, schools were community-centered and largely religionfocused, a logical arrangement when religious congregations were the dominant forms of social
organization. Early school organizational efforts were interwoven with religion.
For example, in 1647 Massachusetts adopted what became known as the Old Deluder
Satan Act. Known as the first compulsory education law in America,10 the Act clearly identified
its purpose as maintaining true “knowledge of the Scriptures” instead of being “clowded by false
glosses of Saint-seeming deceivers” (Old Deluder…, https://www.mass.gov). Despite its stated
religious purpose, the Act only required towns of 100 or more to provide a Latin grammar
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Although the law was indeed compulsory, Hazlett (2011, Abstract) notes it and other similar compulsory
education laws were not “strictly enforced until Horace Mann advocated schooling for all, with his Common School
Movement leading to free, public, and locally controlled elementary schools, beginning with Massachusetts in
1852.”
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school.11 12 “Old Deluder” is arguably a precursor of laws that, while requiring towns to provide
education for all children, could have allowed towns to direct education as each saw fit. 13 14
Ultimately, however, the anti-Deluder model did not prevail. Cubberley (1922, 356) 15
observes that the half century after the Revolutionary War could be seen as a transitional period
from church to state control of education. Common School leaders concerned about post-War
educational decline began to focus not only on providing similar content, but on providing that
content via a similar structure, to all children including those who otherwise could not afford an
education. 16
Beginning around 1825, new cities arose and older cities began to grow, hence
transforming the nation’s previously rural, agricultural, and pioneer character. Educational and
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Latin grammar schools, having originated in Europe, were essentially college preparatory schools. The first one in
America was the Boston Latin School, established in 1635, also known as the first public school in what would
become the U.S. (National Geographic at https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/apr23/first-public-schoolamerica/) Hess (2010, 41) notes that “Historian Gerald Gutek has observed, ‘The colonists believed in a two-track
system of schools – one for the poor and another for the wealthy.’” Latin schools, he says, were for upper class
(male) children.
12
Hazlett (2011, Abstract) notes that “[the] law's title was derived from its purpose, as teaching youth to read
allowed access to the [Protestant] Christian Bible, with their presumably subsequent faith and doctrinal adherence
producing virtuous citizens….”
13
In fact, Vermont and Maine established the first school voucher programs in the U.S. Implemented in 1869 and
1873, respectively, the states’ town tuitioning programs provide for towns without a public school to provide tuition
to send their students to a public or private, non-religious school in another location. (EdChoice, last modified
August 29, 2019, America’s School Choice Programs…)
14
Additionally, early American schools were more likely to be religiously diverse (at least in terms of Christian
denominations), given the fact immigrants to America frequently had escaped religious persecution (van
Raemdonck & Maranto n.d., 4).
15
Ellwood P. Cubberley was both an academic scholar and a (progressive) thought leader in the field of education.
Here, I use his historical writings. Some have questioned Cubberley’s historiography because of his point of view
regarding the formation of the U.S. school system. See, e.g., Cartwright, 1996.
16
The Common School movement had roots in philanthropic group efforts. Philanthropic groups began founding
schools through the Sunday School movement, providing both religious and minimal secular learning; the City
School Societies, fashioned after the English charity schools to provide a rudimentary education to the poor; the
Lancastrian (or monitorial school) movement, a system under which the more advanced students taught less
advanced students; and the Infant-School Societies, establishing schools for children between the ages of four and
eight (Cubberley, 1922, 357-363). According to Cubberley (1922, 363), “These four important educational
movements … all arising in philanthropy, came as successive educational ideas to America during the first half of
the nineteenth century, supplemented one another, and together accustomed a new generation to the idea of a
common school for all.”
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social conditions changed first for people in the Central and Northern states (Cubberley, 1922).
Southern states held their agrarian, slavery-based economic system until long after the Civil War
ended (Cubberley, 1922, 363-364). With city growth also came large-scale manufacturing
leading to the demise of small industries and of the apprenticeship system. Also, the 1810s had
initiated the suffrage movement by extending voting rights to non-property-owning males. With
the extension of voting rights, general knowledge and civic virtue grew in importance, lending
support for educational purposes beyond religion (Cubberley, 1922, 366)
The new focus on education’s importance brought changes in school structure and lesson
content. National growth fueled in large part by immigrants, different from each other and from
those who had settled earlier, helped spark Common Schoolers to work toward civic unification
through education. Religious diversity accompanied immigration, resulting in religious tension
that surfaced in the schools and school reform movements. With increased Catholic immigration
anti-Catholic Protestants, including politicians and Common Schoolers, mobilized to suppress
the spread of Catholicism in the schools (van Raemdonck & Maranto, n.d., 3; Hess, 2010, 8788).
Common Schoolers focused on much more than just religious instruction. The
movement’s efforts to unify the delivery of American education led by extension to a perceived
need for a formal structure by which to do so. Importantly, a visit to Prussia in the 1840s
influenced Common School movement leader Horace Mann to advocate that schools be
organized by age-based grade levels. Prussia, notes Hess (2010, 81-82), had adopted such a
system to help rebuild national pride when the country faced defeat at the hands of Napoleon in
the early nineteenth century. Mann approved of the orderly structure, regardless of why Prussia
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had implemented it in the first place, and recommended it be adopted in the U.S. This rigid,
Prussian war-inspired organizational structure, remains dominant today.
Centripetal Forces Appear: Uniformity and the Power of Progressive Ideas
American public schools became a unified system through various means. Among the
more important are formation of the district system, establishment of state constitutional clauses,
and creation of a mass-production teacher preparation model.
School districts
Near the time states began forming state public school systems, the growing number of
individual community schools began forming into districts. Some experts saw school districts as
the “natural” organizational unit, since schools whose areas adjoined did not follow extant city or
township boundaries and instead became smaller and irregularly shaped school districts.
Cubberley (1916, 5) states, “As a unit of organization, the district was well suited to the needs of
the time…. Districts could be formed anywhere, of any size and shape, and only those families
or communities desiring schools need be included in the district organization.” Cubberley (and
others) therefore embraced the district system, describing it as a creation of the state (Cubberley,
1916, 14).
District formation created American public school monopolies, which continue today.
School district geographic boundaries provided demarcation lines, inside which resident students
attended school. As districts grew, district officials further subdivided districts into school
attendance or “catchment” areas (Cubberley, 1916, 6-8; NCES, 2015-16, The Boundary
Collection), wherein a student attended the school located in the catchment area that includes the
student’s residence. State constitutional provisions and resulting state laws then codified the
monopolistic district system, making it difficult to eradicate.
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State constitutional clauses
Due perhaps in part to a renewed religious conflict, more states began to include
education in their constitutions. Six of the fourteen state constitutions framed by 1800 did not
mention education and several others did so only briefly (Cubberley, 1916, 3). As of 1834,
almost half of the states had adopted education clauses. (Tractenberg, chapter draft, “An
historical overview”). Between 1835 and 1912, the number of states with constitutional
education provisions doubled, and most of these were explicit regarding the establishment and
funding of free common school systems (Tractenberg, chapter draft, “An historical overview”).17
Given the country’s constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, one could argue the
goal of religious preference is a private function as opposed to the more general social functions
of literacy and citizenship. Yet, religious tension helped to solidify state constitutional education
provisions. A new wave of immigrants brought religion back into focus, thereby contributing to
permanent structural changes to public education. With additional millions of Catholics
immigrating to the U.S. in the mid-1840s (Byrne, 2000), Catholic political power increased, and
Catholics began using their power to combat Protestant efforts to de-Catholicize their children
via the common schools. (DeForrest, 2003, II.C.). Education became more diversified in various
locales, but this result was short-lived (Maranto & van Raemdonck, 2015). Ultimately this
religious battle spawned several unsuccessful attempts at U.S. constitutional amendments to
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The anti-Catholic state Blaine amendments – arguably indicative of private motives as opposed to social functions
– would become highly instrumental in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in preventing attempts to move away
from this centralized public education system to one involving parental choice. Equally important, however, the
amendments represent evidence that centralized state educational systems became the consequence of reformers’
attempts to balance the desires for limited government, individual liberties, and natural markets against a social
concern for national unity in the face of diversity. But national unity can easily evade a nation’s grasp if what
constitutes a “unified” view is contentious. As Hayek explains, “The common welfare or the public good has …
remained a concept most recalcitrant to any precise definition and therefore capable of being given almost any
content suggested by the interests of the ruling group” (Hayek, 1976, 2013, 170).
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prohibit federal resources from being given to religious groups or schools. Maine Congressional
Representative and presidential hopeful James Blaine proposed one such amendment in 1875 as
a springboard to the office of President. Upon failure at the federal level, Blaine amendments
began surfacing in states’ constitutions. At this writing, 37 states have Blaine amendments in
their constitutional education clauses.18 (Parker 2016; Institute for Justice n.d.; DeForrest, 2003,
II.C.).
Overall, state constitutions served to solidify the 50 partially centralized and largely
monopolized educational systems into their layered, state-centralized form, thus setting the stage
for a future layer – the federal government – to complete the centropoly. State constitutions
generally call for the state to not only fund, but govern the public schools in a manner that,
structurally speaking, originates at the state level. This more-or-less universal constitutional
system generally sets forth a state elected individual (chief state school officer, governor) or
body (state board of education) to oversee the state system. (Railey, 2017) As pointed out by
Friedman (1955; 1962, 1982), a state government instead could fund but not manage or control
individual schools. This important observation is predicated upon the public choice notion that,
as an organization thickens, two results materialize. First, knowledge dissipates as information
distance lengthens between an organization’s leaders and those it serves (Tullock, 1965, 1992).
Second, this increased distance further exacerbates the natural tendency for leaders’ private
incentives to override concern for those being served (Downs, 1967).
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The state Blaine amendments only recently lost their power to separate religion and public education: in June
2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states cannot exclude religious families and schools from school choice
programs. (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 18-1195, June 30, 2020.) (Institute for Justice,ey,ors n.d.)
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Teacher Preparation
Reformers unified teacher preparation as well, lowering its quality as a result. The
Common School movement spurred efforts to establish a formal teacher preparation system, and
the state normal school became the Common Schoolers’ major teacher preparation effort. As
Labaree (n.d., 293) notes, given limited resources to establish normal schools, “normal school
leaders ended up choosing relevance [reaching more prospective teachers by ‘skimping on
professional preparation’] over rigor [providing ‘a few model teachers’ with rigorous
professional training]”. The development of teachers’ colleges in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to prepare new teachers hence brought considerable uniformity, while
deemphasizing content knowledge of teachers and leaders (Maranto and Wai 2020, 6).
The Progressives and Scientific Management
Progressive reformers not only further solidified a central public education vision, but
also created a centralized delivery system. Continued rapid socioeconomic change including
increased immigration and urbanization in the mid- to late-1800s brought wholesale
transformation not only in specific areas of U.S. social policy, but also in the way policy was
implemented. Having viewed the American “freedom experiment” a failure, Progressives set to
work to design a system that would rein in and thus significantly reduce the influence of the
invisible hand approaches to society and its government, exchanging them for a top-down system
of control through bureaucratic governmental agencies. Centralizers thus pushed for their
arguably private view of government – private, because it is in direct contradiction to the social
functions of American government explicated in the country’s founding documents.
Woodrow Wilson, 26th U.S. President and academic who advocated Progressivism, wrote
prolifically on the Progressive role of government administration arguing that “a professional
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class of experts” constitutes a better, more efficient way to implement policy (Pestritto, 2007,
Administration and the ‘Living Constitution’). He dismissed the founders’ limited-government
social function by stating that “administrative principles and constitutional principles [are]
distinct” so constitutional principles (e.g., that of checks and balances) “interfered with
efficiency and should not be applied to the exercise of administrative power (Pestritto, 2007,
Administration and the ‘Living Constitution’).” In response to Progressive influences,
policymakers began developing programs to serve particular groups of Americans or accomplish
particular policy missions, with agencies employing professional bureaucrats. For the
Progressives, the professionals, guided within a rule-bound bureaucracies, knew what was best
for the public.
The Progressive reformers transformed public education. Thought leaders like
Ellwood Cubberley worked to bureaucratize schools specifically to control them. While
the first state systems originated in the early 1800s (e.g., New York State in 1812
[Cubberley 1916, 9]), states’ educational administrators gradually began adopting the
Progressives’ ideas.
As mentioned previously, the school district/catchment area system resulted in a statesanctioned arrangement of monopolies motivated to maintain their status – one that, when
coupled with the Progressive-led move toward centralization and bureaucratization, tended to
insulate the public school system from those it was intended to serve. Rather than considering a
return to local schools, reformers doubled down on centralization, pushing harder for uniformity
under growing numbers of professional “experts” who would impose supposedly “best” business
practices.
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In the early 1900s, Frederick Taylor’s Scientific Management Theory spread into public
education, first in magazines and education journals which attacked schools as inefficient and
unprofessional (Callahan, 1962, 51). In 1918, the Commission on the Reorganization of
Secondary Education presented the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, which
recommended curricular content that was less academic and more uniform across schools, while
at the same time tracking students within schools (Commission on the Reorganization …, 1918).
Often termed the “factory model” of education, school leaders began assigning students based on
age (elementary and secondary grades) or subject matter (secondary grades), largely for the
convenience of school personnel. This single, “one size fits all” reform has resulted in additional
problems for students, such as impersonalization and social promotion – policies gravely
affecting disadvantaged students who are tracked, and passed through bureaucratic systems
whether they learn or not (Doherty, 2004).
The question of how much control states should exert over their public school systems
evolved erratically across states. As a thought leader, Cubberley (1916, 24-25) discussed the
consideration of elements that could balance a state system between too little and too much state
control. Ultimately, however, he did not equivocate on whether and, to a great extent, how the
state should control the public education system by controlling the schools.
[T]he authority and power to develop [public schools] have come from the State
and not, except secondarily, from the community…. The school district … [was] erected
for the purpose of better local administration. The State creates these subdivisions of
itself and then endows them with their powers … as the best interests of the State may
seem to require. It has been the people as a whole, represented in the legislature of the
State, and not portions of the people here and there, who have been supreme in the matter
of educational legislation (Cubberley, 1916, 14) (Emphasis added).
The Progressive reformers thus pushed for centralizing separate community schools
under state, instead of community, control. They advocated placing that control in the hands of

43
professionals who were removed from the schools. Under public choice theory, every such move
increases the distance between the decision makers and their constituencies. Mises (1949, 1998,
7) states, “There is no such thing as perfection in human knowledge, nor for that matter in any
other human achievement. Omniscience is denied to man.” Building upon this fact, Tullock
(1965, 1992, 76-77) expounds upon bureaucratic actors’ incentives: “While it is probable that the
subordinate will know more about any given situation than his superior, it is also true that the
ambitious and intelligent bureaucrat will tend to cut himself off from external reality, unless he is
a conscious hypocrite. The official who is not hypocritical about his task soon learns than an
active curiosity leads … to quarrels with superiors…; hence he suppresses his curiosity.”
Thus, as organizations become more centralized, organizational actors become even more
separated from complete or accurate information. This fact helps to explain how and why
centralization is the antithesis to optimal community action. In the case of public education,
every step toward greater centralization has further distanced the decision-makers from the
consumers of education (Downs, 1967; Payne, 2008).
Centropoly, Segregation, and Systematic Inequity
Apart from other educational considerations, the district monopoly system gave schools
captive consumers whom bureaucrats could now frequently ignore (Bradley-Dorsey & Maranto,
2021). More egregious, however, the school monopoly apparatus has trapped large numbers of
U.S. schoolchildren whose families cannot afford to move to a different district or school. This
includes, systematically, disadvantaged students and many students of color.19

19

Indeed, despite widespread acceptance of the Tiebout Effect theory (i.e., that the public can “vote with their feet”
to pursue public goods such as schooling by moving to different neighborhoods), the Tiebout Effect is also widely
disputed even for those with the financial means to move. See, e.g., Fedako, 2018.
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A pointed example of the school monopoly effect can be traced through the systematic
segregation of African Americans. Early anti-black public policy actions are perhaps more
widely known than those occurring in the 20th century; however, the black-white gaps observed
by civil rights leaders in the early 1900s (National Advisory Commission, 1968, 223) widened
further with the advent of the Great Depression and the subsequent New Deal policies. Central
among these policies that further disadvantaged black citizens was public housing. For example,
New Deal housing, initially administered by the Public Works Administration in 1933, was
rigidly segregated, and indeed created new segregated neighborhoods, as did later government
housing related programs (Rothstein 2017, 20-24).
Because districts maintained geographic boundaries atop a system of racially and
economically segregated communities, the “common” school system envisioned by Mann,
Cubberley, and others served educational communities whose needs were anything but uniform.
Given racial and economic segregation, the children enrolled in these “uniform” schools differed
markedly across districts – and within districts’ schools – hence rendering education and its
delivery unequal. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, awareness of this inequality grew and
fueled a massive reform movement at the federal level. I turn now to the largest federal reform
initiative and argue that these external efforts ultimately were attempts to reform the extant,
flawed system of vastly unequal schools serving markedly different student populations. Instead,
though, the resulting educational system grew in the U.S. and its bureaucracy strengthened,
increased in complexity, and hardened into a hybridized centropoly, ill-equipped to deal with the
problems it attempted to address regarding the needs of the vastly diverse American student
population in a rapidly changing world.
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One of the most grievous overarching repercussions of American educational reforms can
be explained by examining this formalized school segregation in terms of public choice,
specifically, with what Downs (1967, 144-166) referred to as control processes and the rigidity
cycle. As bureaucracies grow, control increases through processes such as monitoring and the
creation of monitoring agencies (Downs, 1967). Operating bureaus respond by assigning
personnel to provide information to the monitors – information that sheds the best light possible
on the operating bureau. “In potentially controversial matters,” notes Downs (1967, 152), “they
often devote extra resources to ‘beefing up the record’ to provide ample justification for their
behavior.” Downs describes the rigidity cycle as what happens to some bureaus as they grow
larger – effects I ascribe to the centropoly. Layering additional government levels automatically
increases an organization’s size. Leaders’ resulting “leakage of authority…. leads to … a
growing rigidity of behavior and structure within the bureau…” (or, in this case, within the
hybridized super-bureau). Control by monitors results in “ever more complex and ever more
restrictive regulations upon the operating [super-] bureau…. [T]he bureau also tends to devote
ever more resources to figuring out ways of evading or counteracting the monitors’ additional
regulations (Downs, 1967, 159). The author also notes that specialization increases and operating
authority escalates (Downs, 1967, 159), resulting in the “incapability for fast or novel action”
(Downs, 1967, 160).
I demonstrate these effects to some extent in Chapter 3, which first carries on the history
of American public education by summarizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA) and its reauthorizations and other amendments. I then explore several consequences of
the many policies adopted, including an empirical examination of ESEA’s influence on state and
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local staff growth. I conclude by summarizing evidence of the consequences in both theoretical
and student outcome terms.
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Chapter 3 – Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Centropoly Thickens20
Introduction: When Help Turns to Harm
In Doing Bad by Doing Good, Christopher Coyne (2013) addresses the problems of
humanitarian action by summarizing its crucial elements through a public choice lens. Although
humanitarianism is driven by normative principles – i.e., the morality of helping those in need –
Coyne analyzes humanitarian action instead through a focus “on the ability of outsiders to
effectively engage in humanitarian action whether or not there is a moral imperative to do so”
(Coyne, 2013, 12-13). Coyne analyzes “ability” in terms of the system in which state-led
humanitarian action operates, and he argues that the system is woefully inadequate – not only to
produce positive humanitarian outcomes but also because it can cause harm in the form of, for
example, further inhumane actions.
I offer here a partial corollary analysis of public education and the public education actors
who, failing to acknowledge the history of the centropoly, perceive of its schools as the moral
solution to K-12 education and view repairs to the system, through the injection of federal policy
and accompanying funding, as the appropriate solution. After having provided the formative
history of the centropoly in Chapter 1, here I summarize the reform history that began in the midtwentieth century to repair a glaring problem of the “reformed” American public educational
system: what to do with the disadvantaged students who languished in the centropoly’s schools.
After detailing the advent of the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 ESEA) and its multiple
later amendments, including the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), I examine empirically the
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This chapter and Chapter 2 together, in large part, comprise the following forthcoming book chapter: BradleyDorsey, M. (Under Contract). “Rise of a Centropoly: Good Intentions, Distorted Incentives, and the Cloaked Costs
of Top-Down Reform in Public Education” (working title), in Candela, R.; Fike, R.; and Herzberg, R., Institutions
and Incentives in Public Policy: An Analytical Assessment of Non-Market Decision-Making (working title). Under
contract with Rowman & Littlefield International.
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association between ESEA’s amendments and relative state and local public education staff
growth. I then briefly discuss the extent to which the educational condition of disadvantaged
students has changed, if at all.
Dysfunctional Reform for the Disadvantaged: The Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965
(ESEA)
School segregation, propagated by educational, housing, and economic public policies,
set the course for the famous 1954 Brown v. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision
that “[t]he ‘separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson … has no place in …
public education.”21 President Eisenhower’s 1957 decision to send troops to Little Rock
evidenced the slow response to the 1954 Brown decision (Clark 2020). Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech preceded the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by approximately
one year and ESEA by less than two years. The mid-1960s brought President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty. The Civil Rights Act expressly prohibited school
segregation, deeming invalid state and local laws permitting such segregation, yet public school
leaders had already established and continued to maintain government monopolies via district
and school catchment area boundaries. ESEA, intended to improve the educational outcome of
students disadvantaged by low income, was considered a major part of the War on Poverty. Its
spotlight intervention: funding targeted to district public schools with large low-income student
enrollments.
Many expressed concerns regarding federal intervention into education prior to ESEA.
As an early example, even before calls came to focus federal attention on America’s
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See, e.g., “Transcript of Brown v. Board of Education (1954).”
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disadvantaged, the most significant education legislation had been the National Defense
Education Act of 1958 (NDEA). A direct response to Russia’s launching of Sputnik, NDEA
authorized funding for teaching specific secondary school subjects such as math and science.
Although dwarfed in size by ESEA, Senator Barry Goldwater warned, “‘If adopted, [NDEA] will
mark the inception of aid, supervision, and ultimately control of education in this country by
federal authorities’” (Collins, 2014, 9) (Internal references omitted).
Reformers pursued funding focused on education for America’s poor soon after NDEA’s
passage. But these federal reforms faced obstacles, such as the role of the federal government in
education, inclusion of religious schools, and mistrust of local school district officials. President
John F. Kennedy’s Aid to Education bill failed in 1961, in large part because it excluded aid to
private schools. (Sorensen 1965, 360).
During the debate preceding ESEA, civil rights activists argued that public school
administrators had placed low priority on education for disadvantaged students and that the
schools had been unresponsive to these students’ needs (McLaughlin, 1974).22 An anonymous
civil rights activist stated forthrightly, “Title I will be money down a rathole unless it includes
some measure to protect the interests of poor children” (McLaughlin, 1974, 1). Democratic
Senator Robert F. Kennedy expressed similar concerns during the 1965 Congressional hearings
on ESEA. Kennedy noted that “… the school itself has created an educationally deprived
system” (McLaughlin, 1974, 4). Kennedy made a last-minute demand for an amendment to the
legislation mandating reports of educational achievement. “‘What I want to make sure of is not
just that the money is not wasted, because you can find more money, … but the fact that the lives
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For example, ten years after the momentous Brown v Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision ordering
school desegregation – and one year before passage of ESEA – the vast majority of African American students in
the South still attended segregated schools (Sunstein 2004).
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of these children are not wasted,’” he stated (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003, 215). The
Senator’s demand for achievement evidence, however, resulted only in a requirement that
districts or state education departments receiving federal funds file an annual report (Thernstrom
& Thernstrom, 2003, 215). Innocuous though well-intentioned, this language would lay the
groundwork for the use of statewide achievement testing to evaluate schools instead of focusing
on individual student success (Koretz, 2008).
Summary: The Original Act and its Amendments
Enacted in 1965, ESEA marked the onset of rapidly growing federal involvement in
education – which, in turn, further centralized public education, thickened educational
bureaucracy, and solidified into the centropoly. The chain of amendments and reauthorizations
itself illustrates the rapid increase of this hybridized government organizational structure.23
Together with its eight reauthorizations and several other weighty amendments, ESEA has been
the single most significant federal education legislation in the U.S. According to Klein (2015),
“… [F]or the most part, each new iteration has sought to expand the federal role in education.”
The only federal education legislation to surpass the original 1965 Act in scope has been some of
its reauthorizations, most notably the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), which will be
discussed in detail later.
The original 1965 Act consisted of five titles,24 of which Title I was the Act’s focus
(Collins, 2014, 14). Title I, “Financial Assistance to Local Education Agencies for the Education
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School district consolidation is arguably another policy designed to correct underlying systemic problems while
creating or exacerbating extant problems. Driven largely by policy makers’ desire to improve efficiency, the number
of school districts nationally has dropped from more than 127,500 in 1932 to fewer than 20,000 in the early 1970s
and fewer than 15,000 in the 2001-02 school year (Coulson, 2007). As researchers find diminishing returns to the
efficiency of larger districts, it is also noteworthy that larger organizations frequently result in further centralization,
hence greater separation from information.
24
The Act also included a title for “general provisions.”
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of Children of Low-Income Families,” originally funded at $1.06 billion, authorized the
provision of assistance to schools with large proportions of low-income, “educationally
deprived” students via formula-driven grants to compensate for this educational deprivation by
providing additional funding specifically for these students. Titles II through V created several
additional programs, hence adding to federal educational intervention (Collins, 2014, 14-20;
McGuinn & Hess, 2005, 295-6). Ironically, the original Act expressly prohibited federal control
of education (Collins, 2014, 16). However, with successive reauthorizations came additional
programs and requirements. Congress has amended ESEA many times to contain provisions and
government bodies relating to education for disabled students, bilingual education, and other
programs and entities. It is certain, however, that these programs contributed to government
growth at all three government levels: federal, state, and local. Each successive law added
funding, government bodies, or staffing, or a combination thereof. Not all the amendments
addressed the needs of the originally targeted student groups, but they contributed to federal
centralization of education through funding, requirements tied to receipt of the funds, and other,
perhaps unanticipated, incentives resulting from law changes.
Congress reauthorized ESEA every three years during the first fifteen years, increasingly
focusing on “resource accountability,” e.g., ensuring the funds were spent on schools enrolling
low-income students and students with lowest achievement levels (Puma & Drury, 2000, 3).
Schools frequently used “pull-out” programs for eligible students wherein remedial teaching
staff removed students from the regular classroom to instruct them. Criticism of pull-out
programs led to a 1978 amendment which allowed for schools whose enrollment was at least
75% low-income to focus on school, instead of individual student, improvement (Puma & Drury,
2000, 3). The local matching fund requirements, still in place, kept most schools from
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implementing schoolwide programs (Puma & Drury, 2000), but this changed in 1988 when
Congress discarded the local match requirement.
The 1981 reauthorization under Reagan constituted an attempt to reduce federal intrusion
into public education. Under Reagan, federal regulations were reduced from 75 to 14 pages, and
Title I – the largest ESEA-funded program – was renamed Chapter 1 (though this changed back
in later legislation). The 1988 reauthorization began to focus on “‘program improvement’
efforts” where Chapter 1 students showed inadequate gains in achievement (Puma & Drury,
2000, 3).
The law changed again with the 1994 reauthorization. Two important revisions were a
mandate that all states adopt standards-aligned assessment systems by 2000-01, and a reduction
in the poverty-rate threshold, for operating a schoolwide Title 1 program, from 75 to 50%
poverty (Puma & Drury, 2000, 4-5).
In summary, ESEA’s evolution so far had led to promotion of external, school-based
accountability while reducing focus on student-targeted improvement provisions. But
reauthorizations to this point were minor steps when compared to the changes coming through
the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) under George W. Bush. 25
No Child Left Behind Act: Sea Change in Federal Intervention
Other than the original Act, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) exerted the greatest
impact compared to the other ESEA reauthorizations. Enacted in 2002, NCLB “… effectively
scaled up the federal role in holding schools accountable for student outcomes.” (Klein, 2015).
Arguably NCLB’s most important element is made obvious from the Act’s title: No Child
was to be ignored, translated in the Act as focusing on disadvantaged students. As Kymes (2004)
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Appendix A contains a table of all major ESEA amendments, including the eight reauthorizations.
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notes, research conducted by Bush’s administration “concluded that many present-day
educational systems were still attempting to serve a population that has not existed since the
1950s….” The country’s disadvantaged had long since become not simply those who weren’t
interested in academics, but students who, more pointedly, were tied to factors anchored in the
histories of minorities and the poor.
Ironically, then, NCLB represented a recognition that the same problems existed which
the original Act was purposed to address nearly four decades earlier. Even though the goal of the
original ESEA was to improve educational outcomes of this student group, NCLB made specific
demands that attempted to ensure districts and schools would not ignore disadvantaged students.
These demands included mandatory reporting at student subgroup levels (e.g., income and race
or ethnicity), so that districts and schools could not hide achievement gaps by averaging overall
student performance.
Second, and relatedly, NCLB was the first-ever federal attempt at an outcome-based
educational accountability system. Previous ESEA iterations contained provisions that focused
on aspects of accountability, such as testing and reporting, but NCLB contained a federal
mandate that states meet specific outcome measures. Prior to this, several states had adopted
standards- or outcome-based accountability programs beginning in the 1980s and continuing into
the ‘90s. The state-level programs grew out of concerns arising from A Nation at Risk, a 1983
report describing America’s educational system in dire terms.26 27 28
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Considered hyperbole by some, the report claimed: “If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on
America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.”
See A Nation at Risk, April 1993, paragraph 2, at https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html .
27
By 2000, 48 states were involved in standards-based accountability systems. The state plans varied in content,
implementation, and success levels.
28
A Nation at Risk also catalyzed a lot of the federal efforts in the 1980s and onward. See, e.g., Vinovskis (2009).
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Many found themselves still aware that America ranked in the middle among other
nations regarding educational performance (Hanushek & Luque 2003, 485). Some concluded
action was needed at the national level – again, doubling down on externally-sourced, top-down
reform (Downs, 1967).
The cornerstone of the NCLB accountability provisions was the requirement that all
students, with rare exceptions, reach the “proficient” level on state math and reading tests by
school year 2013-14. Under the law, each state was required to (a) define the test score levels
that met the state’s “proficiency” designation, and (b) set and meet its annual targeted “Adequate
Yearly Progress” (AYP), or percentage of students achieving at the state’s self-prescribed
“proficiency” level for each year.
Consequently, state testing became an integral part of the newly mandated high-stakes
accountability system created through NCLB.29 States had to create tests to measure students’
proficiency status in math and literacy in specified grades, while reporting also on student
subgroups such as those from low-income families, those with limited English proficiency, and
students with disabilities.
This testing itself changed administrator and teacher behavior toward their students, as
well as student learning behaviors and outcomes. According to Koretz (2008, 47) in the U.S. the
“primary [function] of large-scale achievement” testing changed from helping individual
students (via diagnosis) to group-based accountability (holding schools, districts, and teachers
accountable) – the latter being precisely the purpose of NCLB-based testing.

29

As mentioned previously, however, not all aspects of the NCLB accountability system were mandatory. The Act
permitted states to set their own proficiency (and other achievement) levels.
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ESEA (and particularly, the NCLB reauthorization) therefore helped create the
organizational accountability movement.30 The concern about disadvantaged students, which
resulted in the Act’s passage, evolved into measurement of disadvantaged student progress,
which then drove the group-based testing accountability movement (Koretz, 2008, 54). This
progression represented a step in the incremental march toward a more centralized and
bureaucratic institution, as the focus became even more centered on the success of the school
instead of the success of the student.
This well-intended testing mandate is a prime example of centralization gone awry. The
mandate took attention away from the constituents – students – as public school system
employees focused on ways to make their institutions look better, or at least deflect punishment.
All such behaviors reflect the “circling of wagons” around the institution itself – precisely the
behavior that public choice theorists had described (e.g., Downs, 1967).
During the latter years of NCLB, raising AYP (the percent-proficient measure) became
increasingly difficult for states. Supporters and critics alike began to question whether it was
possible to reach the 100%-proficient goal for all students. Because of this and other factors, the
federal Education Secretary implemented a directive allowing for a waiver from the continued
mandated increases. Called the ESEA Flexibility Waiver, the U.S. Department of Education
(USDOE) waived states meeting certain requirements from the mandate to continue increasing
their proficiency levels. Forty-two states received flexibility waivers under NCLB (Balingit,
2015).

30

One could analyze the transformation from student to organizational focus, resulting from just the NCLB, in great
detail. Another such example is that the federal government revised its AYP target requirements to allow for states
to meet AYP in a particular year, by improving subgroup performance while not meeting its stated targeted goals.
See, e.g., Schools Seek ‘Safe Harbor’ from 100 Percent Proficiency, 2008.
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However, many of NCLB’s institutional effects survived. By holding districts and
schools accountable – perhaps a natural policymaker inclination, given schools’ prior
performance regarding disadvantaged students – the Act served to focus on the organization and
not on the students themselves. In other words, students became the instruments to reflect school
and district success, rather than the constituency to be served.
ESEA: Connections to Government Growth and Centralization
Though difficult to measure in a causal sense, ESEA has had a dramatic impact on
government growth and centralization both directly and indirectly. Several indicators of this
growth and centralization apply at all government levels and can be attributed, at least in part, to
the adoption of ESEA and its subsequent reauthorizations.
Federal Funding
While not the sole cause of federal education funding increases, ESEA has figured
prominently and remains an important funding source. The following provides a summary of
federal elementary and secondary education funding in general and ESEA specifically.
As illustrated in the first panel of Figure 2, federal funding for elementary and secondary
education (constant dollars) rose from $5 billion in FY 1960 to $20 billion in FY 1970, the year
of the second ESEA reauthorization. By FY 1980 spending had increased to a $29.7 billion high.
That year was followed by a sizeable and sustained spending decrease (as measured in constant
dollars) that lasted until after the fifth ESEA reauthorization (FY 1988). Revenues climbed for
the next approximately two decades with additional fluctuations, including a dramatic spike due
to the Great Recession, and then declined abruptly after the Great Recession to approximately
$57 million. Apart from the relatively flat funding during the 1980s and the abrupt decline
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following the 2010 Great Recession-related spike, total federal elementary and secondary
education funding (in current dollars) generally has continued to rise over the decades.
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Reauthorization dates, titles: See Appendix A.
Figure 2. Federal Revenues for Elementary and Secondary Schools: FY 1920 – FY 2015
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Figure 3 represents the funding history of Title I grants to local education agencies
(LEAs),31 evidencing the dramatic funding increases from just the largest ESEA program. As
shown in Figure 4, ESEA Title I grant funding historically has fluctuated from between 20 and
39 percent of total federal elementary and secondary education funding. In 2018, ESEA
comprised 29 percent of federal K-12 education funding.

Figure 3. ESEA Title I Grants to Local Education Agencies: Appropriation Amounts for FY
1980–FY 2019
Source: Education Department Budget History Table: FY 1980-2021, at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html.

31

According to ESEA, a local educational agency (LEA) is “a public board of education or other public authority
legally constituted within a State” for control of public schools (USDOE, n.d., “Definitions”).
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Figure 4. ESEA Title I Grants as a Percent of All Federal Education Revenues: Current Dollars
Source: Education Department Budget History Table: FY 1980-2021, at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html.
In recent fiscal years, the amount of federal ESEA funding has stabilized at around $14 $16 billion. In FY 2017, ESEA Title I funding was just over $14 billion, and total federal
funding for public school education was over $57 billion. Total federal revenues per pupil, based
on the $57 billion amount, was more than $2,000 (NCES, 2020, 7).
Staffing: Federal, State, and Local Levels
As with federal funding, the number of federal full-time equivalent (FTE) education staff
for public school education functions has increased markedly since the passage of ESEA. As of
1965, the Office of Education, within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
employed more than 2,100 people. Forty-five years later, in 2010, the U.S. Department of
Education (USDOE) employed almost 4,300 people. The federal public school-related workforce
increased dramatically with the upgrade of the federal education function to a cabinet level
agency in 1979. Before the change the Office of Education had approximately 3,000 employees
(USDOE, 2010).
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The staffing increases were not confined to the federal government, however, since
ESEA and its reauthorizations contain specific powers and duties for both state education
agencies (SEAs) and LEAs. Figure 5 provides a historical overview of staffing changes at the
state and local public education institutional levels between 1957 and 1997. As shown, school
district FTE staff grew from fewer than 1.5 million FTE in 1957 (0.9% of the total U.S.
population) to about 3.9 million in 1997 (1.4% of the total U.S. population). Total state and local
staff grew from about 2.0 million FTE in 1957 to more than 7.0 million in 1997. Subtracting, this
means the number of FTE positions for state agencies grew over the same period from 0.5
million to about 3.1 million. State agency personnel include employees hired to support or
oversee state educational programs and policies.
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Figure 5. Full-Time Equivalent Employment of U.S. State and Local Public Education Agencies:
FY 1957 – FY 1997
The student-to-staff ratio provides another illustration of public education employment
increases over time. In FY 1950, the number of students per staff member was 19.3 (Maranto &
McShane 2102, 28). By FY 1993 the ratio had dropped to 10.1. From FY 2000 to FY 2018 the
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ratio has hovered between 8.0 and 8.9 except for FY 2015, when the ratio jumped to 9.4. The
ratio for FY 2018 was 8.5.
Figure 6 (divided into panels 6.a. and 6.b) provides a state-by-state comparative
illustration of the change in the proportionate number of local public school FTE staff, i.e., per
100 students enrolled in local public schools, between 1993 and 2013. As shown, states have
differed in the staffing levels they have provided in the public schools. Also as shown, most, but
not all, of the states’ staffing levels increased between 1993 and 2013.
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Figure 6.a. Alabama - Missouri
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Figure 6.b. Montana - Wyoming
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Figure 6. Local Public School FTE per 100 Students Enrolled, School Years 1995 & 2014
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core
of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey", 1994-95 v.1a,
2013-14 v.1a; "State Nonfiscal Public Elementary/Secondary Education Survey", 1994-95 v.1b,
2013-14 v.1a.
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Empirical Evidence: ESEA is Associated with State and Local Staff Growth
Although the descriptive evidence appears to show general growth in staff numbers, not
all states grew in staff during the more recent years, and staffing levels differed markedly among
states. Here I attempt to answer a single research question: Is ESEA and its subsequent
amendments related to state and local public education staffing growth? I hypothesize that the
various amendments are indeed associated with staffing growth at the state (SEA) and local
(LEA) levels.
In seeking literature on this subject, I examined the question both specifically to U.S.
public education and more generally to U.S. governmental bureaucracies regardless of specialty.
I found a rich and diverse theoretical literature, which I summarized in small part in Chapter 1.
Regarding the precise question of staffing growth, either in education specifically or in U.S.
governmental bureaucracy generally, I located only Scafidi (2012, 2017). Scafidi (2012, 1) notes
that, between Fiscal Year (FY) 1950 32 and FY 2009, K-12 public school enrollment increased
by 96 percent, yet in the same period the public school FTE count grew 386 percent. Scafidi
(2017, 3) conducts extensive descriptive work on U.S. public education staffing, noting that
staffing declined from FY 2009 to FY 2012 because of the Great Recession; however, “[a]fter
FT 2012, American … public school employment began growing again at a rate faster than
increases in student enrollment.”
The staffing surge Scafidi (2012, 2017) identifies accompanies the fact that public school
organizations also have become more complex. Scafidi states the staffing increase was not driven
only or even primarily by an increase in the number of teachers. Instead, during this period,

32

Scafidi (2012) began measuring prior to enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the
Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, both (and especially the latter) of which influenced large increases of public
educational staff.
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“[T]eachers’ numbers increased 252 percent while administrators and other staff experienced
growth of 702 percent, more than seven times the increase in students (Scafidi, 2012, 1).” Both
the teaching and administrative staff influxes have revealed themselves through new staff titles,
such as several mentioned in a recent Fayetteville, Arkansas school board agenda. These include
federal Title I teachers and administrators, in-school suspension staff, child nutrition staff,
speech pathology staff, film and TV staff, coaching staff, personalized learning staff, gifted and
talented teachers, and special education teachers (Fayetteville Public Schools, 2019).
The following longitudinal, fixed-effects regression analyses provide a clearer picture of
the relationship between ESEA over the years and public education staffing levels. To conduct
this regression model, I obtained panel data covering multiple years for each of the 50 states
from two sources: (a) 1965 – 1992 data from the U.S. Census of Governments (COG) conducted
every five years, wherein I calculated the average change for the years in between the five-year
intervals; and (b) the NCES Common Core of Data (CCD) for 1993 - 2009. The lack of a single,
continuous data set presents a limitation. The CCD data might be preferable since annual data are
available, but they do not cover the earlier ESEA years. Although the COG data were gathered
only every five years, it is possible that earlier, smaller school organizations paid more careful
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attention to data reporting. Either way, because there is a clear change between the two data sets,
as shown in Figure 7,33 I could not combine them.
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Figure 7. Mean State-Local School FTE per 100 Population Based on Different Data Sources:
1970-2009
Sources: U.S. Census, NCES. See Footnote 33 for detail.

33

Sources of Figure 7 include the following: Population: U.S. Census: 1970-1980 – Population Distribution Branch,
Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States, 1970 to 1980; 1981-1990 – Population Distribution
Branch, 1981 to 1989 Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States, and Year-to-Year Components of
Change (all data consistent with the intercensal estimates shown in Table 2 of CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS Series, P25-1106); 1990-2000 – ST-99-7 State Population Estimates and Demographic Components of
Population Change: Annual Time Series, April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999, Population Estimates Program, Population
Division; 2000-2010 – Table 1. Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions,
States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010; 2010-2019 – Population Division, Table 1. Annual Estimates
of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019
(NST-EST2019-01). Staff:1972 Census of Governments, Vol. 3 Public Employment, No. 2 Compendium of Public
Employment, Table 13 Full-Time Equivalent Employment of State and Local Governments. 1982 COG, Vol. 3, No.
2; 1992 COG, Vol. 3, No. 2; U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core
of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey", 1992-93 v.1a, 1993-94 v.1a, 1994-95
v.1a, 1995-96 v.1a, 1996-97 v.1a, 1997-98 v.1a, 1998-99 v.1c, 1999-00 v.1b, 2000-01 v.1a, 2001-02 v.1a, 2002-03
v.1a, 2003-04 v.1b, 2004-05 v.1c, 2005-06 v.1a, 2006-07 v.1c, 2007-08 v.1b, 2008-09 v.1a; "State Nonfiscal Public
Elementary/Secondary Education Survey", 2008-09 v.1c, 2018-19 v.1a.
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Therefore, I conducted two separate longitudinal panel data, fixed-effects regression
analyses, both of which follow the same model:
!"#$%&!" = (# + ($ *+,$,!" + (& *+,&,!" + ⋯ + (' *+,',!" + .$ !"#/"0!" + .& !"#/"2!" + 3!"
My dependent variable, !"#$%&!" , is the natural log of state and local public education
FTE staff for each year beginning two years after the relevant amendment group. This
measurement is to account for the time lag between a law’s adoption and the changes
implemented as a result.
My independent variables of interest are categorical variables representing all sets of law
changes beginning just after adoption of the original ESEA. The variable value is “1” if the
amendments were in effect for a particular year. For example, the variable for the 1981
reauthorization would contain a value of “1” in the years 1981 and all years thereafter. I compare
the resulting associations relative to the 1965 original enactment. Hence, law change coefficients
are additive.
In this relatively simple model, I employ fixed-effects panel regression to account for
nonrandom, unmeasured differences within individual states, such as economic conditions. I add
controls for the natural log of the state’s population in poverty and of the state’s total population
in each year as reported by the U.S. Census.
As discussed previously, Figure 7 shows a clear pattern of increase in the mean
proportional state and local education FTE in most ESEA amendment years. Only 4 of the first
23 years and 3 of the second group of 17 years experienced a mean proportional FTE decrease
over the previous year. Considering all fiscal years shown in both data sets, there is an overall
growth pattern over the years, and proportional FTE growth occurs in most, but not all, years. It
is possible that most of the absolute growth in the overall mean state and local public education
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FTE occurred in the first set, i.e., FYs 1965 – 1992 (using the first data set). During this period
the number of FTE grew from less than 1.5 in 1965 to almost 2.1 in FY 1992 for every 100
people. During the second period (using the second data set) the mean FTE dipped to 1.8 per 100
people in FY 1993 and rose again to 2.1 in FY 2009. Note, however, the sizeable interruption in
values between the two data sets, as shown in the figure.
Table 2 reveals the results of the regression analyses. The first column, reflecting the first
and largest set of ESEA laws, shows that of the eleven law changes in the regression, six (those
enacted in 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1984, and 1988) reveal highly statistically significant
(p=0.01) FTE staff growth. Of the remaining five laws (those enacted in 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981,
and 1983), only two are associated with FTE staff decreases and none are statistically significant.
Of the two laws associated with FTE staff decreases, the 1981 law might be expected to show a
negative association since the 1981 reauthorization was President Reagan’s attempt to reduce
federal education influence.
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Table 2
Associations between State and Local Education Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Staff (log) and
ESEA Amendments by Year Adopted; Amendment Years 1966 – 1992; 1994 – 2002 34
Earlier ESEA Amendments
1966
0.061***
(0.008)
1968
0.071***
(0.009)
1970
1972
1974
1977
1978
1981
1983
1984
1988

0.074***
(0.008)
0.045***
(0.008)
0.012
(0.008)
0.007
(0.010)
-0.013
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.008)
0.011
(0.010)
0.034***
(0.009)
0.080***
(0.005)

Later ESEA Amendments
1994
0.074***
(0.018)
2002
0.055***
(0.012)
No. in Poverty
(log)
0.096
(0.078)
Population (log)
0.900***
(0.122)
Constant
-3.758***
(1.311)
Observations
840
Number of States
50
R-squared
0.438
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number in
poverty (log)

-0.194***
(0.013)
Population (log)
1.035***
(0.018)
Constant
-2.284***
(0.184)
Observations
2,395
Number of States
50
R-squared
0.944
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

34

Because the two datasets could not be combined, I ran separate regressions.
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To interpret the model, it is important to remember that all laws are in operation from
their enactment year forward. Additionally, because the law variables are binary, all are relative
to the original 1965 Act’s passage. Finally, the model assumes staffing changes two years
following adoption of the law. Therefore, to interpret the regression results, one must consider
that the 1965 Act’s staffing influence continues in all years since and including 1967 (two years
after passage, the assumed staff change delay), the 1966 reauthorization’s staffing influence
continues in all years since and including 1968, and so on. This means, for example, that the
1966 law change, for which the assumed staffing change is in effect from 1968 forward, is
associated with a 6.1 percent FTE increase. The 1968 law, in effect from 1970 forward, is
associated with a 7.1 percent FTE increase, and so on. The population coefficient is expected to
be large and highly statistically significant, since states’ populations have grown sizably over the
past decades. Controlling for population eliminates this variable’s impact from the law change
associations.
Importantly, however, the log of the number in poverty is highly statistically significantly
(p=0.01) associated with a 0.194 percentage point FTE decrease. In other words, poverty is
associated with a decrease in FTE separate and apart from the law changes and the population
control. This could have additional, and concerning, implications for the nation’s poorest
students. More research is necessary to further examine this coefficient.
The second column in Table 2 shows a similar analysis for the 1994 and 2002 laws. As
shown, these laws are associated with highly significant (p=0.01) total FTE staff increases of 7.4
and 5.5 percent, respectively. The poverty coefficient in this model is not statistically significant.
In summary, over the two analyses (using two data sets), there are positive associations
between FTE increases and eight of thirteen ESEA law changes. None of the five remaining law

76
changes analyzed was associated with a statistically significant FTE change, and only two of
those five (nonsignificant) associations were negative. The negative association between poverty
and FTE in the first analysis needs further examination, as it might be concerning.
The Educational Condition of Disadvantaged Students
The obvious question becomes whether the sizeable resource increases, due at least in
part to passage of ESEA and its subsequent iterations, have resulted in educational improvements
for the disadvantaged students they were intended to help. Clearly, ESEA was adopted to reduce
or even close achievement gaps between low-income and other students. Also, clearly, research
evidence reveals it has not done so – especially when considering the multiple billions of dollars
spent over time.
Descriptive NAEP Test Evidence
NAEP, mandated by Congress, is “the only assessment that measures what U.S. students
know and can do in various subjects across the nation [and] states….” (NCES, n.d., at
https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/) Although limited, i.e., it samples each state’s
fourth- and eighth-grade student bodies, NAEP measures include public school reading and math
scores. Also, while NAEP has been testing students since 1969, longitudinal, standardized data
became available for all states only upon the passage of NCLB.35
Figures 8 and 9 show the NAEP average scale score performance data for 4th and 8th
grade math. As shown by these figures and by Figure 11, the NAEP math scale score gaps have
remained relatively constant.

35

Nevertheless, NAEP reported test scores for those states that did participate prior to NCLB.
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Figure 8. NAEP Average Test Scores for 4th Grade Math: 1996-2019
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1996, 2000, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Mathematics Assessments.

Figure 9. NAEP Average Test Scores for 8th Grade Math: 1996-2019
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1996, 2000, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Mathematics Assessments.
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Figure 10. NAEP Math Test Score Gap between Low-Income and Not Low-Income 4th- and
8th-Grade Students: 1996-2019
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1996, 2000, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Mathematics Assessments.
Figures 11 through 13 show the same information for NAEP reading scores. Reading scores once
again depict a stubborn gap between low-income and not low-income students.
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Figure 11. NAEP Average Test Scores for 4th Grade Reading: 1996-2019
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 2000, 2002,
2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Reading Assessments.

Figure 12. NAEP Average Test Scores for 8th Grade Reading: 1996-2019
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 2002, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Reading Assessments (2001 data not
available).
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Figure 13. NAEP Reading Test Score Gap between Low-Income and Not Low-Income 4th- and
8th-Grade Students: 1996-2019
Sources: 4th Grade – U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National
Center for Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998,
2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Reading Assessments.
8th Grade – U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 2002, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Reading Assessments (2001 data not
available).
Sousa and Armour (2016) Research Synthesis Summary
Addressing only ESEA’s Title 1, Sousa & Armor (2016) review prior research evaluating
the program’s effectiveness in closing achievement gaps between disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged students using a research synthesis approach to summarize studies conducted
between 1966 and 2011. After reviewing five peer-reviewed evaluation studies and conducting
their own standardized national assessment score trend analysis, the authors conclude there is
“very little evidence that the Title I compensatory education program has significantly improved
the academic achievement of disadvantaged students nationwide” (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 309).
In summary, none of the studies used randomized control trials (RCT), considered the
only true experimental design, because RCT has never been used to evaluate the overall Title I
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program across the nation. This is likely due to the “near universal implementation of Title I,”
which negates possibility of a control group.
Nevertheless, Sousa and Armor (2016) examined five peer-reviewed studies – two metaanalyses, two National Assessments (conducted by the USDOE), and one panel data analysis of
state-level results of the standardized national assessment (National Assessment of Educational
Progress, or NAEP).36 They also conducted their own summary analysis of NAEP data covering
1990 to 2013.
Three peer-reviewed studies evaluated Title I effectiveness at closing gaps during school
years prior to before 2000, i.e., before NCLB was implemented. These studies showed “[no]
meaningful gap reductions” and, in fact, widening achievement gaps in one of the studies (Sousa
& Armor, 2016, 309).
The two later peer-reviewed studies provide evidence suggesting NCLB “had modest
effects on 4th grade test scores, especially in math, and these gains were somewhat stronger for
disadvantages [sic] students” (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 309). One of these studies is particularly
noteworthy. Dee & Jacob (2011) conducted a quasi-experimental examination in which the study
authors compared states that had not implemented NCLB-like accountability reforms prior to
NCLB with their performance under NCLB. The authors found that, by 2003, states with preNCSL accountability reforms reduced the gap between black and white students by 7 points
compared to 5 points for states without the pre-NCSL reforms (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 310). A
similar finding resulted for students disadvantaged by poverty.

36

NAEP, mandated by Congress, is “the only assessment that measures what U.S. students know and can do in
various subjects across the nation [and] states….” (NCES n.d., at https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/)
Although limited, i.e., it samples each state’s fourth- and eighth-grade student bodies, NAEP measures include
public school reading and math scores.
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Finally, Sousa and Armor (2016) conduct an overall analysis of 1990-2013 NAEP data.
The authors conclude, “The overall progress is disappointing, particularly for the poverty gap.
The achievement gaps between [low-income] students … and those not [low-income] have
remained virtually constant for reading and math at both grade levels [i.e., 4th and 8th grade]”
(Sousa & Armor, 2016, 310). Black-white and Hispanic-white gaps showed better results. The
authors then commented on the distinction between results before and after NCLB, noting that
“after 2000 [the national approach] was to adopt accountability practices which had proven
effective in some states during the late 1990s” (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 310).
The distinction between pre- and post-NCLB Title I effectiveness studies should be
emphasized. Whereas prior to NCLB, Title I consisted of several policy changes and nearly four
decades, the studies regarding NCLB-related effectiveness – and particularly Dee & Jacob
(2011) – are more specific. This places at least the Dee & Jacob study on stronger footing when
considering Title I effectiveness. However, several areas of concern remain. First, Dee & Jacob
found gap improvements for only certain NAEP test scores among different disadvantaged
groups. Second, as noted previously, others have expressed concerns with the institutional
accountability approach adopted through NCLB. Additionally, concerns have been raised that, at
least in the states that implemented the NCLB flexibility waiver, achievement scores might have
dropped.37 Since the Sousa and Armor study ends in 2013, and NCLB waivers were generally
granted in 2014 and 2015, additional study is necessary to determine what happened later
because of NCLB, as well as what happened after NCLB was no longer in effect.

37

AYP did, in fact, drop dramatically for the lowest-performing Title I schools in Kansas once that state
implemented the waiver. As a result, after receiving this information the Kansas legislature implemented the state’s
only tax credit scholarship for these schools. See Appendix B for the presentation to the joint meeting of the Kansas
Senate and House Standing Education committees; see Kansas State Department of Education (n.d.), “Tax Credit for
Low Income Students Scholarship Program.”

83
Major Reason behind ESEA Reforms’ Failure: A Public Choice Explanation
Given the layered structure of the school system, it is not difficult to explain why
hundreds of billions of federal reform dollars amounted to little, if any progress for any,
including disadvantaged students. The district monopolies provide personnel with negligible
incentive to improve student outcomes. The layering begun via early state control has only
increased in the ensuing years, as federal and state controls have expanded thereby thickening
educational bureaucracy. Thus has the centropoly formed and strengthened. Relatedly, a key
disincentive to change, quite simply, is that most educational administrators and school boards
prefer schools to remain as they are, not as some, e.g., some policymakers and much of the
public, would like them to be (Maranto & Wai, 2020; Downs, 1967).
The entire infrastructure of laws, agencies, and staffing resulting from ESEA and its
iterations was superimposed, in waves, upon an already centralized and monopolized public
education system, hence bringing to life the hybridized U.S. educational centropoly, with its
layers of government operating above each student. The effects of this large-scale evolution
should be emphasized. Layering has contributed to what Tullock (1965, 1992) discusses
regarding communication distortions, and to what Downs (1967) refers to as the rigidity cycle.
Government layering has produced additional bureaucracy which, in turn, has led to reduced
information as well as increased monitoring, regulation, and defensive moves, of and by the
centropoly.
Additionally, as Mises (1944, 57-63) explains, a public bureaucratic manager has only
his/her set of rules to govern behavior. This happens because public enterprises, such as public
schools, lack the simple information device of the profit motive. Absent the profit motive, public
managers have no way of determining the public’s needs or demands or how these compete
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among different groups of people, but they do understand that (a) “… the appearance of a deficit
is not considered a proof of failure…”; and (b) “every service can be improved by increasing
expenditures” (Mises, 1944, 61, 62). Since the primary interest of each such manager is
“improving the satisfaction of needs only in their special branches of activity” (Mises, 1944, 62),
the focus becomes budget maximization.
Finally, the centropoly has decreased focus on schools’ constituencies. Stated
alternatively, increased defensiveness and information distance further emphasize private
motives (Tullock, 1965, 1992). Disadvantaged students and their parents were captive in school
districts in 1965, and they remain captive today, because they cannot afford to move to a
different district or school or to enroll their children in a private school. Educational captivity
places these students and their parents under the control of officials – at three government levels
– working in settings offering job security in numerous ways, via the school system’s nowcentropolized status. Professional educators frequently tell complaining or questioning parents to
leave their children’s education to the professionals. Yet, these professionals not only have
limited information relative to that of the parents, but they also prioritize their own private
interests ahead of those of the students.
As shown previously, in U.S. public educational centropoly, the purpose of the institution
is to maintain the institution. The public school system fits Downs’s description of bureaus –
actually, of an organization (more precisely, a bureau) made up of several bureaus. A state
educational system is composed of the state education bureau and its many school district
organizations or bureaus. The imposition of federal control – tied to the “golden handcuffs”
offered by the additional federal funding – has further centralized and bureaucratized the public
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education system: now, the states as well as their monopolistic school districts are required to
follow federal bureau mandates in addition to their respective state bureau requirements.
The public school system frequently defends itself against perceived threats, such as
funding cuts or school choice legislation, by publicly stating that its goal is to serve the children.
Public choice theory, however, helps to explain how the public education system primarily
serves itself. The schools and states exhibit collective willingness (of multiple organizational
participants) to take the strings attached to higher-level (e.g., federal) money, thereby becoming
more bureaucratic. This, in combination with the fact that the bureaucracy is separated, often by
several levels, from its constituency, means that self-interested bureaucrats decide with woefully
inadequate information on what is best for the students under their control.
Given these circumstances, what is the educational centropoly’s incentive to focus on
improving, for example, achievement gaps evidenced in the NAEP scores? The students will
remain regardless of personal or institutional achievement (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Given
widespread public sector job protection and teacher tenure, neither low-performing teachers nor
poorly performing school leaders are incentivized to prioritize student achievement. Finally, their
monopoly status coupled with their political clout means that public schools will remain
unchanged regardless of their performance or lack thereof. Widespread measurable success –
indeed, much success at all -- under such a system could be viewed as the exception, and not the
rule.
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PART TWO: Charter Schools in the Shadow of the Centropoly
Chapter 4 – Charter Schools: History, Context, and Political Considerations
Introduction
Ironically, American charter schools emerged both from, and as an alternative to, the
educational centropoly. Although now squarely a part of the school choice movement, charter
schools began as an attempt to reform school districts by flattening their structure. When this
attempt received no traction, reformers shifted it into a school choice option. Why and how did
this unique reform occur?
To understand the charter school reform movement in America, one must know the
underlying system from whence it emerged and provided an alternative. In Chapter 2, I provided
a somewhat detailed history of the system’s formation; here, I first summarize that history
focusing on the centripetal forces that shifted American public education from small,
community-based schools to a monopolized, centralized bureaucratic structure which I call the
educational centropoly. I then summarize the history of the charter school movement. Finally, I
discuss the theory behind charter schools in three ways: decision-making theories as they apply
to a school choice reform like charter schools, and public choice theory from both the decision
makers’ and educational centropoly bureaucrats’ viewpoints.
The American Public School System in the Context of Formal Organizational Theory
It is important to examine the literature related to public organizations, of which
American public schools are a subset, to fully understand the politics of charter school formation
and growth. As noted previously, little if any research has been conducted on public school
organizations themselves. Here I employ theoretical literature regarding public choice.
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Public Choice Theory in Context
In Chapter 1, I provide a detailed analysis of public choice theory in the context of the
bureaucracy. Here, I discuss public choice theory both in terms of the formal policy decision
makers (i.e., state legislatures) and in terms of the formal policy decision influencers (i.e.,
educational centropoly bureaucrats).
Central tenets of public choice theory include that (a) officials, acting rationally, make
choices based upon private (as opposed to their more public and benevolent) motives; (b)
complete knowledge allowing for optimal implementation decision-making is largely missing
from the bureaucratic organization; and (c) in place of knowledge to drive organizational
decisions, bureaucratic officials seek strategies to maximize their budgets (Downs, 1967;
Niskanen, 1971). This latter behavior likely is the natural conclusion to officials’ actions based
on rational incentives. Regarding incentives, Downs (1967, 82) states, “Utility maximization …
means the rational pursuit of one’s goals…. In order to predict what officials will do, we must
know their goals.” Downs (1967, 82) juxtaposes social functions– the overt, publicly stated goals
of an organization –against individual officials’ private motives. Private motives include
increased power among organizational leaders, job retention and pay increases for employees,
and others.
Because humans populate institutions, institutional behavior is fundamentally human
behavior. However, the layering of the TPS system’s institutional control over humans produces
layered responses which might strengthen incentives to protect the institution itself. Assuming,
as with the public choice model, that “every official acts at least partly in his own self-interest”
(1967, 83), one must take private motives into account when examining the actions of a bureau.
Downs (1967, 83) cites Calhoun (1953, 5): “‘Each [individual]… has greater regard for his own
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safety or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others, and, where these come in
opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own’” (Emphasis added).
Downs (1967) describes how bureaucracies are formed and how they implement
decisions based on public choice theory. But how did America’s schools become so
bureaucratic?
The Structuring of the American Public Education System
American public schools began with both public and private roots as individual,
voluntary efforts in small communities before the nation’s establishment. It would take many
decades for schools to be absorbed, by what one might describe as organizational centripetal
force, into centralized state school systems.
During early days some private schools were permitted to operate in community
schoolhouses. In other areas, parents and others volunteered to form and operate schools.
Legislators permitted and funded still other schools via a “rate bill”, for which only the users of
the school would pay (Cubberley, 1916, 4).
Prior to and even after the Revolutionary War, school organizational efforts were
interwoven with religion but soon began to take on secular characteristics. Cubberley (1922,
356) points out that the half century after the Revolutionary War could be seen as a transitional
period from church to state control of education. Alongside this change, community schools
began organizing into districts. Cubberley (1916, 5-7) describes the evolution of the district
system from establishment in only small areas to statewide; as more districts formed the web of
districts spread first across counties and then across states.
Importantly, the district and state system transformed American public schools into a
network of monopolies. School district geographic boundaries provided demarcation lines, inside
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which resident students attended school. As districts grew, district officials further subdivided
districts into school attendance or “catchment” areas (Cubberley, 1916, 6-8; NCES, The
Boundary Collection), wherein a student attended the school located in the catchment area that
includes the student’s residence. State constitutional provisions and/or resulting state statutes
then codified the monopolistic state-plus-district systems, which continue today (Railey, 2017;
states’ constitutional education clauses and education statutes). As pointed out by Friedman
(1955; 1962, 1982), a state government instead could fund but not manage or control individual
schools.
The Common School movement occurred at roughly the same time, as the nation grew
rapidly into one consisting of diverse immigrant groups. Common Schoolers worked to unify the
nation civically through education. Led by Horace Mann and mixing secular and Protestant
motives the Common School movement brought about a Protestant-influenced education (hence
making Catholic immigrant children more suitable citizens in the view of Protestant reformers)
(van Raemdonck & Maranto n.d., 3; Hess 2010, 87-88) and importing the age-based grade level
system from Prussia (Hess, 2010, 87-88).
The Progressive movement brought leaders like Ellwood Cubberley to bureaucratize
schools specifically to control them (Cubberley, 1916, 14). This influence spread to teacher and
principal preparation, which were influenced by a uniform teacher preparation model (Maranto
& Wai, 2020) and implementation of the principles of Scientific Management (Callahan, 1962).
The Progressives thus pushed for centralizing separate community schools under state, instead of
community, control. The movement also succeeded in not only training school leadership with a
focus on efficiency, rather than education, but also in creating the satellite institution of teacherand leadership-training colleges and universities (Callahan, 1962; Maranto and Wai, 2020).
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Finally, state constitutions provided a sound structural base for centralization in addition
to the district monopolistic system. Whereas early state constitutions seldom mentioned
education, later state constitutions systematized the 50 partially centralized and largely
monopolized educational systems into their conglomerate, centralized form.
The layering of districts under centralized state control produced concrete negative
effects. Drawing on the history of U.S. educational reforms over time, one of the most serious
overarching effects resulted from combining formalized school segregation, via district and
school monopolization, with what Downs (1967) and others discuss of formal institutions’
centripetal pull. District and school catchment area systems, now constitutionally and/or
statutorily protected and layered under centralized state control, have trapped large numbers of
U.S. schoolchildren whose families cannot afford to move to a different district or school. This
includes, systematically, disadvantaged students and many students of color.38
Importantly, because districts’ geographic boundaries were now formalized into state
systems and lay atop a system of racially and economically segregated communities, the
“common” schools envisioned by Mann, Cubberley, and others governed the educational needs
of communities whose needs were anything but uniform. Given racial and economic segregation,
the children enrolled in these uniform schools differed markedly across districts – and among
districts’ schools – hence rendering education and its delivery unequal. In the mid-twentieth
century, awareness of this inequality grew and fueled a massive reform movement at the federal
level. Bradley-Dorsey (forthcoming) argues that federal reform efforts beginning in the midtwentieth century, while attempting to reform the extant system of unequal schools serving

38

Indeed, despite widespread acceptance of the Tiebout Effect theory (i.e., that the public can “vote with their feet”
to pursue public goods such as schooling by moving to different neighborhoods), the Tiebout Effect is also widely
disputed even for those with the financial means to move. See, e.g., Fedako, 2018.
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markedly different student populations, instead increased centralization and top-down control.
The advent of federal interventions into an already layered, centralized TPS system resulted in
further layering and more centralization. As pointed out by Downs (1967), increasing a
bureaucracy’s size and external control mechanisms produces defensive moves on the part of
bureaucrats, which actions themselves result in rigidity and possibly also in additional size
increases.
School Districts: Evolution of Bureaucracy and Size
Since the early days of district formation and state control, centralized system
organization also has continued to evolve. Due in large part to federal intervention (BradleyDorsey, forthcoming), district staffing has grown demonstrably. Scafidi (2012, 1) notes that,
between Fiscal Year (FY) 195039 and FY 2009, K-12 public school enrollment increased by 96
percent, yet in the same period the public school FTE count grew 386 percent. Scafidi (2017, 3)
notes that staffing declined from FY 2009 to FY 2012 as a result of the Great Recession;
however, “[a]fter FY 2012, American … public school employment began growing again at a
rate faster than increases in student enrollment.”
The staffing surge accompanies the fact that public school organizations also have
become more complex. Scafidi states the staffing increase was not driven only or even primarily
by an increase in the number of teachers. Instead, during this period, “[T]eachers’ numbers
increased 252 percent while administrators and other staff experienced growth of 702 percent,
more than seven times the increase in students (Scafidi, 2012, 1).” Both the teaching and
administrative staff influxes have revealed themselves through new staff titles, such as several

39

Scafidi (2012) began measuring prior to enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the
Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, both (and especially the latter) of which influenced large increases of public
educational staff.
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mentioned in a recent Fayetteville, Arkansas school board agenda. These include federal Title I
teachers and administrators, in-school suspension staff, child nutrition staff, speech pathology
staff, film and TV staff, coaching staff, personalized learning staff, gifted and talented teachers,
and special education teachers (Fayetteville Public Schools, 2019).
However, states vary widely in the relative size of their TPS organizations. Table 3 shows
the public school employee load for each of the 50 states, in order of their relative number of
FTEs. As shown in Table 2, public school FTEs per 100 adults range in the 50 states by a factor
of more than 2.0, from 1.5 to 3.7. In the example states used previously, Kansas school districts
have approximately 3.1 FTE employees for every 100 adults, or 1.7 times as many as Arizona’s
approximately 1.8 local school district FTE employees per 100 adults. As explained later in
greater detail, I hypothesize that across all states the number of TPS FTEs per 100 adults, an
important expression of TPS power since adults are allowed to vote, is inversely related to
charter market share.
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Table 3
State Rankings: 2017 K-12 Public School FTEs per 100 Adults
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

State
Nevada
Washington
Arizona
California
Oregon
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
South Carolina
New Mexico
Louisiana
Michigan
North Carolina
Rhode Island
Delaware
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Alabama
Wisconsin
Tennessee
Maryland
Colorado
Illinois
Montana
West Virginia

TPS FTE Staff
per 100 Adults
1.50
1.67
1.84
1.97
2.04
2.05
2.07
2.16
2.19
2.25
2.29
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
2.40
2.41
2.46
2.47
2.51
2.52
2.52
2.53
2.62

Rank
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

State
Missouri
Utah
Virginia
Indiana
New York
Minnesota
Oklahoma
Kentucky
Georgia
New Hampshire
South Dakota
Mississippi
Alaska
Iowa
Kansas
Arkansas
North Dakota
Maine
Nebraska
Texas
New Jersey
Connecticut
Ohio
Vermont
Wyoming

TPS FTE Staff
per 100 Adults
2.64
2.64
2.75
2.75
2.76
2.79
2.83
2.84
2.86
2.86
2.96
2.96
3.11
3.12
3.14
3.18
3.20
3.29
3.29
3.31
3.44
3.45
3.55
3.58
3.73
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Charter Schools: Historical and Political Context
The modern concept of school choice was born in 1955, before most federal intervention
into the TPS system began, via Milton Friedman’s treatise on school vouchers (Friedman,
1955).40 41 Friedman’s (1955) call for vouchers reasoned against formal institutional control of
public schooling, recommending free market control instead. That same year, the Minnesota
legislature enacted the first tax deduction for education expenses (EdChoice, “America’s School
Choice Programs…”), but twentieth-century school choice did not arise for several decades. The
Wisconsin Legislature adopted the first voucher program in 1990, and shortly thereafter the
Minnesota Legislature adopted the first charter school program (1991).
Charter School History
Public charter schools grew out of the modern TPS educational reform movement
generally, as well as the school choice movement. In 1974, principal-turned-academic Ray
Budde presented his idea for reorganizing school districts in a paper titled “Education by
Charter.” Kolderie (2005, 1) describes Budde’s idea as one of reorganizing school districts by
focusing on their existing schools:
[Budde had] always had a strong interest in ‘the way things are organized’
and in ‘how things work or don’t work in organizations’…. Ray Budde’s proposal
was actually for a restructuring of the district: for moving from ‘a four-level line
and staff organization’ to ‘a two-level form in which groups of teachers would
receive educational charters directly from the school board’ and would carry the
responsibility for instruction….
Importantly, Budde’s idea was to flatten an already centralized and layered bureaucracy.
Though Budde’s idea went almost unheeded, in 1988 American Federation of Teachers president

40

Voucher programs consist of providing public money for parents to place their children in private schools.
The oldest U.S. school voucher programs still in operation began in Vermont (1869) and Maine (1873). Source:
https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/vermont-town-tuitioning-program/; and
https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/maine-town-tuitioning-program/.

41
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Albert Shanker revived and revised the idea in a speech wherein he endorsed the notion of
teachers beginning new schools. However, Shanker’s idea, which would have required school
district authorization and contemplated collective bargaining between unions and districts
(Peterson, 2010), was short-lived. 42 Instead, Kolderie, Joe Nathan, and others in Minnesota
transformed the idea into one requiring authorization outside the school district and union
organizations, at which time Shanker removed his support (Peterson, 2010). The first charter
school law was born out of this movement in Minnesota in 1991, not long after enactment of the
first private school voucher law (Wisconsin, 1990).
Once the Minnesota Legislature had adopted the first charter law, the charter school
movement caught fire. Generally, charter schools were accepted more rapidly than were
vouchers. From 1991 through 1998, a total of 34 states plus Washington, D.C. enacted charter
laws (Hassel, 1999, 1). Currently 45 states plus the nation’s capital have charter laws, while 5
states have no such measures. (Sixteen states plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico have
voucher programs.)
Charter Law Quality Rankings
Having been influenced by both the centropoly and the private school choice movement,
all charter laws require charters to be public schools of choice, meaning they are publicly funded,
nonreligious, and tuition-free, and the school cannot discriminate or be selective in enrolling
students. Frequently they focus on innovative teaching methods or specialized curricula (Hassel,

42

Other reform efforts also influenced the charter movement. Economic deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s
generated interest in deregulating other areas of government and some states followed suit, attempting to deregulate
their public education systems. During the 1980s, Minnesota business and nonprofit organizations examined ways to
deregulate the state’s public schools (Cohen, 2017). In 1994, the Arizona State Senate considered a bill that would
have reduced state mandates over the school system. Although that bill died in the House, the Legislature passed its
charter school bill later that year. (Overview: Bill History for SB 1187 [1994]. Retrieved 12/23/19 from
https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/6658?Sessionid=21.)
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1999, 5). Charter school laws differ drastically in strength and quality, however. Hassel (1999,
18) describes strong statutes as those possessing five characteristics: allowing a body or bodies
other than a local school district to authorize a charter; allowing multiple parties to begin a
charter school, granting charters both legal and fiscal independence from school districts,
exempting charters from most school district laws and regulations, and authorizing the creation
of many new charter schools (Hassel, 1999, 18).
Others, such as the Center for Education Reform (CER) and the National Alliance for
Public Charter Schools (NAPCS), both charter school advocacy organizations, and the American
Federation for Teachers (AFT), a teachers’ union, differ in the items they define as foundations
of good charter school state laws. While some scholars doubt the efficacy of state charter school
rankings,43 here I use the CER model because it places value on charter school laws containing
fewer government restrictions (Chi & Welner, 2008, 275-276) and is as such better aligned with
public choice theory.44
The 2018 CER model ranks states by assigning points based on four elements, assigning
a letter grade to the various rankings (Candall, 2018, 9-11):
•

Authorizing (15 points possible) – CER assigns points not only on the presence of
multiple authorizers, but also on the degree of independence authorizers possess.

•

Growth (15 points) – Charter laws lose points if policies (e.g., caps on the number of
charters) prevent the opening of additional charters or the spread of successful charter
models.

43

See, e.g., Chi & Welner, 2008.
In promoting the use of a transparent goal set behind any ranking system, Chi & Welner (2008) propose the
addition of equity as a charter school law component. An admirable quality at its base, adding this to charter school
laws while ignoring the history of the segregated educational centropoly could be problematic. This, however, is a
topic for a separate discussion.

44
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•

Operational Autonomy (20 points)– According to CER, states that grant blanket
waivers from school district rules result in more innovation and more diverse
educational offerings; points assigned by CER vary based on the degree of autonomy
a state’s laws allow.

•

Funding Equity (15 points) – States that do not offer at least baseline funding to
charters inhibit their growth and development; CER therefore varies points based on
funding equity.

Table 4 lists the 50 states and the District of Columbia45 in order of their 2018 “grade”
ranking by CER. Figure 14 maps the CER’s 2018 grade ranking of U.S. state charter laws. CER
assigns the grades based on the total number of points granted (Candall, 2018, 66). The states are
listed in that order within each grade ranking.46

45

In the next chapter, I exclude analysis of the Washington, D.C. charter schools. Instead, I examine state political
influences, wherein generally a governor and legislature determine the existence of charter schools. The U.S.
Congress and President vote on the Washington, D.C. charter schools, hence considerably changing the political
landscape.
46
Both the table and the map show the status of charter school laws as of 2018, at which point only 44 states had
enacted charter school laws. As noted previously in this paper, currently the charter state count is 45, with the recent
addition of Vermont’s charter school law. Such a recent addition would not have influenced the findings of this
paper, since charter enrollment data are collected through 2016.
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Table 4
List of States and District of Columbia According to 2018 CER National Charter School Law
Rankings & Scorecard (in order of ranking)
Ranking
A
B
C

D

F
0
(No charter school
law)

47

States
District of Columbia47, Arizona, Indiana
Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, California, Florida, New York,
Massachusetts, South Carolina
Texas, North Carolina, Utah, Oklahoma, Missouri, Wisconsin,
Louisiana, Tennessee, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey
Hawaii, Kentucky, Oregon, Arkansas, Delaware, Maine,
Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, Alabama, Wyoming,
Mississippi, Rhode Island, Washington
Alaska, Virginia, Kansas, Maryland, Iowa
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, West
Virginia

Note again that I exclude Washington, D.C. See Footnote 45 for detail.
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Figure 14. Map of CER’s 2018 Grade Ranking of U.S. State Charter School Laws

Thus, states with charter laws differ in the strength and quality of those laws. Seen
alternatively, states differ in their ability or willingness to resist charter school legislation or
expansion. Among the first wave of charter school laws adopted, the Arizona and Kansas laws
serve as examples of differing charter law quality. Both states passed their charter school laws in
1994. However, Arizona’s law allowed for multiple authorizers, did not cap the number of
charter schools, and allowed charters flexibility (Ziebarth, 2019, [NAPCS], 14). Kansas’s law
restricted authorization to only school districts.48 Twenty-six years later, Arizona maintains more
than 500 charter schools, which serve approximately 213,000 students, or almost 20% of

48

CER granted Kansas points for not placing a cap on the number of charter schools; however, allowing only school
districts to authorize charters effectively provides a structural limitation on the total number of charters authorized.
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students attending publicly funded schools.49 Kansas has 10 (school district-authorized) charter
schools, which serve about 3,300 students, or less than 1% of Kansas’ 491,000 public school
students.50 In 2018, CER ranked Arizona’s charter law first among the 50 states, and Kansas’ law
forty-second of the forty-four states with charter laws at the time.
The bases of these ranking differences have led to vastly different charter school
enrollment proportions among the states. Table 5 lists the 50 states in order of their charter
school enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled.

49
50

Arizona Charter Schools Association. (n.d.; © 2020).
Kansas State Department of Education. (n.d.; © 2021).
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Table 5
Charter Enrollment per 100 TPS Students Enrolled: School Year 2018
Charter
Enrollment
Rank State
Per 100TPS
Rank State
1 Arizona
17.08
26 Indiana
2 Colorado
13.26
27 Oklahoma
3 Utah
11.29
28 Georgia
4 Louisiana
11.29
29 Tennessee
5 Delaware
11.25
30 New Jersey
6 Florida
10.44
31 Illinois
7 California
9.95
32 Maryland
8 Michigan
9.62
33 Missouri
9 Nevada
9.32
34 New Hampshire
10 Pennsylvania
7.97
35 Connecticut
11 New Mexico
7.81
36 Maine
12 Idaho
7.00
37 Kansas
13 Ohio
6.64
38 Wyoming
14 North Carolina
6.50
39 Washington
15 Minnesota
6.41
40 Mississippi
16 Arkansas
6.36
41 Virginia
17 Rhode Island
6.20
42 Iowa
18 Hawaii
6.18
43 Alabama
19 Texas
6.02
44 Kentucky
20 Oregon
5.54
45 Montana
21 Alaska
5.27
46 Nebraska
22 New York
5.12
47 North Dakota
23 Wisconsin
4.94
48 South Dakota
24 Massachusetts
4.69
49 Vermont
25 South Carolina
4.48
50 West Virginia

Charter
Enrollment
Per 100TPS
4.47
4.18
4.11
3.76
3.51
3.24
2.67
2.58
1.97
1.92
1.24
0.64
0.60
0.22
0.20
0.09
0.08
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Relationship between TPS FTE Rankings and CER Charter Law Rankings
As shown in Figures 15 and 16, comparing the quality of states’ charter school laws, as
measured by CER, to the proportions of charter school enrollment and TPS FTEs reveal strong
patterns. Figure 18 displays perhaps a predictable pattern between the mean charter school
enrollment per 100 TPS students and the 2018 CER charter school law ranking. Since CER is a
proponent of charters, one might expect the organization’s ranking criteria to relate to greater
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charter enrollment at the higher ranks. Figure 19, on the other hand, shows an inverse pattern
between the mean TPS FTE per 100 adults and the 2018 CER charter law ranking. This
comparison has not been made before, to this author’s knowledge. This descriptive comparison
illustrates what I suspect to be occurring nationwide – that a relationship exists between TPS
power measured in proportional staff numbers, and proportional charter enrollment. Overall, the
correlation between the 2018 CER state rankings and charter enrollment per 100 TPS students is
0.534.
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In Chapters 2 and 3, I show how the American public school system became monopolized,
centralized, and bureaucratized. In both Weber’s political analysis of bureaucracy and public choice
theory one needs only the third characteristic – bureaucracy – to cement an organization’s power.
The question that arises from the descriptive analyses in this chapter is simple: Does the centropoly
itself hold political power over states’ charter schools?
In Chapter 5, I use the relationships illustrated in Figures 18 and 19 to conduct an empirical
analysis of the potential power of the educational centropoly to influence the size and strength of
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states’ charter schools through the mechanism of staff counts. First, though, I present an exploration
of relevant decision-making theory focused at the policymaker (i.e., elected official) level instead of
the bureaucratic level. Although Part Two of my dissertation addresses the political power of the
centropoly, its power is in influencing those who make the policy decisions. One should therefore
consider decision-making theory in light of the power of the centropoly. Here I briefly examine
Lindblom’s incrementalism theory, Tsebelis’s veto player theory, and Kahneman and Tversky’s
prospect theory, and then place them in context with public choice theory.
As pointed out in Atkinson (2011), Charles Lindblom introduced the theory of
incrementalism in decision-making in 1959 and continued to expand and revise this theory
throughout his career. As summarized by Atkinson (2011, 10), incrementalism consists of decision
makers engaging in “a local search for options” when “certainty regarding outcomes or agreement
over core values” is absent. This process produces “small adjustments from the status quo premised
on what is practical and what is possible” (Emphasis added). Lindblom adjusted his theory during
his scholastic career, expanding it to include what he termed partisan mutual adjustment, a term
referring to large-scale policy decisions, hence broadening the concept of incrementalism to issues
larger than everyday, small-scale political decisions.
Importantly, notes Atkinson (2011, 11), Lustick (1980) agrees with Lindblom’s basic theory
but limited it by arguing incrementalism “works well in situations where … there are no thresholds
or sharp discontinuities” (e.g., no drastic departures from past policy, funding, or bureaucratic
control, which could result in a partisan split among policymakers). Atkinson (2011, 11) notes that
Howlett and Ramesh (2003) argue incrementalism is but one of several decision-making styles, one
that is “best suited … to situations in which the policy context is relatively simple, and the
constraints on decision makers are relatively high.”
I argue that school choice in America, exemplified by charter schools, represents a “sharp
discontinuity” from the status quo of the centropoly, since it represents a drastic departure from the
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past arrangement between policymakers and the centropoly. School districts – as well as the state and
federal education departments that support and oversee them, see in any school choice option the
threat of losing student enrollment to these other schools. Importantly, centropoly funding is driven
by enrollment. Just as importantly, the larger the centropoly’s representation among a policymaker’s
constituency, the greater is its influence on the policymaker’s vote. Because of the high stakes the
policy context is not simple nor the constraints on decision makers low. Hence, policymakers
expecting school choice reform to occur under an incrementalist approach would see disappointment
instead.
I argue further that the following two theories of decision-making provide a better basis for a
policymaker’s choice to pursue school choice. As explained previously, school choice is a direct
threat to the power of the centropoly in at least three ways. School choice threatens to (a) reduce the
monopolistic power of the school districts; (b) reduce the centropoly’s material resources (i.e.,
money and staff); and therefore (c) reduce the centropoly’s power in general.
Tsebelis (2000) contrasts incrementalism with the veto player theory of decision-making
Tsebelis bases his theory on a constitutional distinction regarding the basis of “support and authority
for executives, legislatures and judiciaries….” When a constitution provides for independent support
bases, there are relatively many “veto [control] points” (Atkinson, 2011, 13). In brief, the veto player
theory maintains a quantitative basis. Atkinson (2011, 13) points to a quotation by Tsebelis (1999,
605) for clarification: “Significant policy change is more difficult to achieve as the number of veto
players increases.”
Atkinson (2011, 13) critiques the veto player theory for being “deterministic and
mechanical,” stating further:

In the veto player model policy assumes a stop-and-go quality with a
heavy emphasis on stop. There is no allowance for mutual adjustment beyond the
institutional core, even though research shows that governments, hemmed in by
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coalition partners, constitutional veto players, and the tyranny of the electoral
cycle, can be both pragmatic and imaginative.
Atkinson’s critique is apt when considering the policymaker’s decision to support or
oppose school choice. When considering school choice, the veto player theory applies to
constitutional, quantifiable characteristics of a state’s political landscape. A state’s constitution
can and has played an important role in the success or failure of various states’ choice proposals.
Limiting this discussion to only charter schools, the Kansas constitution serves as an example.
The Kansas Constitution, Article 6, establishes an independent State Board of Education “which
shall have general supervision of public schools….” and which is answerable to neither the
Governor nor the Legislature. Some have noted this constitutional construction might place the
State Board of Education as a coequal to the three branches of Kansas government in some ways,
including the control over charter schools.
As Atkinson (2011, 14) notes, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory
which addresses the risks associated with decision-making. While risk reduction assessment is
essential to both incrementalism and prospect theory, the latter argues that decision makers use
heuristics, such as looking for “similarities in decision situations” to assist them in dealing with
uncertainty. In short, says Atkinson (2011, 14), “Prospect theory’s most important contribution … is
the observation that people behave differently in confronting decision situations in which outcomes
are framed as losses compared to gains.”
Both the veto player and prospect theories of decision-making fit – to some extent, at least –
the decision process of enacting charter school laws. The veto player theory, though strict and
mechanical, can at least serve as an additional incentive (or disincentive) to pursue such legislation,
depending on a state’s constitutional structure and language. The prospect theory is even more
applicable, as it places decision-making squarely in the realm of risk assessment.
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Both theories comport with the public choice notion of rational self-interest. Nobel laureate
James M. Buchanan is noted for describing public choice theory as “politics without romance”
(Buchanan, 2003, 13). Public choice theory posits that those who have sought election wish to
maximize their chances of winning the next election (Brennan, n.d.). Given the unromantic, private
goal maintained by elected policymakers of winning the next election, Brennan comments:
The logic of public choice theory is that we need to take seriously the fact that
government is a complex social machine inhabited by people who are, more or less,
the same as everyone else and in which periodic elections play a central role. The
critical question for assessing policy is not ‘what policy is the best we can imagine?’
but rather, ‘what, from what we know of real-world politics, is the policy that’s most
likely to actually emerge from the policy determination process?’ (Brennan, n.d.)
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Chapter 5 – Public School FTEs as a Predictor of Low Charter School Enrollment
Introduction
Charter schools have served several purposes, not the least of which is to provide an
alternative to the traditional public school (TPS) system, especially for students who otherwise
have little chance of leaving their local public school. Charters have grown rapidly but not
uniformly across states. With vastly different or nonexistent laws among the 50 United States,
charter school enrollment in 2018 ranged from 0.0 to nearly 17.1 students for every 100 public
school students enrolled.51
On another public education metric, in 2016 the 50 states employed from 1.5 to 3.8 fulltime equivalent (FTE) public school staff per 100 adults. Many have known that charter school
laws differ in strength, which results in charter school enrollment differences. Fewer likely knew
that the proportion of TPS FTE staff differs among the states by a factor of more than two. Here I
show that these variables are strongly related, with evidence to suggest why and how these
relationships exist.52
U.S. public school politics are complicated and intertwined. More than 200 years of TPS
history have effectively produced a monopolized, centralized, and layered system. The question I
pose here is: To what extent has this system itself slowed or stopped school alternatives for
students otherwise unable to leave their assigned TPS schools?
Charter schools emerged in the recent past as one such alternative. Most early charter
school political research, however, stopped short of examining the TPS institution itself. Past

51

The District of Columbia’s 2018 charter school enrollment amounted to 44.3 students per 100 TPS students
enrolled. I exclude Washington, D.C. from this analysis, primarily because the entire U.S. Congress decides its
charter school law. Additionally, its enrollment proportion is clearly an outlier when compared to the 50 states.
52
Some have suggested another research direction, i.e., measures of TPS FTE staff proportional to TPS enrollment
and to cost per pupil. The purpose for such research would be to assess whether a cost difference exists between
low-staff and high-staff states.
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research primarily addresses party politics, rural-versus-urban politics, teacher unions, and race
or ethnicity in examining the strength of the charter school movement.
Only recently have scholars explored the extent to which the TPS system itself might
prevent the creation of alternative schooling opportunities for those who cannot afford to leave
the school system. This literature is important, since the conglomerate history of TPS reform has
produced a layered bureaucracy which, I suspect, frequently works to close off alternatives. I
seek here to quantify the extent to which this turf-protective tendency is associated with the
presence or lack of strong charter school laws and resultant charter enrollment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review the literature
regarding charter school politics. I explain my hypotheses in Section 3 and summarize my
methodology and results in Section 4. Controlling for variables shown in previous research to be
associated with charter market share and for which multiple-year data exist, I test for an
association between proportional charter enrollment and the proportional size of TPS FTE staffs,
to determine whether this measure of the political strength of traditional public schools is
associated with charter enrollment.
This comparison carries the potential limitation of how to interpret any relationship
derived from regressing charter market share on TPS FTE proportion. The likelihood is high that
the relationship between these two variables is endogenous – that is, the question becomes to
what extent each of these variables influences the other. On the one hand, according to public
choice theory the TPS institutional pull would yield a negative association (i.e., charter
enrollment would be expected to decline as TPS FTE increases, because staff increases result in
increased TPS system power); on the other hand, a strict zero-sum analysis of staffing
requirements based on enrollment between TPSs and charters could lead one to predict a positive
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association (i.e., increased charter enrollment would be expected to decrease TPS FTE
requirements). Although using panel data and fixed effects regression helps to remove
endogeneity, I also employ additional analyses to mitigate the problem (Section 5). As I deepen
the findings, a clearer picture emerges of how the TPS institution might prevent alternative
learning opportunities offered by charter schools. My ultimate goal is to understand institutional
inflexibility in the context of learning alternatives and for what it might be doing to students in
trade for adults’ job security and institutional control. I discuss these and other implications in
Section 6.
Literature Review
Charter school politics are complicated and attempts to understand them have been
ongoing since the charter movement’s inception in 1991. Having grown partially out of the
broader school choice movement, charter schools have inherited some of the political issues
surrounding school choice in the U.S., though the tension and complexity might play out
differently among the different varieties of educational choice. Race and partisan politics are two
of the primary issues, although researchers have studied other issues as well. On the other hand,
influence by other forces, such as an early connection to teachers’ union officials, might cause
differences between charter school and private school choice politics.
When examining charter school politics, it is important to look beyond the surface. One
should examine charter school politics as part of the broader category of school choice politics –
and, since the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, perhaps certain TPS district political issues as
well. Charter-related political issues also may be divided into several additional subject
categories, among them partisan and urban versus rural considerations. Third, charter politics
should be examined relative to TPS organizations. Finally, and underlying all considerations,
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charter-related politics influence the strength of charter laws as well as whether a charter law
exists at all. Hence, the mix of a state’s charter politics might influence a continuum of results.
Potentially Relevant School District Political Issues
In a paper unrelated to charter schools or school choice specifically, Hartney and Finger
(2020) conduct a TPS district-level analysis of influences on COVID-19 related reopening plans
by comparing political measures to other influences such as market forces. The authors find that
two measures of the political environment – “far more than ‘markets’ or ‘science’” – appear to
influence school district reopening plans. These measures are the percentage of voters in the
district’s county who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 general election, and the size of a
school district as a proxy of teacher union strength. They out-perform both private market share
and health-related measures in their predictive power regarding reopening plans. This finding
was in large part related to its pandemic setting. There are, however, parallels one can draw
between measures Hartney and Finger (2020) examined, and measures related to charter school
politics – but importantly, Hartney and Finger’s analysis omitted a relevant consideration if one
is to transfer the analysis to non-pandemic settings. Partisan politics, union politics, and TPS
(versus other school options’) market share issues could also affect charter school presence and
strength in states.
In this study I examine partisan political characteristics based on state-level measures for
which yearly data were available. Facing a similar challenge with union analysis, I use Right-toWork law status as a proxy for union involvement. Noting the authors’ consideration of market
influences, I include measures for private school enrollment (private competition with charter
schools) and per-pupil expenditures (public competition) over time at the state level.
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School Choice Politics
Shuls & Wolf (2015) clearly describe the complications of private school voucher
politics, noting the simplistic political linkages normally attributed belie their true complexity.
The politics of school vouchers in the United States are often simplistically and
inaccurately portrayed as pitting Republicans against Democrats and whites against
minorities. In reality, the political coalitions that have succeeded in passing private school
choice laws … consistently involve a blend of African American or Latino Democrats, …
due to a concern for social justice and an expectation that minority students will benefit,
along with (mainly) white Republicans, … due to confidence in the effectiveness of
market-based reforms and the fact that vouchers are a wedge issue for Democrats.
Opposition … typically comes from both white and minority representatives of the
educational and Democratic political establishment, along with moderate white
Republicans representing rural and suburban districts. Thus, the political divide
surrounding school vouchers is more new versus old, grassroots versus established, and
both ideological extremes versus the ideological middle than it is a simple case of right
versus left or white versus black (Shuls, 2018, Abstract).
Shuls (2018) analyzes the intricate relationships and distinctions between personal and
political motivations in support for or opposition to school choice programs. In his focus group
analysis of St. Louis and Kansas City parents, he points out what appears to be a contradictory
stance.
….[S]chool choice programs [elicit] mixed emotions from parents. Most
participants personally support school choice and … [send] their children to
magnet, charter, or private schools. At the same time, they have reservations
about broader school choice programs. As Schelling (1978) suggests, these
individuals act in their own self-interest despite the impact it might have on the
aggregate. More to the point, they are willing to express choice themselves, but
deny it to others (Shuls, 2018, 80).
Explaining this contradiction, Shuls (2018, 88) describes the tension between looking out
for one’s own children and supporting neighborhood schools. “[I]t is not surprising that many
parents face a school choice dilemma,” Shuls states. “They want to help the local public schools
but they are not sure if they should send their children to the struggling district schools.”
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Charter Schools and Partisan Politics
Wong and Shen (2004) dissect states’ charter laws by examining specific charter law
characteristics’ relationships with each other and with other factors. The authors find that
Democratic legislative control results generally in more restrictive laws but is not “universally
‘anti-charter.’” (Wong and Shen, 2004, 193). Instead, the relationships depend on which charter
school law characteristics are considered.
Hassel (1999) earlier found that party politics, particularly Republican control, are
associated with early passage of charter laws and even more strongly associated with strong
charter school laws. The author categorizes state legislative party control for the years 1991-1995
into “high-GOP” and “low-GOP” (Republican control of both chambers in more or less than half
of these years, respectively). Two-thirds of states (66.7%) with high-GOP legislatures adopted
charter laws versus 35.0% of low-GOP states. The ratio of high-GOP to low-GOP states passing
strong laws was nearly 3:1 (44.4% versus 15.0%).
Hassel (1999) also tracked party control of the governorship in those years. States with
Republican governors were only slightly more likely to pass charter laws: 42.1% versus 38.7%
for Democrat governors. The partisan gap widens significantly when examining these
independent variables for passage of strong charter laws. Republican governor-controlled states
adopted 36.8% of strong laws to Democrat governor states’ 9.7%.
Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) conduct a highly detailed state- and district-level analysis.
They decline to measure associations between partisan politics and passage or strength of charter
school laws, stating they consider such measures, in the context of the states’ presumably
representative government, to generally reflect “the preferences and demographics of the
electorate…” (Stoddard & Corcoran, 2007, 45). An exception was made for a single year, for
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which the authors measured the association between Republican governors and charter laws and
found no statistically significant effect after controlling for other variables in the model.
Urban versus Rural State Politics
Shakeel and Henderson (2020) review eight years of national survey data and find
reduced support for charter schools among rural residents. Using a survey instrument the
researchers find that increased information does not lead to greater charter support among rural
residents. Hence, the charter school support gap between urban and rural residents appears to
remain stubborn. Shakeel and Maranto (2019) note that rural communities have fewer charter
schools, probably since rural communities have greater support for traditional schools and less
diversity among students, which leads to less demand for schooling options. The authors point to
the existence of “successful charter school networks” located in large cities and supported by
“highly educated social entrepreneurs … and educational philanthropies….” On the other end of
the spectrum, states without charter laws tend to be rural. Similarly, but in mirror image, Hassel
(1999) and Wong and Shen (2004) find that urbanized areas are associated with strong charter
laws.
Charter Schools and Organizational/Bureaucratic Politics
Several organizations are involved in the operation of traditional public schools (TPSs),
and their constituencies might have strong opinions regarding charters. These organizations
include teachers, administrators, and parent groups. The politics of these organizations overlap at
least minimally if not significantly. The most often-cited example is teachers’ unions. Stoddard
and Corcoran (2007, 44) find a somewhat complicated relationship between teacher union
membership proportion and charter school legal status. The higher a state’s percent of teacher
union members, the less likely the state was to pass a charter law in the 1990s; the more likely it
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was to pass a law later and to pass a weaker law. However, once a law was passed, the
association between teacher union membership and percent of students enrolled in charters was
positive though weak (when controlling for law strength). Moe (2011) and Maranto (2005)
suggest the possibility that strong unions might result in weaker public schools, particularly in
urban areas, leading different state-level coalitions to coalesce against alternative schooling
options in the weaker-school states. Maranto (2020) further suggests a distinction in school
politics between strong-union states such as New York and weak-union states in “flyover
country”, detailing the perhaps-counterintuitive motives of administrators in emphasizing loyalty
rather than academic quality in their schools.
Other TPS-related organizations include school board members, school administrators,
state education departments, school employees (not necessarily union-involved), and parent
groups. The first two of these organization types are more likely to be organized formally; the
third (state education departments) is likely to have a neutral or covertly supportive relationship
with TPSs, differentiated by charter school status in the state; the fourth (employees whether
union members or not) is likely to be unofficially organized around self-interests related to
employment and pay; and the fifth group (parents) is likely to be unorganized or at least less
formally organized, and might be either self- or community-interested, or both53.
Researchers have studied support or opposition in its relationship to charter schools by
groups that naturally include parents. Stoddard and Corcoran (2007, 44-45) study charter support
by racial and ethnic population proportions. They find that states with proportionately larger
Hispanic populations tended to pass earlier and stronger charter laws. The proportion of Black

53

See, e.g., Shuls, 2018.

124
population has no significant relationship with “passage, timing, or strength” of charter laws but
is strongly related with charter enrollment rate.
Finally, and importantly, two recent studies examine the relationships between TPS
organizational strength (measured via staffing counts) and charter school law support or strength.
Tran (2020) examines the characteristics associated with passage of the 2016 Massachusetts
charter schools referendum and finds no significant association with teacher count. On the other
hand, Conaway, Scafidi, and Stephenson (2016) examine the associations between voter support
for the successful Georgia 2012 Charter Schools Amendment and a number of county-level
characteristics including the percentage of public school employees. The authors find a negative
relationship between voter support and public school employees as a percent of the county
population. Although these two studies resulted in different findings, both support the analyses
contained herein, as will be discussed later.
The goal of this chapter is to further elucidate some aspects of organizational
relationships. Importantly, associations need to be examined between drivers of TPS institutional
strength and charter school law presence and strength. Although it is frequently agreed that such
relationships somehow drive school choice support or opposition, this abstract philosophical
agreement has perhaps resulted in only minimal research in the area. Yet, its examination might
provide additional information on an organizational predictor of charter law strength and the
resulting possibility of charter school enrollment changes. This is ultimately what I seek.
Hypotheses and Data
Here I compare associations with some, but not all, variables shown in previous research
to be associated with charter schools. Because I am relying on panel data, I am limited to using
variables for which there are measures across time. Additionally, because my model contains
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data across several years, I control for population growth to separate its influence from my
associations of interest. Finally, recognizing that the potential for bias due to unobserved
variables exists, I use a state fixed effects model to control for unobserved differences within
states. I further parse this issue by includng year fixed effects in the panel regression model to
control for between-state differences across the various years.
Hypotheses
I hypothesize that there is an inverse association between TPS system size/strength and
charter law quality. I proportion the state TPS FTE count against the state’s adult population,
since adults may vote. I proportion charter school enrollment against TPS enrollment.
Data
I employ multiple-year panel data for the 50 states to gain a clearer picture of
relationships across time between my dependent variable and my variable of interest plus several
controls. By doing so under a panel data fixed effects regression model, I control for unobserved,
time-invariant differences within states. Such differences might include intra-state general
economic conditions.
Using two rich datasets I determine the covariation between TPS FTEs per 100 adults
living in the state and charter school enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled in the state, while
controlling for several variables. I use the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
Common Core of Data (CCD) for all TPS, charter school, and private school information. The
CCD, maintained by the U.S. Department of Education and the Institute for Education Sciences,
consists of an immense set of enrollment, funding, and staffing data for public schools. NCES
provides the data at several levels, including the state level. The Digest of Education Statistics,
an annual compendium of data tables within the CCD, provided all charter school enrollment
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data and TPS staff and enrollment data used for my analysis.54 I use the U.S. Census Intercensal
Estimates for data on the population of residents aged 18 and over and the population by race
and ethnicity. I use data on expenditures per pupil, adjusted for regional cost differences,
maintained by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. Additionally, I use state-level historical data
obtained from Ballotpedia regarding the political party mix of the governor’s and state legislative
offices.
Variables
I employ one dependent variable: 4ℎ&67!"(& , which represents a state’s charter
enrollment in a particular year for every 100 TPS students enrolled that year in the state. I derive
these variables using data from the NCES Digest of Education Statistics and the U.S. Census
Intercensal Estimates. Because charter enrollment data were available at the state level only for
certain school years, my analysis is limited to school years 2000-2006 and 2010-2016. Note I use
a measurement of charter enrollment that follows the FTE measure by two years, in keeping with
my hypothesis that TPS power (relative proportional FTE) predicts the charter school enrollment
probability and would therefore take time to materialize.
My variables of interest are represented by the vector $%&!" and include the proportion
and annual percentage change of TPS FTE per 100 adults (for state i and year t). The latter
variable, reflecting annual percentage change, helps to control for endogeneity between the
dependent variable and my primary variable of interest. These data also are derived from NCES
Digest and U.S. Census data.
Demographic and other controls include the following: 896!" – a racial/ethnic breakdown
of the percentage of Hispanic students and the percentage of Black or African American students

54

See https://nces.ed.gov/about/.
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who do not identify as Hispanic; %",:!/"2!" – the state’s total population, to control for the
effect of population growth on the analysis; /;7/<29!&=26>!" – the average expenditures per
pupil, adjusted for regional cost differences; /790&67100%/A!" – the average number of private
school students enrolled per 100 TPS students enrolled in the state (as noted, data were available
only for every other year so sample size is compromised when using this variable); /:7,B89=!"
– categorical variable indicating a state’s legislative and executive office party mix, wherein a
“1” indicates complete Republican control (governor’s office, both legislative chambers), “2”
indicates complete Democrat control, “3” indicates a partisan split between the governor’s office
and the legislative chambers; and “4” indicates a partisan split between the legislative chambers;
Year variables; and Right-to-Work variables – a vector of variables including a binary variable,
wherein the value of “1” is given if the state has maintained Right-to-Work status for the
duration of its charter school law, and an interaction between Right-to-Work status and
proportional TPS FTE. Note I employ these variables in my second analytical model. I obtained
this dataset from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).
Research Design and Results
Descriptive Analysis
Tables 6 and 7 provide the parameters of the variables I employ in my model. As shown,
although there are more total observations for the variable of interest (proportional TPS FTE)
and the controls, the lack of observations in several years for the dependent variable
(proportional Charter enrollment) limits the observations used in much of the analysis. Also, as
noted the limited data available for private school enrollment further reduces the sample size in
models employing this control.
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Table 6
Dependent Variable and Controls
Variable
Charter Enrollment per 100 TPS Students
Total Population (log)
Pct Black Non-Hispanic
Pct. Hispanic
Expenditures per Pupil
(Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; avg.)
Expenditures per Pupil
(Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; log)
Private Enrollment per 100 TPS Students
Party mix
Year

850
850

Mean
2.303
15.132
10.097
9.984

Std.
Dev.
2.864
1.012
9.417
9.730

Min
0.000
13.111
0.283
0.683

Max
18.635
17.483
37.357
48.535

850

10668

2980

4895

22506

850
399
850
850

9.238
11.440
n/a
n/a

0.268
4.853
n/a
n/a

8.496
2.381
1.000
2000

10.022
28.062
4.000
2016

Obs
650

Table 7 describes attributes of my variable of interest, for all 50 states as well as for
Right-to-Work (RTW) and non-RTW states. Note there is little difference between the maximum
values for RTW and non-RTW states, but the minimum value for RTW states is approximately
0.4 FTE per 100 adults less than the minimum value for non-RTW states.

Table 7
Variable of Interest, Right-to-Work States
FTE Per 100
Std.
Adults
Obs
Mean
Dev.
RTW States
391
2.760
0.506
Non-RTW States 459
2.660
0.463
All States
850
2.706
0.485

Min
1.127
1.591
1.127

Max
3.898
3.890
3.898

Initial Research Design
I employ OLS regression methods on panel data to determine the association between
charter market share and TPS strength once I have controlled for a number of state-level
characteristics examined in previous studies. My equation is as follows:
4ℎ&67!"(& = (# + C$ ($ $%&!" + C& (& 896!" + =) () %",:!/"2!"
+ =* (* /;7/<29!&=26>!" + =+ (+ /790&67100%/A!" + C, (, /:7,B89=!" + 3
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where 4ℎ&67!"(& is the charter school enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled for state i in
year t+2 (two years after measurement of $%&!" ); $%&!" is a vector of variables representing
proportional TPS FTE per 100 Adults, including the proportion and annual percentage change of
public school FTEs per 100,000 adults; 896!" is a vector of variables representing the percentage
of non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics in a state; %",:!/"2!" is a variable representing the log of
total population; /;7/<29!&=26>!" is the average expenditures per pupil, adjusted for regional
cost differences; /790&67100%/A!" is the average number of private school students enrolled
per 100 TPS students enrolled; /:7,B89=!" is a categorical variable indicating a state’s
legislative and executive office party mix, wherein a “1” indicates complete Republican control
(governor’s office plus both legislative chambers), “2” indicates complete Democrat control, “3”
indicates a partisan split between the governor’s office and the legislative chambers; and “4”
indicates a partisan split between the legislative chambers; Year is the school year; and 3
represents the error term.
Initial Results
Table 8 displays the results. Here I include the analysis without, and then with, the
private enrollment proportional variable. As mentioned, private enrollment data were available
for only every other year, thus decreasing the sample size considerably. Exhibiting the results in
this manner illustrates the effect of the smaller sample size as well as the variables themselves.
As shown, all other things being equal, a state’s TPS FTE per 100 adults has nearly a 1:1
inverse association to charter enrollment per 100 TPS students, significant at the 99 percent
confidence level (p=0.01), when employing Model A (without private enrollment). In other
words, a one-unit increase in the FTE per 100 adults is associated with a 0.951-unit decrease in
charter enrollment per 100 TPS students (p=0.01). When employing Model B (with private
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enrollment but without per-pupil expenditures), the coefficient expands to a loss of nearly 1.6
charter students per 100 TPS students enrolled (p=0.05). Model C, the complete model (albeit
with a smaller sample size), results in a slightly smaller (1.534-unit) decrease (p=0.05). Hence,
the null hypothesis (i.e., no inverse association between proportional charter enrollment and
proportional TPS FTEs) is rejected, regardless of the model employed.
The table also shows a highly statistically significant (p=0.01) association between
charter enrollment per 100 TPS and the following variables:
•

Total population (log) – All other things equal, controlling for total population
separates the effect of population growth from the associations of interest. As shown
in Table 5, a 1 percent increase in total population is associated with an
approximately 0.08- to 0.10-unit increase in charter enrollment per 100 TPS students,
depending on the model examined.

•

Percent of the population who are of Hispanic descent – Growth in the Hispanic
population is associated with an increase in proportional charter enrollment. Every
percentage point increase in Hispanics in a state is associated with an increase of
approximately 0.4 to 0.5 students in charter enrollment per 100 TPS students
depending on the model chosen, all things equal. Note again that the proportion of
Hispanics within states has been increasing over time.

All other things equal, with every percentage point increase in Black Non-Hispanics in
the state, charter enrollment per 100 TPS students is predicted to decrease by nearly 0.4 units in
any of the models, although only the Model A coefficient is statistically significant. Note that
Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) earlier found a strong relationship between Black proportion and
charter enrollment growth. However, when considering this finding, it is important to remember
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that over time, the within-state percentage of Blacks has decreased in recent years, while the
within-state charter enrollment has generally increased. Hence, this negative coefficient, highly
statistically significant but not large, could be an artifact of these shifting demographic patterns
over time.55
Private enrollment per 100 TPS students is associated with a 0.13- (Model B) or 0.14(Model C) unit charter school enrollment reduction (p=0.05). Expenditures per pupil appear to be
associated with a statistically insignificant charter school enrollment reduction.
The variables regarding political party mix appear to weakly reinforce previous research,
if at all. All other things equal, and relative to years in which Republicans held the governor’s
office and the majorities of both state legislative chambers, a partisan split among these three
state-level elective office groups is associated with approximately a 0.3- to 4-unit decrease in
charter enrollment per 100 TPS students (p=0.05 or p=0.1 in Model A; p>0.1 otherwise).

55

It is also possible that other factors influence this coefficient. A newly developing literature is surfacing which
provides evidence that African American adults might oppose TPS alternatives for the rational reason that they are
successful in seeking and keeping employment in the TPS system. See, e.g., Carroll, Cheng, Maranto, & Teodoro
(In Press), who advance a “theory of race and ambition, in which individuals respond rationally to their career
opportunities in light of their own racial identities (Carroll, et al., 4).” The authors posit that “Black individuals
perceive public education administration as offering promising career opportunities relative to other alternatives
(Carroll, et al., 3-4),” largely because of the job discrimination experienced historically by African Americans.
Further study is important to analyze this potential nexus between race and institutional control.
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Table 8
Original Model: Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment in the 50 States
Charter Enrollment
per 100 TPS Students
TPS FTE/100 Adults
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS FTE/100
Total Population (log)
Pct Black Non-Hispanic
Pct. Hispanic
2.Party-All 3 Dem. (Gov, Sen, Hs)
3.Party: Split, Gov Different
4.Party: Split, Sen/Hs Different
2002.year
2003.year
2004.year
2008.year
2009.year
2010.year
2011.year
2012.year
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
2016.year
Expenditures per Pupil
(Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; log)

(A) 50 States; PP Exp
Incl; Priv Enr Excl
-0.951***
(0.344)
0.017*
(0.010)
7.944***
(1.762)
-0.384***
(0.146)
0.524***
(0.086)
-0.050
(0.182)
-0.311**
(0.156)
-0.323*
(0.176)
0.095
(0.222)
0.086
(0.234)
0.151
(0.256)
0.452
(0.434)
0.484
(0.453)
0.686
(0.468)
0.681
(0.481)
0.883*
(0.499)
1.071**
(0.526)
1.166**
(0.553)
1.410**
(0.580)
1.524**
(0.613)
-1.086

(B) 50 States; PP Exp
Excl; Priv Enr Incl
-1.572**
(0.617)
0.014
(0.021)
9.906***
(2.838)
-0.341
(0.234)
0.461***
(0.131)
-0.115
(0.279)
-0.346
(0.249)
-0.35
(0.274)

(C) 50 States; Both PP
Exp and Priv Enr Incl
-1.534**
(0.617)
0.016
(0.021)
9.419***
(2.858)
-0.358
(0.234)
0.408***
(0.136)
-0.037
(0.284)
-0.309
(0.250)
-0.289
(0.277)

-0.075
(0.243)

0.079
(0.269)

-0.2
(0.363)

0.529
(0.662)

-0.128
(0.415)

0.641
(0.715)

0.209
(0.452)
0.328
(0.464)

1.058
(0.787)
1.234
(0.830)

-1.498

(0.748)
Private Enrollment
per 100 TPS Students
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of state_id

-106.7***
(28.120)
649
0.643
50

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.131**

(1.137)
-0.138**

(0.063)
-142.5***
(41.910)
300
0.642
50

(0.063)
-121.2***
(44.860)
300
0.645
50
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Additional Analyses and Results
As stated previously, the analyses shown in Table 8 are limited by suspicion of
endogeneity between the dependent variable, proportional charter enrollment, and the primary
independent variable of interest, proportional TPS FTE per 100 adults. Although I address this
endogeneity to some extent with the panel data fixed-effects method and the secondary variable
of interest, annual percentage change in TPS FTE per 100 adults, some concern remains.
Two characteristics researched in previous literature are absent from my initial analysis:
union strength and rural versus urban populations. Multiple-year data were unavailable for both
of these variables. Creating a workaround for the rural-versus-urban population spread in states
might be challenging because of changing demographic patterns in some areas. Hence, this study
is limited to some extent by the exclusion of this control variable. Later I discuss the extent to
which the rural nature of states might be reflected in the RTW analyses.
However, union strength can be proxied using states’ status with regard to Right-to-Work
(RTW) laws. RTW laws grant states the authority to determine whether workers must join a
labor union to get or keep a job (NCSL, n.d.). States without RTW laws therefore allow unions
to determine this employment criterion. As of this writing, 27 states had RTW laws and 23 states
allowed unions to control union membership as an employment criterion (NCSL, n.d.).
I create a binary variable wherein a “1” indicates a state is a RTW state, and a “0”
indicates the state does not have a RTW law. While most of states’ RTW laws have existed for
decades, a few states passed their laws only recently. To account for this issue in my data, I
count as “RTW states” only those states that had RTW laws in place during the entire span of
time their charter school laws have been in place. This restriction results in 23 states with RTW
laws for my analysis, and I count the remaining 27 states as non-RTW states.
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With the RTW variable added, I first segregate the two state groups and redeploy my
models for each group. Along with the strong, highly statistically significant, negative coefficient
of interest in the original model resulting from the 50-state analysis, anecdotal evidence
influenced me to not expect to see a large difference between the two state groups. Anecdotally, I
knew that Arizona and Kansas both were RTW states, even though they were on opposite ends
of the spectrum on both my dependent variable and my independent variable of interest.
However, my analysis lacks the potentially important consideration of states’ relative rural
nature. Therefore, I make no hypothesis about the relationship between proportional charter
enrollment and proportional TPS FTE staff.
Table 9 shows the results of this initial RTW analysis alongside those of the original 50state regression. As shown, the two state groups diverge dramatically. All other things being
equal, states with RTW laws show an even larger negative and statistically significant
association between proportional TPS FTE and proportional charter school enrollment than did
all 50 states in the initial models; further, states without RTW laws show a positive, though
statistically insignificant, association between these two variables.
The fact that the coefficient for my variable of interest diverges so dramatically between
the two groups of states provides evidence that endogeneity between the dependent variable and
the variable of interest is minimal. If the relationship were endogenous, one would expect similar
coefficients between the two groups of states.56
This was not the only coefficient by which the two state groups differ. All other things
equal, racial and ethnic differences are more pronounced and party politics make a bigger

56

Some experts recommend controlling for endogeneity in situations such as these by regressing the year-to-year
change in the variables in question. While here I use another way to control for endogeneity which reveals important
underlying associations, I show the year-to-year change regression results in Appendix C.
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difference in RTW states (though statistical significance varies depending on the model used).
Moreover, a pattern emerges between the two state groups when examining the year fixed
effects, with RTW states generally showing negative associations for most years while non-RTW
states generally show positive associations, all else equal.

Table 9
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Segregated-States Analysis
Charter Enrollment
per 100 TPS Students
TPS FTE/100 Adults
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS FTE/100
Total Population (log)
Pct Black Non-Hispanic
Pct. Hispanic
2.Party-All 3 Dem. (Gov, Sen, Hs)
3.Party-Split, Gov Different
4.Party-Split, Sen/Hs Different
2002.year
2003.year
2004.year
2008.year
2009.year
2010.year
2011.year

Model A: PP Exp Included; Priv Enr Excluded
(1)
(2)
(3)
50 States; No
States w/
States w/o
RTW Distinction
RTW Laws
RTW Laws
-0.951***
-2.801***
0.331
(0.344)
(0.672)
(0.356)
0.017*
0.029*
-0.004
(0.010)
(0.016)
(0.011)
7.944***
17.75***
7.057***
(1.762)
(3.603)
(2.063)
-0.384***
-0.799***
-0.308*
(0.146)
(0.220)
(0.176)
0.524***
0.770***
0.313***
(0.086)
(0.178)
(0.082)
-0.050
-0.788**
-0.198
(0.182)
(0.358)
(0.194)
-0.311**
-0.830***
-0.546***
(0.156)
(0.268)
(0.175)
-0.323*
-0.623*
-0.059
(0.176)
(0.357)
(0.172)
0.095
-0.304
0.27
(0.222)
(0.371)
(0.229)
0.086
-0.762*
0.549**
(0.234)
(0.396)
(0.242)
0.151
-1.277***
0.912***
(0.256)
(0.456)
(0.263)
0.452
-3.175***
2.323***
(0.434)
(0.879)
(0.426)
0.484
-3.431***
2.546***
(0.453)
(0.913)
(0.446)
0.686
-3.398***
2.826***
(0.468)
(0.942)
(0.462)
0.681
-3.735***
2.990***
(0.481)
(0.970)
(0.482)

0.079
(0.269)

-0.873*
(0.470)

0.626**
(0.280)

0.529
(0.662)

-3.986***
(1.435)

3.131***
(0.645)

0.641
(0.715)

-4.485***
(1.561)

3.541***
(0.706)
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Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl.
(1)
(2)
(3)
50 States; No
States w/
States w/o
RTW Distinction
RTW Laws
RTW Laws
-1.534**
-3.910***
0.0869
(0.617)
(1.145)
(0.624)
0.016
0.053
-0.025
(0.021)
(0.035)
(0.021)
9.419***
21.25***
8.117**
(2.858)
(5.895)
(3.250)
-0.358
-0.471
-0.533*
(0.234)
(0.364)
(0.287)
0.408***
0.716**
0.113
(0.136)
(0.273)
(0.136)
-0.037
-0.527
-0.435
(0.284)
(0.562)
(0.307)
-0.309
-1.062**
-0.668**
(0.250)
(0.459)
(0.278)
-0.289
-0.433
-0.059
(0.277)
(0.568)
(0.269)

Table 9 (cont.)
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Segregated-States Analysis
2012.year
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
2016.year
Expenditures per Pupil
(Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; log)

0.883*
(0.499)
1.071**
(0.526)
1.166**
(0.553)
1.410**
(0.580)
1.524**
(0.613)

-3.686***
(0.998)
-3.705***
(1.059)
-3.872***
(1.111)
-3.855***
(1.163)
-4.037***
(1.226)

3.262***
(0.501)
3.509***
(0.529)
3.758***
(0.558)
4.081***
(0.586)
4.333***
(0.620)

-1.086
(0.748)

3.793**
(1.593)

-106.7***
(28.120)
649
0.643
50

-287.1***
(57.080)
298
0.65
23

1.058
(0.787)
1.234
(0.830)

-4.596***
(1.714)
-4.791***
(1.790)

4.235***
(0.783)
4.602***
(0.836)

-3.523***
(0.709)

-1.498
(1.137)
-0.138**
(0.063)

4.416*
(2.480)
-0.109
-0.141

-4.665***
(1.086)
-0.135**
(0.062)

-74.77**
(31.880)
351
0.751
27

-121.2***
(44.860)
300
0.645
50

-344.7***
(94.850)
138
0.661
23

-74.3
(49.380)
162
0.769
27

Private Enrollment
per 100 TPS Students
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of state_id

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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To provide greater precision, I employ an interaction between states’ FTE per 100 adults
and their RTW law status. I revise my model as follows, by adding an interaction variable.
!ℎ#$%!" = '# + )$ '$ *+#!" + )% '% ,-$!" + .& '& +/0123/4!"
+ .' '' 35%364-2#.4$7!" + .( '( 3%-8#$%100+3;!" + )) ') 31%0<,-.!"
+ .* '* *+#_>+?!" + @
where *+#_>+?!" is the interaction between proportional TPS FTE and the binary variable
wherein a “1” represents states with RTW laws.
As shown in Table 10, the association between proportional TPS FTE and proportional
charter enrollment results in an additional coefficient of -1.267 (p=0.1) or -1.001 (p>0.1),
depending on the model, in states with RTW laws, all things equal. This coefficient is additive to
that of states without such laws, i.e., -0.5 or -1.125 (p>0.1). Hence, in states with RTW laws, a
one-unit increase in TPS FTE per 100 adults is associated with a 1.8- to 2.1-unit decrease in
charter enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled. The joint significance test shows the addition
of the interaction term, along with the FTE variable, is significant at the 95% confidence level in
the complete model.

Table 10
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Interaction
Model A: PP Exp Included; Priv Enr Excluded

Charter Enrollment
per 100 TPS Students
Difference in effect of TPS
FTE/100 Adults on Charter Enr:
RTW vs. non-RTW States
TPS FTE/100 Adults
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS
FTE/100
Total Population (log)
Pct Black Non-Hispanic
Pct. Hispanic
2.Party-All 3 Dem.
(Gov,Sen,Hs)
3.Party-Split, Gov Different
4.Party-Split, Sen/Hs Different

(1) 50
States; No
RTW
Distinction

-0.951***
(0.344)
0.017*
(0.010)
7.944***
(1.762)
-0.384***
(0.146)
0.524***
(0.086)
-0.050
(0.182)
-0.311**
(0.156)
-0.323*
(0.176)

(2) States
w/ RTW
Laws

-2.801***
(0.672)
0.029*
(0.016)
17.75***
(3.603)
-0.799***
(0.220)
0.770***
(0.178)
-0.788**
(0.358)
-0.830***
(0.268)
-0.623*
(0.357)

(3) States
w/o
RTW Laws

0.331
(0.356)
-0.004
(0.011)
7.057***
(2.063)
-0.308*
(0.176)
0.313***
(0.082)
-0.198
(0.194)
-0.546***
(0.175)
-0.059
(0.172)

Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl.

(4) RTW
Interaction

-1.267*
(0.646)
-0.496
(0.414)
0.016
(0.010)
7.535***
(1.770)
-0.412***
(0.146)
0.534***
(0.086)
-0.024
(0.182)
-0.297*
(0.155)
-0.281
(0.177)

(1) 50
States; No
RTW
Distinction

(2) States
w/
RTW
Laws

(3) States
w/o
RTW Laws

~
-1.534**
(0.617)
0.016
(0.021)
9.419***
(2.858)
-0.358
(0.234)
0.408***
(0.136)
-0.037
(0.284)
-0.309
(0.250)
-0.289
(0.277)

-3.910***
(1.145)
0.053
(0.035)
21.25***
(5.895)
-0.471
(0.364)
0.716**
(0.273)
-0.527
(0.562)
-1.062**
(0.459)
-0.433
(0.568)

0.0869
(0.624)
-0.025
(0.021)
8.117**
(3.250)
-0.533*
(0.287)
0.113
(0.136)
-0.435
(0.307)
-0.668**
(0.278)
-0.059
(0.269)

(4) RTW
Interaction

-1.001
(1.077)
-1.125
(0.758)
0.016
(0.021)
8.937***
(2.906)
-0.374
(0.235)
0.421***
(0.137)
-0.006
(0.286)
-0.285
(0.251)
-0.273
(0.278)

~
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Table 10 (cont.)
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Interaction
Model A: PP Exp Included; Priv Enr Excluded
Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl.
(1) All 50;
(2) RTW
(3) Non(4) RTW
(1) All 50;
(2) RTW
(3) Non(4) RTW
No RTW
States
RTW States Interaction
No RTW
States
RTW States
Interaction
0.0951
-0.304
0.27
0.066
(0.222)
(0.371)
(0.229)
(0.222)
2003.year
0.086
-0.762*
0.549**
0.055
0.079
-0.873*
0.626**
0.058
(0.234)
(0.396)
(0.242)
(0.233)
(0.269)
(0.470)
(0.280)
(0.270)
2004.year
0.151
-1.277***
0.912***
0.101
(0.256)
(0.456)
(0.263)
(0.257)
2008.year
0.452
-3.175***
2.323***
0.37
(0.434)
(0.879)
(0.426)
(0.435)
2009.year
0.484
-3.431***
2.546***
0.403
0.529
-3.986***
3.131***
0.464
(0.453)
(0.913)
(0.446)
(0.454)
(0.662)
(1.435)
(0.645)
(0.666)
2010.year
0.686
-3.398***
2.826***
0.6
(0.468)
(0.942)
(0.462)
(0.469)
2011.year
0.681
-3.735***
2.990***
0.59
0.641
-4.485***
3.541***
0.577
(0.481)
(0.970)
(0.482)
(0.482)
(0.715)
(1.561)
(0.706)
(0.719)
2012.year
0.883*
-3.686***
3.262***
0.798
(0.499)
(0.998)
(0.501)
(0.500)
2013.year
1.071**
-3.705***
3.509***
0.969*
1.058
-4.596***
4.235***
0.985
(0.526)
(1.059)
(0.529)
(0.527)
(0.787)
(1.714)
(0.783)
(0.791)
2014.year
1.166**
-3.872***
3.758***
1.061*
1.234
-4.791***
4.602***
1.156
(0.553)
(1.111)
(0.558)
(0.555)
(0.830)
(1.790)
(0.836)
(0.834)
2015.year
1.410**
-3.855***
4.081***
1.305**
(0.580)
(1.163)
(0.586)
(0.581)
2016.year
1.524**
-4.037***
4.333***
1.408**
(0.613)
(1.226)
(0.620)
(0.615)
Expenditures per Pupil
-1.086
3.793**
-3.523***
-0.834
-1.498
4.416*
-4.665***
-1.28
(Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; log)
(0.748)
(1.593)
(0.709)
(0.757)
(1.137)
(2.480)
(1.086)
(1.161)
Constant
-106.7***
-287.1***
-74.77**
-102.3***
-121.2***
-344.7***
-74.3
-115.8**
(28.120)
(57.080)
(31.880)
(28.140)
(44.860)
(94.850)
(49.380)
(45.260)
Observations
649
298
351
649
300
138
162
300
R-squared
0.643
0.65
0.751
0.645
0.645
0.661
0.769
0.646
Number of state_id
50
23
27
50
50
23
27
50
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
~ Joint Significance Tests: Variables of Interest:
Variables of Interest
Model A: PP Exp Incl.; Priv Enr Excl.
Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl.
1-Difference in effect of TPS FTE/100 Adults
on Charter Enr:RTW vs. non-RTW States;
-1.763 (p=0.01)
-2.126 (p=0.05)
2-TPS FTE/100 Adults
Charter Enrollment
per 100 TPS Students
2002.year

140

141
Discussion
I seek to quantify the relationship between a state’s traditional public school (TPS)
organizational power, measured by the proportion of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff per 100
adults in the state, to the presence and strength of the state’s charter school law, measured by the
proportion of charter students enrolled per 100 TPS students enrolled two years after the FTE
proportional measure. Using a panel data fixed effects model and controlling for variables
researched in previous literature for which I could obtain multiple-year data or a suitable
alternative, under the interaction model I show evidence of a strong and statistically significant
(p=0.05) inverse association between a RTW state’s FTE per 100 adults and its later charter
enrollment per 100 TPS students in the complete model. The ratio between the two variables is
approximately -2.1:1; translated, this means that in RTW states every unit increase in the
proportion of FTE per 100 adults is associated with a 2.1-unit decrease in charter enrollment per
100 TPS students in those states.
Two control variables show highly statistically significant (p=.01) associations under the
complete interaction model. The total population and the percent of Hispanic population
variables produced positive coefficients. Although highly statistically significant, neither of these
coefficients was large. No other associations, including the percent of non-Hispanic Black
population, were statistically significant. The percent Hispanic variable coefficient was
consistent with findings of previous literature (Stoddard and Corcoran, 2007). The percent Black
non-Hispanic coefficient was negative and insignificant, and hence it does not appear to be
consistent with previous literature (Stoddard and Corcoran, 2007). However, the proportion of
Black population within states has been shrinking relative to other racial and ethnic groups, so
the small negative coefficient might be a statistical artifact of this shift.
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The controls dealing with partisan split between the governor’s office and the two
legislative chambers were negative, relative to all being held by Republicans or Republican
majorities. However, they were statistically insignificant, making this finding generally null and
therefore inconsistent with previous literature.
I am left with the limitation that I have not specifically analyzed rural versus urban
differences across states with respect to proportional charter school enrollment, while also
considering my TPS power variable of interest. Using the RTW distinctions provides some level
of rural-vs.-urban comparative analysis, since strong unions dominate in largely urban states.
However, no state is completely rural nor completely urban, and thus additional study would be
necessary to conclude with certainty that the RTW-related findings clearly and solidly reflect
rural-vs.-urban differences. While questions remain regarding the extent to which the relative
rural versus urban nature of these states is driving the differences, it is possible that these
differences are (a) related to a state’s RTW (and, hence, union) status, and/or (b) reflected in the
year fixed effects. In revisiting the segregated results of RTW versus non-RTW states (Table 7,
Models 2 and 3), clear differences are apparent between the two state groups. The positive
association between log of population growth and proportional charter enrollment growth for
RTW states is more than twice the size of that for non-RTW states. Likewise, there are sizeable
distinctions between the coefficients for percent Black and percent Hispanic. All of these withinstate coefficients, though different for the two state groups, still reflect the same sign – e.g., if
negative for one group, the association is also negative for the other group. The year fixed effects
analysis, using between-states measures, shows a different outcome, with associations generally
being negative for RTW states and positive for non-RTW states. However, these differences do
not change the general conclusion that there is a large negative association between proportional
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charter enrollment and TPS power as expressed through my variable of interest. Additional
research might better illuminate the true situation.
Importantly, these results comport with the literature on two states’ charter school
politics. Tran (2021) finds that teacher count is not associated with the successful passage of the
2016 Massachusetts charter school referendum, while Conaway, Scafidi, and Stephenson (2016)
find to the contrary that public schools exhibited protective power against the 2012 Georgia
Charter Schools Amendment Referendum through their staffing numbers. Notably, Georgia is a
RTW state, while Massachusetts is not.
Additionally, regarding union politics, Maranto (2005, 2020) and Moe (2011) find that
the TPS institution behaves differently in non-union states. Following the results of this analysis
coupled with both public choice theory and the previously mentioned literature on non-union
states, one might conclude that the TPS institution steps up to defend itself against interlopers.
My major finding provides strong quantitative evidence that the monopolistic,
centralized, and multi-layered government institution of public education in at least RTW states
has considerable influence on whether and to what extent the charter school alternative can be
predicted to exist. In these states the larger the state’s TPS institution, the lower the chance for
charter educational opportunities to exist. Again, the difference between RTW states and nonRTW states suggests that in RTW states, the institution steps up to protect itself against the
charter alternatives. Moreover, based on this analysis, it appears that bureaucratic, rather than
partisan, politics affect charter school strength in RTW states.
This finding is particularly concerning for disadvantaged students in RTW states,
including low-income students and students of color, who find themselves unable to opt out of
the TPS system governing their area of residence. Without alternatives such as high-quality
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charters, disadvantaged students will continue to have no choice but to attend the public school
assigned to them. Under this system, it is important to remember that the staff in public schools
which are filled with students who have no other options – i.e., the institution itself – has little to
no incentive to improve the educational outcomes for these students.
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Chapter 6 – Charter School Closing Inequities: Do Automatic Closure Laws Target Black
Charter Entrepreneurs and Black Students?57
Introduction
Inherent to the charter school innovation is the explicit bargain that in exchange for
substantial autonomy, charter schools which fail to succeed will face closure, providing strong
incentives for successful outcomes in serving students (Hassel, 1999). Many charter schools do
in fact close, though this itself poses issues regarding racial inequity. Paino, Boylan and Renzulli
(2017) report that from 1994 to 2005, 1-4% of charter schools closed each year (n=416), with
78% doing so in their first four years after opening. Controlling for variables including school
age, size, measured achievement, and free and reduced lunch percentage of students, they find no
relationship with the percentage of Hispanic and white enrollment, but that a 1% increase in
African American enrollment is associated with a 1% increase in the likelihood of closure.
Controlling for age, region, and urbanicity, an 80% African American school would have a
roughly 4.6% annual likelihood of closure, compared to roughly 2.3% for an 80% white school.
This research does not consider the race of the charter school founder as a predictor of school
closure, nor probe potential interaction between race and regulatory policy environment. Both
merit consideration, especially given research finding that African American operators are less
likely to be awarded charters, particularly where the regulatory barriers to receiving a charter are
high (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020).
Here, using data from the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ElSi), a National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) web application, as well as successful (i.e. accepted)
petitions to open charter schools submitted between 2010-2020, we can provide better
57
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understanding of whether charter schools that were founded by African Americans or serve a
greater percentage of African American students are more likely to close, and specifically
whether the regulatory barriers that disparately preclude market entry also disproportionately
predict market exit. As detailed below, the data do in fact indicate that charter schools started by
African Americans and serving relatively more African American students are more likely to
close, particularly in states with automatic closure provisions.
Literature Review
An enormous literature details multifaceted racial inequities in public schools. Prior work
explores a wide range of phenomena including student discipline, student attainment and
achievement, and even hiring and promotion into school leadership (works within Milner &
Lomotoy, 2014; Carroll, Cheng, Maranto & Teodoro, In Press). Importantly, policymakers
created charter schools in part to empower teachers (Cheng, Maranto, & Shakeel, 2020; Maranto,
2015) and to serve marginalized ethnic communities (works in Fox and Buchanan, 2014), but
even more to close “achievement gaps” as measured by test scores, particularly for African
American and Latinx students (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). Quantitative evidence
indicates that certain charter schools have succeeded in closing achievement gaps (Cheng, Hitt,
Kisida & Mills, 2017), though researchers have questioned the means used (Golann, 2015), and
whether mere increases in test scores have substantial positive long term impacts on student
success (Ladner, 2018). An additional literature offers widely contested findings regarding nonacademic impacts from market-based approaches to public schooling, including increased use of
charter schooling. For example, former Chicago Public Schools CEO and U.S. Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan (2018) argues that closing low performing urban schools and replacing
those schools with charter schools or other public school options has short-term costs to students
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and their communities, but offers long term benefits by improving human capital among the least
well off, offering the most disadvantaged students greater opportunities. In contrast, Morel
(2018) contends that closing district schools and replacing them with charter schools politically
disempowers communities of color and reduces public employment of African American
education professionals. In short, the impacts of charter schooling on racial equity involve
complex, intellectually contested terrain.
An important, but less examined aspect of neoliberal education reform begins with the
reality that it is not only traditional public schools which close after failing to meet specified
criteria. A small, but important literature examines charter school opening and closing, processes
which are indeed central to the charter school model, which proposes autonomy in exchange for
accountability, including the threat of closure. Market accountability is one part of this: if a
school fails to please, parents may leave for other options, closing a school by voting with their
feet. Yet charter schools also face administrative accountability, disciplinary or closure decisions
made by the public bodies such as school boards and state departments of education which
granted their charter. In practice administrative accountability may involve highly detailed
rulemaking and complex administrative judgements on the part of regulators regarding whether
performance is adequate (Hassel, 1999; Maranto, 2015). In practice such decisions, like charter
authorization decisions, may reflect the biases of regulators. There is indeed a longstanding
literature regarding how regulation has systematically disadvantaged African Americans in
housing (Massey & Denton, 1998), professional licensure and employment (Dorsey, 1983;
Friedman, 1962), and civil service employment (King, 1995). More recently, some have applied
insights from these areas to the provision of charter schools.
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While factors including financial stability and academic performance influence charter
school approval and survival, research also finds empirical evidence of discrimination in policymaking systems. Using a Critical Race Theory approach to study the charter authorizing process
in post-Katrina New Orleans, Henry (2021) argues that a charter authorizing process ostensibly
engineered as “neutral, benign, and objective” is in fact a gatekeeping mechanism that tends to
privilege elites and punish people of color. Some African American charter entrepreneurs have
echoed these concerns. The African American Charter Schools Coalition formed in Philadelphia
in 2020, their mission predicated on the observation that Black-led charters face greater obstacles
regarding oversight, expansion, and renewal (Graham, 2020).
Regarding charter school closing, studying Florida charter schools, Jameson (2017) finds
that measured school academic performance, age, and size all correlate negatively with the
likelihood of closure: in short newer, lower performing, and smaller charters are more likely to
close. Roughly in accord with these findings, coding charter applications from eight states and
New Orleans in the 2010-18 period, Kingsbury, Maranto and Karns (2020) find that charter
schools associated with charter management organizations, which are more often led by whites,
are less likely to close. Comparing the large and lightly regulated Arizona charter sector to
comparable traditional public schools, Milliman (2016) finds that lower academic performance
increases the likelihood that charters will close, while having no impact on other public schools.
Milliman does not explore the impacts of race. In contrast to Milliman, in a quantitative and
qualitative study of North Carolina charter school closures, Paino, Renzulli, Boylan and Bradley
(2014) find evidence that market (parent exit), financial, and administrative/bureaucratic factors
influence closing; academic results do not have direct impacts. Similarly, in their study of Ohio
charter schools, Gilblom and Sang (2019) find little statistical evidence that measured academic
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achievement affects the likelihood of charter closure, but considerable evidence that integrated
schools are more likely to survive while predominately white and predominately African
American schools are more likely to close. Also studying the Ohio charter market, though over a
different time period, Carlson and Lavertu (2016) find evidence that mandatory closures of low
performing charter schools in Ohio led to modest improvement in charter school academic value
added over time, as Duncan (2018) indicated regarding closings of low performing district
schools in Chicago.
Here, we build on prior research regarding the role of race and regulation in shaping
charter school markets, to test four hypotheses regarding disparate impacts of charter school
closing on under-represented communities. We add to the literature by specifically assessing
whether automatic closure disparately impacts charter founded by or serving African Americans.
Automatic closure laws establish “tripwires” that require authorities to close the school. In nonautomatic closure states, charter schools are subjected to individualized progress and procedural
assessments likely involving opportunities to correct deficiencies.
We hypothesize that:
•

H1: The proportion of African American students in a charter school will be
positively related to charter school closure.

•

H2: In states with automatic charter closing provisions, schools serving larger
percentages of African American students will be relatively more likely to close.

•

H3: Charter schools started by African American educational entrepreneurs will be
relatively more likely to close than those started by other educational entrepreneurs.

•

H4: In states with automatic charter closing provisions, schools started by African
American educational entrepreneurs will be relatively more likely to close.
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Methods
Testing our hypotheses requires data about which charter schools closed, the student
demographics of charters schools, and the race of the charter school founder. The first two
variables are available through the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ElSi), a National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) web application. Notably, ElSi does not provide
information about why certain charter schools closed, but rather the timeframe in which they
operated or ceased operating. Ideally, we would be able to disentangle the precise reason why a
charter ceased operations--- whether it comes about from charter revocation, voluntary closure,
transition into a traditional public school or some other factor---to bring greater clarity to our
analyses. This is a limitation in that we lack data to determine whether closings reflect market or
regulatory accountability. Policymakers like Keegan (2001) and academics like Maranto (2015)
and Yancey (2000) suggest that that regulatory warnings or sanctions may reduce enrollment
from parents, suggesting interactions between the two processes. Nevertheless, whether a
cessation of operations is a market sanction (i.e. low enrollment or financial mismanagement) or
was imposed by external public authorities, the data can test our hypotheses.
Identifying the race of the charter school founder is less straightforward. We code the
race of the “contact person” identified on the petition originally submitted for charter
authorization. The “contact person” (henceforth, founder) is likely the most deeply involved of
the founding members, and their race serves a reasonable proxy for the composition of the
founding group (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020).58 Charter school petitions do not identify
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the racial identity of the founder. We code race by performing an internet search of the name of
the founder---along with their affiliated charter school or other details identified in the petition
(e.g. place of residence or occupation)---and then use our best judgement to identify their racial
classification. McCormick et al. (2015, p. 393) conclude that such practices tend to deliver
accurate results, and that social scientists should consider social media “as a valuable source of
demographic information to answer relevant social science questions.” To assess the validity of
our coding process, a second coder reviewed a random sample of 50 charter petitions and coded
the race of the main point of contact. The two coders agreed in 45 of 50 cases (intercoder
agreement=90%).
Charter school petitions are not publicly housed in one domain. Rather, custody of
records varies from state to state, and typically from authorizer to authorizer. To access as many
records as possible, we collected all publicly available records of charter schools that opened
between 2010-2020.59 In states with charter school laws that did not make records publicly
available, we contacted the state charter agency to request records of charters opened between
2010 and 2020, and then issued official public record requests if our informal request went
unanswered. A summary of where the charter petitions were collected from is available in Table
11. Several requests were denied, and we therefore do not have petitions from all states with
charter schools. Moreover, because custody varies by authorizer, the petitions we received are
typically not the universe of successful petitions submitted in that state, but the ones submitted to
a particular authorizer or authorizers. In all, we collected 925 successful petitions from 24 states.

59

We limit the sample to these years due to our supposition that earlier records might not be digitized or readily
accessible.

156
Table 11
Charter Petitions by State and Means Collected
State Petitions How Petitions were Procured
Collected
AR
39
Publicly available
AZ
70
Publicly available
CT
6
Shared upon request
CO
51
Received through public records request
DE
9
Publicly available
FL
180
Publicly available
GA
26
Shared upon request
ID
26
Shared upon request
IN
25
Publicly available
LA
22
Shared upon request
MA 27
Publicly available
MO 8
Publicly available
NC
92
Publicly available
NJ
16
Shared upon request
NM 23
Publicly available
NV
3
Shared upon request
NY
146
Publicly available
OH
10
Publicly available
OK
19
Publicly available
OR
5
Shared upon request
PA
30
Received through public records request
RI
8
Shared upon request
SC
68
Received through public records request
TX
16
Publicly available
We use Education Commission of the States (ECS) data (2018) to determine whether a
state employs automatic closure laws and the timing of such laws, as seen in Table 12. Notably,
ECS categorizes four states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington) as automatic
closure states despite statutory language that suggests otherwise. We classify these four states as
automatic closure states in our estimates, and confirmed that the underlying results are not
sensitive to their inclusion or exclusion.
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Table 12
Automatic Closure Provisions by State
State
Alabama
District of Columbia
Florida
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Michigan
Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
Ohio
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas

Utah
Washington

Statute
Ala. Code § 16-6F-8
D.C. Code § 38-1802.13; D.C. Code § 381802.13
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1002.33

Year Adopted
2016
1996

Ind. Code Ann. § 20-24-2.2-2
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1907 (transferred to 724209)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:3992
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.507
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 160.405(8)(b)
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388A.300
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 194-B:16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3314.35
Okla. Stat. ttl. 70, § 3-137
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 16-77
S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-110; S.C. Code Ann. §
59-40-111
Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-122
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.027; §12.063; and
§ 12.115

2011
1994

Utah Code Ann. § 53A-1a-510 (repealed)
New Statute: 53G-5-503
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.710.200

2012

1997
2009
1998
2013
1995
2006
2015
2016
2002
2014
Home Rule
charters: 1995;
Campus or Campus
Program charters:
1997;
Open Enrollment
charters: 2013
2014
2013

Results
Hypotheses 1 and 2 use data from ElSi. Therefore, to test these hypotheses, we use data
that encompasses all charter schools that were opened between 2010-11 and 2018-19, the most
recent year for which ElSi provides data. We treat schools operating as charters in that year as
open, whereas we consider schools opened in 2010-11 or thereafter but closed or operating as
traditional public schools (i.e. charter to district conversions) in 2018-19 as closed.
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Descriptive statistics (Table 13) lend support to our hypotheses. Among majority Black60
charter schools, 604 of 1,894 (31.9%) closed. Among all other charter schools, 900 of 4,058
(22.2%) closed. Moreover, automatic closure appears to impact schools differently depending
upon their racial composition. In settings with automatic closure, 409 of 1,063 (38.5%) charters
that served a majority Black student body closed, compared to just 205 of 1,404 (14.6%) of other
charters. By comparison, majority-Black charters in states without automatic closure were 2.7
percentage points less likely to close compared to all other schools (23.5% to 26.2%).

Table 13
Charter Closure Rates by Student Racial Composition and Automatic Closure61
Student
Demographics

Number and % of
Charters that Closed

Majority Black

604/1,894
(31.1%)
900/4,058
(22.2%)

All Others

Number/% of Charters that
Closed in States with
Automatic Closure
409/1,063
(38.5%)
205/1,404
(14.6%)

Number/% of Charters that
Closed in States Without
Automatic Closure
195/831
(23.5%)
695/2,654
(26.2%)

In our fully specified linear probability model62 we express closure as a function of the
proportion of African American students63, automatic closure, and an interaction between those

60

For this and other analysis that uses student demographics, we use ElSi data to calculate the average proportion of
African American enrollment during the time period beginning in 2010-11 and ending 2018-19.
61
Observations from states with automatic closure are categorized as “without automatic closure” if they were
closed before the automatic closure provision was enacted. For example, a Florida charter that closed in 2011-12
would not be scored as subject to automatic closure. A Florida charter that closed in 2012-13 or later would be
scored as subject to automatic closure. Our method might occasionally misapply an automatic closure label, as
school closing information and automatic closure statutes are not defined at a more granular level than the year in
which they occurred. These “bubble” schools (i.e. the closure school year overlaps with the timing of the automatic
closure statute) comprise less than 1% of our dataset.
62
ElSi tables specifically denote whether a school has ceased operations. For reasons unclear, sometimes ElSi
reports zero enrollment during years in which the school is reported to be operating, although the estimates generally
return to a non-zero number after one year. As a sensitivity test, we omitted schools reporting zero enrollment
during 2018-19 from the analysis. None of the estimates change in practical terms, and none change in terms of
statistical significance.
63
The proportion of African American students is the average proportion of African American students in the school
between 2010-11 and 2018-19, or whatever years the school operated over that span.
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two terms, as well as year opened fixed effects, formally:
Y= β1AASharei + β2AutoClosureit + β3AASharei*AutoClosureit + β4 YearOpenedi + εit
In this and subsequent models, we include a state fixed effect when automatic closure is
not featured as an explanatory variable, but omit it if automatic closure is featured. Given the
high degree of collinearity between the two variables, the inclusion of both variables makes
interpretation of the automatic closure variable challenging.64

64

As a sensitivity test, we check how inclusion of both state FE and automatic closure impacts our estimates. The
impact of the proportion of African American students changes appreciably in model II, increasing from .0003 to
.0019 (p=.01). In model III, the coefficient for that variable becomes positive (.0012) and remains statistically
significant (p=.01). All told, the models affirm our hypothesis about a disparate impact from automatic closure,
although they indicate that all charters are penalized for enrolling more African American students.
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Table 14
Racial Composition and Closure Regression Estimates65
I
Proportion of African
.0019***
American Students
(.0002)
Automatic Closure
Proportion of African
American
Students*Automatic
Closure
Year Opened Fixed Effect
State Fixed Effect
Obs.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.

II
.0002
(.0002)
-.1143***
(.0117)

III
-.0020***
(.0002)
-.2586***
(.0154)

-

-

.0045***
(.0003)

Y
Y
5,458

Y
N
5,458

Y
N
5,458

Regression results (Table 14) support our hypotheses. Among all states, a one percent
increase in the share of African American students is associated with a .19 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of closure after controlling for year opened and state in which the
charter school operates. In the fully specified model (column III), a one percent increase in
African American students is associated with a .20 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of
closure in states without automatic closure. However, in states with automatic closure, a one
percent increase in African American students is associated with a .45 percentage point relative
increase in the likelihood of closure compared to states without automatic closure, all else equal.
Illustratively, the estimates indicate that a charter school in which 30% of the student body is
African American has a 6.0 percentage point lower likelihood of closure compared to a school
with no African American students if the school is in a state without automatic closure.
However, if the 30% African American school is in a state with automatic closure, the school has
a 7.5 percentage point greater likelihood of closing compared to the school with no African
American students.

65

Regression estimates utilize robust standard errors.
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Hypotheses 3 and 4 require us to utilize the dataset that we constructed through soliciting
charter school petitions and coding the race of the main point of contact. Unadjusted differences
(Table 15) hint at the possibility that automatic closure is more punitive to Black charter
entrepreneurs than to others. Among schools started by African American charter leaders in
states that utilize automatic closure criterion, 53.2% closed compared to just 20.4% of charters
founded by others. The incidence of closure is also greater among African American
entrepreneurs in states that do not utilize automatic closure criterion, but the difference is
substantially less pronounced; Among charters founded by African American leaders in states
that do not utilize automatic closure, 18.9% of charters closed compared to 11.5% of charters not
founded by African Americans.
Table 15
Charter Closures by Race and Automatic Closure66
Point of Contact

Number and % of
Charters that Closed

African American

41/132
(31.1%)
94/645
(14.6%)

All Others

66

Number % of Charters
that Closed in States
With Automatic Closure
25/47
(53.2%)
46/226
(20.4%)

Number % of Charters that
Closed in States Without
Automatic Closure
16/85
(18.9%)
48/419
(11.5%)

Observations from states with automatic closure are categorized as “without automatic closure” if they were
closed before the automatic closure provision was enacted.
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To obtain linear probability estimates we express closure as a function of the race of the
founder and other characteristics, formally:

Y= β1AACharterEntrepeneuri + β2AutoClosureit + β3AACharterEntrepeneuri*AutoClosureit +
β4AAStudentSharei+ β5AAStudentSharei*AutoClosureit + β6 YearOpenedi + εit

Though we already assessed the correlation between student racial composition and
closure, we include them in certain iterations of this model. African American charter
entrepreneurs are more likely to serve African American students (r=.49), so the inclusion of
both variables is important to understand which variable, if either, is driving any observed effect.
Once again, we omit the state fixed effect from models that include automatic closure, as
their inclusion makes it challenging to interpret the automatic closure coefficient.67
Linear probability estimates support our hypotheses that charter schools started by
African American charter entrepreneurs are relatively more likely to close than those started by
other charter entrepreneurs, and that they are disproportionately impacted by automatic closure
mandates. Specifically, after controlling for state and year opened, charters with African
American founders are 18.1percentage points more likely to close compared to others. Estimates
also support our hypothesis that African American founders are disparately impacted by
automatic closure. Compared to states and time periods without automatic closure, African
American founded charters are 23.7 percentage points more likely to close after controlling for
whether the founder is African American, automatic closure, and year opened.

67

As a sensitivity test, we included state fixed effects in all models to observe how it effects our variables of
interest. No variables of interest drop in their significance level. However, the interaction term in column IX
becomes statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.

Table 16
Founder Race and Closure Regression Estimates
I
II
III
African
American
.1811*** .1539***
.0700
Charter
(.0412)
(.0406)
(.0445)
Entrepreneur
Automatic
.1257*** .0857***
Closure
(.0293)
(.0304)
African
American
.2365***
Charter
(.0887)
Entrepreneur*
Auto. Closure
Proportion of
African
American
Students
Proportion of
African
American
Students*
Auto. Closure
Year Opened
Y
Y
Y
Fixed Effect
State Fixed
Y
N
N
Effect
Obs.
767
767
767
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

.0285
(.0545)

.0358
(.0562)

-

-

-

.0787*
(.0429)

.0917**
(.0436)

.0369
(.0308)

.0207
(.0421)

-

.0650**
(.0280)

.0065
(.0388)

.0135
(.0434)

-

.1627*
(.0983)

.1367
(.1111)

-

-

-

-

-

.0008
(.0005)

.0006
(.0006)

.0022***
(.0005)

.0016***
(.0005)

.0009*
(.0005)

.0003
(.0006)

.0016***
(.0006)

-

.0006
(.0012)

-

-

.0017*
(.0010)

.0014
(.0009)

-

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

649

649

717

717

717

649

649
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Insofar as student and founder demographics are correlated, regression analysis indicates
that both factors independently predict closure, although the finding is sensitive to model
specification. Moreover, the estimates generally affirm that automatic closure disparately
impacts both Black founders and schools that serve a larger share of African American students
even when accounting for the other variable.
Discussion
Linear probability estimates support our four hypotheses. Charter schools are more likely
to close when they educate more African American students and more likely to close when they
were founded by an African American charter entrepreneur. Moreover, automatic closure
mandates appear to disparately impact charter schools that serve more African American
students or those founded by an African American charter entrepreneur.
Notably, recent research (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020) indicates that African
American charter leaders are less likely to be affiliated with charter management organizations
or education management organizations compared to other charter leaders. Information about
association with an EMO or CMO were not systematically or consistently recorded in the charter
petitions that we accessed, so we cannot conclude to what degree that might explain the higher
incidence of closure or disparate effect from automatic closure laws. Given that EMOs and
CMOs have expertise in navigating state charter laws and regulations, it is plausible that schools
affiliated with them are less likely to be closed down, and that this phenomenon may help
explain the greater incidence of closure among charters founded by African Americans.
Our examination is limited by the fact that we did not distinguish between different
states’ automatic closure laws. Automatic closure provisions vary widely across states. While
consistently providing one or more “tripwires,” states with auto-closure provisions differ in
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which tripwires they use. For example, several states require automatic closure if a school fails to
meet certain academic performance expectations, but those expectations differ. Some states
allow for discretion at the charter school level – allowing a charter school serving a highly
challenging student body to set and meet performance standards realistic to the specific students
being served. Other states require all charter schools meet uniform performance or growth
standards, regardless of the specific student body served. Another auto-closure trigger, relating to
charter school fiscal conditions, varies among the states from specific (i.e., a charter’s failure to
meet accepted accounting principles) to language that allows greater interpretation (i.e., a charter
displays a “pattern” of unacceptable accounting practices). Thus, the condition of automatic
closure is not the same from state to state, and further study could discern whether stricter autoclosure laws exacerbate the racially inequitable outcomes that we observe in our study.
Regardless of underlying cause, our observations about how student and founder
demographics predict charter school closure should raise alarm among policymakers and
advocates. For those who intrinsically value charter schools as institutions authentically rooted in
and empowering the communities they serve, our findings---in conjunction with the observation
that African Americans are disproportionately denied charters in the first place---raise concern
about the degree to which charter schooling has strayed from its original mission. For those who
view charter schools as a means to better outcomes rather an end unto themselves, our findings
raise questions about whether charter school closures---especially those caused by automatic
closure laws---benefit the students they serve. Concerns are elevated by the fact that African
American staff tend to benefit African American students, often in ways not detected by test
scores (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020; works in Milner & Lomotey, 2014). In the same
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vein, perhaps charters founded by African American charter entrepreneurs benefit African
American students in ways not detected by test scores.
Our findings also invite fresh deliberation about the merits of automatic charter closure
laws. As of 2011, approximately 1 in 5 charters that close do so because they fail to meet
performance benchmarks (Consoletti, 2011). The topic of automatic closure laws is contentious
even among pro-charter organizations, as it exposes a rift between the “market model” and
“regulatory model” of charter schooling (Hess, 2004). The National Association for Charter
School Authorizers “encourages states to establish in statute a process for automatic closure of
underperforming charter schools” (NACSA, n.d.). The National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools echoes that sentiment (Ziebarth, 2015), whereas the Center for Education Reform posits
that foot voting by parents should ultimately arbitrate questions of school quality (Consoletti,
2011). Overall, the evidence base to support their differing positions is mixed. On one hand, a
study in Ohio indicated that charter school students academically benefited in math when their
schools are shuttered due to mandatory closure laws (Carlson & Lavertu, 2016). On the other
hand, a national study indicates that more stringent charter regulatory regimes are not predictive
of stronger achievement on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) exams (Wolf
et al., 2021).
Clearly, this is an area on which more research is needed, so that policymakers can make
better informed choices regarding how to best balance possible tradeoffs between two values
underlying the charter school movement: accountability, and representation of under-served
communities.
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Conclusion
Scholars cannot examine reform completely without understanding prior history. Neither
can they contemplate reform and all its effects without considering the structure in which
reforms occur. Education reformers too frequently proceed with research and recommendations
while remaining unaware of the history and structure of the system they wish to reform. As a
result, ambitious and well-intended reform efforts are frequently at least unsuccessful and at
most resource-wasteful and even harmful to those they are intended to help. In this paper, I fill
an important niche in education reform research. Here I offer explanations regarding how and
why large, interconnected bureaucracies, once established, tend to protect themselves against
change. I suggest that nothing else is as important in explaining structurally why decades of
increased funding and various reforms implemented by well-intended policymakers have failed
to improve either achievement or equity.
I have provided a summary of the American public school system’s formation. I show
how, from the country’s individual community-led beginnings, myriad centripetal and other
forces joined together to amass a monopolized, centralized, and layered bureaucratic structure I
call the education centropoly.
Using historical, theoretical, and empirical analyses, I provide evidence that the
educational centropoly has done much to segregate the country’s disadvantaged students,
trapping them not only in schools layered under levels of centralized bureaucracy and run by the
centropoly’s growing number of bureaucrats, but also in a uniform, inflexible system that serves
student bodies that are anything but uniform. As a result, the educational centropoly has done
little to help students of disadvantage.
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Chapter 1 argues that public choice theory provides not only an adequate, but perhaps the
most suitable basis for examining the centropoly. Chapter 2 provides a somewhat complete
history of the system’s formation, addressing how the underlying district system is both
monopolized and segregated and how it became centralized at the state level. Chapter 3 shows
how, upon realization that the underlying system did not serve low-income students, the federal
government intervened with its most significant education reform ever – ESEA and its
reauthorizations, including NCLB; yet, these reforms served mainly to grow the centropoly. In
Chapter 3 I show empirically that ESEA is associated with large staff increases while
improvement in achievement is nebulous. My later review of NAEP scores, including Sousa and
Armour’s (2016) synthesized review of ESEA Title I effectiveness studies, indicates
disadvantaged students showed only scattered academic improvement.
If the system cannot improve, what of attempts to leave it? Can America’s student body,
including and especially disadvantaged students, find schools that give them not only an
education, but a foundation in agency for their adult lives?
In Chapters 4-6, I turn to aspects of the charter schools reform movement as one avenue
of exit from the centropoly but one that decidedly takes political support to achieve. Chapter 4
reveals how charter schools were born of both the public school system and the school choice
movement. Importantly, the chapter also discusses various theories of how elected policymakers
decide to make major (as opposed to incremental) changes. Once again, public choice theory
imposes its rational self-interest basis. Taken to its logical extent, and – as evidenced empirically
in Chapter 5 – considering the potential strength of the centropoly in at least the Right-to-Work
states, it is little wonder that charter school laws vary so widely in quality and strength. Chapter
5, alluded to previously, shows a strong and statistically significant inverse association between
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relative state and local traditional public school staff counts and charter school enrollments in
Right-to-Work states. Chapter 6 provides another concerning aspect in the analysis of the
centropoly’s potential effect on exit from its stronghold. We show that the presence of automatic
closure laws – likely a “compromise” to get charter school legislation passed – are significantly
associated with disproportionate likelihood of closure of Black-operated and Black-attended
charter schools.
It is not sufficient to say only that reformers are well-intentioned. I must add that those
employed in the centropoly are not ill-intentioned. These bureaucrats are by-in-large not bad
people; instead, they are normal people. This is a frequent theme of public choice-based work:
when faced with a choice between the “greater good”, as reflected in the public motives of an
organization, and private benefits, as reflected in individuals’ life considerations, public choice
dictates that private motives win the contest. Reformers might be advised to stop trying to
change the centropoly bureaucrats, who are rewarded for choosing based on their private
motives, and instead work to create alternatives to the centropoly. Over time, those parents least
well served by the centropoly will depart for those alternatives; those well-served will remain.
However, my research indicates at least two problems regarding this latter point. First,
the centropoly works diligently to prevent alternatives from being created. In addition to
Chapters 5 and 6 of this paper, which detail a mechanism as well as results of opposition by the
centropoly, one need only read about school choice legislation around the country to gain an
understanding of how centropoly bureaucrats, and those beholden to them, work to prevent such
alternatives. Importantly, the system teaches an ideology of conformity to its values and to
reverence for the system itself.
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Second, preventing alternatives means those ill-equipped – or ill-disposed – to advance in
the one-size-fits-all school system will continue to suffer. For thousands of students – including
those disadvantaged by poverty or disability as well as those who choose to be different for
myriad reasons – the centropoly severely limits their opportunities to flourish.
In researching this paper, I noted several areas in need of additional research. These
include a concerning finding in Chapter 3. In examining the associations between ESEA
reauthorizations and state and local public school staff (FTE) increases, I find that a state’s
population in poverty (logged) is highly statistically significantly associated with an FTE
decrease. In other words, poverty is associated with a decrease in FTE, separate and apart from
the law changes and the population control variable. This finding might simply reflect the fact
that poverty increases and staffing might decrease during a state-level economic downturn.
However, the finding seems to indicate that the poorest students might be served by fewer, not
more, public school staff; hence, further research is necessary to determine the detail behind this
association. In my Chapter 5 examination of the association between relative TPS staff counts
and charter school enrollment, I note that an increase in a state’s Black population is associated
with a decrease in charter school enrollment. Given that this finding is contrary to expectations,
but that in recent decades the Black population proportion in states has been decreasing, this
could simply be an artifact of the relative population decrease. However, it might also represent
evidence supporting a newly developing literature postulating that African American adults
might oppose TPS alternatives for the rational reason that they (the adults) are successful in
seeking and keeping employment in the TPS system. See, e.g., Carroll, Cheng, Maranto, &
Teodoro (In Press).
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I wish to study other aspects of this structural phenomenon as well. In Chapter 3, I
mention concern with the accountability system created by NCLB, but accountability in general
deserves much further study. I propose studying accountability from the perspective of
examining how the centropoly itself prevents effective accountability – perhaps above and
beyond that of a “regular” government service. Several scholars and I have begun to examine
educational accountability by first comparing educational accountability research to general
government accountability research, and I hope to continue that work. Of course, this research
would be but a first step in evaluating whether the centropoly could ever be held accountable,
given that it consists of a layered structure of interconnected bureaucracies. Additionally, there is
much to be done in terms of the involvement of higher education – both in its own right, as well
as its relationship to the centropoly in terms of educator training. One straightforward project
would be to update the findings contained in Greene (2010) which detail the disproportionate
growth in university administrative staff.
In the meantime, students continue to churn through the educational centropoly.
Disadvantaged students, in particular, move through the system with little to show for their time.
Scholars must continue to research the structural impediments to educational success, and they
should do so with urgency.
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Appendix A
Table
Elementary and Secondary Education Act: Initial Authorization, Reauthorizations, Amendments, and Flexibility Waiver
Law/
Agencies/Boards
Year Authorization Brief Summary
Created
1965 P.L. 89-10
Initial Enactment; created Titles I-V; Title 1-A (Basic Grants, focused on
concentrations of low-income students in LEAs) is primary focus. Also
provides federal funding for library materials, "supplemental educational
services", education research, and SEAs (state boards of education [34 CFR §
300.41]).
1965 P.L. 89-313
ESEA-related amendments affecting impact aid districts; created new program
to provide grants to State Education Agencies (SEAs) for education of children
with disabilities ("SEA grants").
1966 P.L. 89-750
First reauthorization; extended Title I-A program for two years (through FY
Bureau for Education
1968), modified Basic Grant program formula which expanded program size
and Training of the
and increased cost; eliminated a grant program scheduled to go into effect FY
Handicapped; National
1967 so its approximately $400 million became available for Basic Grants.
Advisory Committee on
Added Title VI (Education of Handicapped Children).
Handicapped Children
1968 P.L. 90-247
ESEA Amendments of 1967: extended Title I-A program through 1970,
Advisory Committee on
authorized use of advanced appropriations for ESEA programs; changed Basic the Education of
Grant formula (minimally) and re-added a modified Special Incentive Grant
Bilingual Children
formula (not funded until FY 1971). Added Title VII (Bilingual Education).
1970 P.L. 91-230
Second reauthorization: ESEA Amendments of 1969: extended most ESEA
programs through FY 1973; modified Basic Grant program, expanded Special
Incentive Grant program and included provision for Special Grants to Urban
and Rural Schools - to provide additional funding to areas with high
concentrations of disadvantaged children.
1972 P.L. 92-318
Minor amendments (US Congress, Hearings 1972, 161).
176

Year
1974

Law/
Authorization Brief Summary
P.L. 93-380
Made changes to the three Title I-A formulas (Basic Grants, Special Incentive
Grants, and Special Grants), many of which reflected concern that the formulas
favored urban over rural areas. Authorized research on bilingual education by
the National Institutes of Health, provided for several categorical programs.

1977

P.L. 95-112

1978

P.L. 95-561

1981

P.L. 97-35

1983
1984

P.L. 98-211
P.L. 98-511

(Carter) One-year extension of ESEA to study programs before next
comprehensive reauthorization.
Third reauthorization: Extended Basic Grants for five years, made changes to
allocation formulas "generally benefitting urban areas." (CRS Report R44898)
Added a new Concentration Grant program, providing supplemental funds to
areas with especially high concentrations of low-income students. Converted
Special Incentive grant program to federal matching grant program for state
compensatory education expenditures beginning FY 1980. Dropped Special
Grant program.
Fourth reauthorization: (Reagan) Education Consolidation and Improvement
Act of 1981 (ECIA) - Largely unsuccessful attempt to convert ESEA programs
into block grants, resulting in only one block grant which replaced a few small
categorical education programs. ESEA Title I became Chapter I of the ECIA
(Financial Assistance to Meet Special Educational Needs of Disadvantaged
Children). Consolidated remainder of ESEA into ECIA Chapter 2
(Consolidation of Federal Programs for Elementary and Secondary Education).
"[Increased] states' flexibility in controlling allocation of federal funds"
(Collins, 2014, 18).
Clarification and clean-up amendments.
Changes to Bilingual Education Act, focus on English language learners
(ELLs).

Agencies/Boards
Created
National Advisory
Council on Bilingual
Education, National
Center for Education
Statistics (NCES),
Advisory Council on
Education Statistics
"[M]ultiple new offices,
councils, committees,
and commissions"
(Collins, 2014, 18)
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Year
1988

1994

2002

Law/
Authorization Brief Summary
P.L. 100-297
Fifth reauthorization: Generally extended programs through 1991. Repealed
the ECIA, returned provisions back to ESEA, modified various ESEA
programs, added several new programs. Reauthorized Title I-A as Title I,
Chapter I-A. Updated Basic Grant formula, made significant changes to
Concentration Grant formula in favor of rural areas. Authorized creation of
national evaluation standards for Title I programs and required states to
establish student performance standards for Title I students.
P.L. 103-382
Sixth reauthorization: (Clinton) Improving America's Schools Act - changed
existing Basic Grant and Concentration Grant formulas; added two new
formulas - Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants, both
attempting to target Title I-A funds more effectively on concentrated areas of
low-income students. Merged the SEA grant program for students with
disabilities into the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
removed full funding requirements for SEA programs. Tied federal funding to
requirement that state standards be consistent with national (Goals 2000)
standards. (President Clinton pursued Goals 2000 in parallel with this
reauthorization.) Required states to define "Adequate Yearly Progress" (AYP).
States are permitted to determine “cut scores” – the test scores at which
proficiency and other achievement levels are met.
P.L. 107-110
Seventh reauthorization: (G.W. Bush) No Child Left Behind Act significantly changed underlying programs by requiring stepwise achievement
improvement in states and accountability programs: state testing in math and
reading for Grades 3 - 8; required states to meet AYP goals (established by
each state individually, but 100% of students in each state were required to
reach “proficiency” level in math and reading achievement by 2014), increased
teacher education requirements, provided consequences for schools that fail to
meet AYP goals. Maintained and made small changes to Basic Grant,
Concentration Grant, and Targeted Grant formulas.

Agencies/Boards
Created
Upgraded NCES status
(Collins, 2014, 18)

178

Law/
Agencies/Boards
Authorization Brief Summary
Created
Offered by
Flexibility waiver authorization: "In September 2011, the U.S. Department of
USDOE
Education (ED) offered each State educational agency (SEA) the opportunity to
request flexibility on behalf of itself and its local educational agencies (LEAs)
and schools. This voluntary opportunity provided ... flexibility from certain
[NCLB] requirements ..., in exchange for rigorous and comprehensive Statedeveloped plans designed to improve educational outcomes for all students,
close achievement gaps, increase equity, and improve the quality of instruction.
Each SEA with an approved request that will expire at the end of the 2014–
2015 school year may request a three-year renewal of ESEA flexibility,
through the 2017–2018 school year."
2015 P.L. 114-92
Eighth reauthorization: (Obama) Every Student Succeeds Act (Note: NCLB
expired in 2007, but ESEA was not reauthorized until December 10, 2015.).
ESSA revamped NCLB's language to be more permissive as to determining
and measuring student achievement improvements
Sources: CRS Report R44898, Updated July 17, 2017, titled "History of the ESEA Title I-A Formulas", retrieved 2/29/20 from
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44898.html#_Toc488412031 ; Collins, C.A. (2014). READING, WRITING, AND
REGULATIONS:A Survey of the Expanding Federal Role in Elementary and Secondary Education Policy, Mercatus Center
Working Paper No. 14-24, August 2014, p. 18; USDOE, "ESEA Flexibility Renewal" (n.d.). Retrieved 3/2/20 from
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/flex-renewal/index.html ; and “Goals 2000 and ESEA” (n.d.). Clinton Digital
Library. Retrieved 3-17-20 from https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/exhibits/show/education-reform/goals-esea .
Year
2011
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Appendix B
Selected Slides from Presentation to Joint Meeting of Kansas Standing Senate & House
Education Committees – February 2014
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Appendix C
Table.
Using Annual % Change Variables in Place of Regular Proportion Variables
Ann Pct Change Charter Enr
per 100 TPS
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS FTE/100
Total Population (log)
Pct Black Non-Hispanic
Pct Hispanic
Exp per Pupil (Adj. Reg'l Cost Difcs; log)
2.Party: All 3 Dem. (Gov, Sen, Hs)
3.Party: Split, Gov Different
4.Party: Split, Sen/Hs Different
2004.year
2005.year
2006.year
2011.year
2012.year
2013.year
2014.year
2015.year
2016.year
2017.year

Model A:
PP Exp Included;
Priv Enr Excluded
0.906

Model C:
Both PP Exp and
Priv Enr Included
(8.753)

(3.111)
-0.484
(5.922)
-0.132
(0.487)
-0.441
(0.318)
1.288
(2.952)
-1.091
(0.682)
-0.0276
(0.566)
-0.953
(0.712)
-2.858***
(0.963)
-3.042***
(1.174)
-2.585*
(1.346)
-2.483
(1.858)
-2.392
(1.934)
-2.371
(2.045)
-2.256
(2.152)
-2.358
(2.249)
-2.339
(2.380)
-2.275
(2.417)

(10.170)
-3.004
(10.740)
-0.121
(0.847)
-0.503
(0.561)
2.359
(5.462)
-1.092
(1.281)
-0.14
(1.086)
-0.756
(1.342)

Private Enrollment per 100 TPS Students
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of States

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.516
(100.100)
421
0.095
42

-2.91
(1.899)
-2.046
(3.190)
-1.819
(3.500)
-1.822
(3.681)

-1.433
(4.160)
0.251
(0.248)
31.58
(181.300)
226
0.101
42
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